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Worldwide, providing sufficient housing continues to be a main planning concern.  In 
the context of rapid urbanization after World War II, housing demand in primate 
mega-regions has reached an unprecedented level in human history.  In many 
Southeast Asian metropolises, the failure of wide-ranging housing development 
approaches in the past have resulted in the further proliferation of informal settlements 
as shelters for many urban inhabitants.  Metro Manila, the capital region of the 
Philippines, is no exception.  Apart from dilapidated living environments in a 
growing number of informal settlements, the urban housing crisis today has grow more 
serious with the increasing proportion of ‘landless’ and ‘disempowered’ people who 
lack access to formal land markets and decision-making processes.  In response to 
this complication, a renewed housing strategy called ‘enablement’ --one that takes into 
account democratizing the planning process by stressing the value of third party 
interventions to enhance citizen empowerment-- has been taken on board.  Civil 
society is perceived as a critical catalyst in development activities, and the ascendancy 
of NGOs has become evident in both domestic and international arenas.  Nowadays, 
Filipino NGOs occupy an important position in current planning agendas and 
frameworks, strategically locating themselves at the heart of broader socio-political 
networking.   
The improvement of informal settlements is a political act on a 
community-wide scale to defend a space for living. It necessarily requires collective 
actions to heighten the degree of social mobilization within a settlement.  Experiences 
of Metro Manila show that in order to galvanize collective action towards 
improvement, communities should ensure access to external institutions’ resources and 
 vi
assistance.  The establishment of socio-political networks involving external 
institutions would help landless, poor communities gain a greater voice in the politics 
of planning.  In this regard, democratization driven by enablement principles has 
indeed opened up a new horizon for appraising external interventions and changing 
conventional structures of systematic disempowerment surrounding marginalized 
groups. 
Nonetheless, the Metro Manila case also discloses that the democratization of 
the planning process and diversification of actors involved have brought about 
fragmentation and conflict, particularly in the implementation of cross-boundary 
projects.  Enhancement of decentralization and devolution policies in the enablement 
strategy has ironically intensified inter- and intra-city contentions which (1) hamper 
the creation of effective alignments among the actors; and (2) destabilize established 
socio-political networks.  As a means to resolve these predicaments, it is 
recommended that the mechanism of urban governance should be reconsidered, and 
the viability of organizing a unified planning body on a regional scale explored.  Even 
as we celebrate the rise of civil society and local autonomy, pragmatic centralized 
schemes should exist to bind concerned actors together in efforts to deal with 
metro-wide problems such as housing.  In sum, the case study of Metro Manila 
highlights that arranging favorable legislative goals and institutional settings is not 
sufficient.  What is needed is the facilitation of effective executing mechanisms 
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1.1 General Background and Objective of Research 
 
Worldwide, providing sufficient housing has been a main concern of planning, and 
numerous endeavors have been made to satisfy the growing needs in this area.   
Owing to massive internal migrations from peripheries to centers and rapid 
urbanization after World War II, housing demand in urban areas has reached an 
unprecedented level in human history.  In particular, urbanization trends have been 
more intensive in developing countries than in developed countries (Dimitriou, 1990).  
In Asia, a sharp rise in foreign investments has led to major industrial structural 
changes in many countries.  The rapid growth of export-oriented industrialization in 
Asia has in turn reinforced concentration in primate cities.  As summarized by Askew 
& Logan (1994, p.6): “the spatial transformations of urban settlements … have been 
… primarily [an expression of] international economic transformations in regional 
perspective.”   
At the national level, economic and industrial restructuring has had a 
considerable impact on the spatial distribution of housing demand in many cities 
(Richardson, 1987).  At the same time, while it is commonsensical to expect housing 
to be supplied in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quality and quantity 
in tandem with the changing economic landscape, housing policy in many developing 
nations in Asia have simply not kept pace.  Housing is often regarded as a social cost 
instead of a productive investment, and thus, housing policy has seldom been 
incorporated into national goals.  During the 1950s and 1960s, the objectives of 
national plans were focused on establishing facilities for economic development and 
on raising the productivity of prioritized industrial sectors.  Social investments to 
improve living environments --to nurture human capital that is supportive of 
industrialization and economic growth-- were generally regarded to be outside the 
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scope of these plans.  Given government neglect, slums and squatter settlements 
started to emerge as shelters for many urban inhabitants.  The prevailing attitude 
among governments perceived the expansion of substandard settlements as a 
transitionary phenomenon that would gradually fade away with economic development 
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989).  In reality, however, slums and squatter settlements 
have thrived and swelled as economic development --often inegalitarian in effects-- 
pushed the poor out of housing and land markets.  Although the urban housing crisis 
in developing countries has been brought about even before the advancement of 
globalization, a rapid increase of dilapidated housing is inextricably linked to global 
and national economic forces, coupled with the lack of appropriate government 
policies to deal with housing the people under conditions of rapid global change.   
 The urban landscape in cities of developing countries in Asia displays both 
elements of ‘modernity’ and ‘backwardness.’  This reminds us of what Castells (1991, 
p.206) theorizes as ‘the dual city,’ the product not only of an unequal “urban-social 
structure resulting from juxtaposition of, the yuppies and the homeless,” but also the 
“simultaneous and articulated processes of growth and decline.”  Castells’ assertion 
has become more convincing in consideration of the fact that many substandard 
settlements in Asia are physically segregated but not geographically isolated.  
Substandard settlements are indeed an enclave where poor households are likely to 
cluster; yet, their locations are not within certain confined areas like ghettos but often 
adjacent to modern, sophisticated buildings.  Thus, the proliferation of substandard 
settlements should not be interpreted as a detachment from growth.  Rather it is a 
representation of what is an attachment to growth, signs of decline which occur in 
parallel and in proximity.  
 Living and housing conditions in such settlements are not necessarily safe and 
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comfortable by any account.  Nevertheless, the conditions are not as destitute as the 
ones in earlier (colonial) periods, from a material viewpoint.  In many cases, 
construction materials have been replaced by more durable ones and settlers have 
managed to ensure access to basic utilities such as electricity and water.  However, 
the lack of land tenure and security has meant that there is a threshold to the 
improvements that can be voluntary made.  The noteworthy point is that the urban 
housing crisis in Asia today has been exacerbated and further complicated by the 
increasing proportion of inhabitants who are not so much impoverished in terms of 
living conditions but whose status are ‘informal’ in a de jure sense.  In this light, the 
problem lies in not absolute material terms.  Rather, it is the growth of the 
disempowered population relative to the powered few, and the ever-widening social 
inequalities between landowners and the landless mass that lies at the heart of the 
housing crisis.   
This thesis is not an ethnographic study investigating life styles, profiles, and 
living conditions of the poor; it is a detailed inquiry into the legislative and 
institutional settings, and the socio-political correlations and networks among a range 
of actors involved in housing development for informal settlers.  The underlying 
objective of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of present planning frameworks, 
policy, legislative, and institutional settings, which influence the transformation of 
grass-roots organizations into active subjects of development.   
 At the outset, some housing terminology should be clarified.  As Berner 
(2000, p.556) states, “although ‘squatter’ is a legal concept, ‘slum’ refers to the 
physical characteristics of the place of residence, and ‘urban poor’ to the income of 
residents, much of the literature does not discriminate between the three terms but use 
them interchangeably.”  Two important observations follow: (1) slum dwellers and 
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squatters are not mutually inclusive; and (2) not all inhabitants living in either slum or 
squatter settlements are classified as poor.  Hence, as Porio et al. (2004) suggest, 
‘housing poor’ should be differentiated from ‘income poor.’ 
First, slum dwellers represent subjects who live in physically dilapidated areas 
while squatters indicate subjects who exercise squatting, the act of invading land 
without landowners’ permissions, thereby possessing no tenure.  In general, squatting 
is illegal according to legislations.  However, some of the de jure squatters are not 
squatters in a de facto sense.  In fact many people in substandard settlements have 
deep root in the urban space concerned and enjoy social acceptance, sometimes 
through a patron-client relation, with some even paying a nominal fee for using land.  
If there are some forms of consensus with landowners, patron, and/or society, the 
subject may not be generalized as squatters in spite of their non-tenure status.1  From 
this de facto perspective, it is problematic to employ the term ‘squatters’ to describe all 
non-tenure households without reservations.   
Second, it is important to note the socio-economic stratification and 
disparities among the inhabitants of substandard settlements.  Although the incidence 
of being poor --typically defined by the use of an absolute measure such as the poverty 
line-- tends to be much higher in such settlements, the inhabitants are not a 
homogenized mass.  Their socio-economic profiles are not only diverse but dynamic.  
‘The poor,’ imagined as groups of households with low and unstable incomes, 
unskilled and casual employment in the informal sector, is a simplified conception.  
Findings of this study’s fieldwork show that the levels of the household economy vary: 
there is a wide range of the average monthly income per household from PHP 
                                                  
1 Unlike squatter settlements in many Latin American cities that suddenly emerge by 
large-scale overnight invasions, squatter settlements in Asian cities gather shape incrementally.  
This characteristic in turn underpins the gradual establishment of social acceptance in many 
Asian squatter settlements. 
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[Philippine Peso] 4,000 with a breadwinner working as a street vendor to PHP 20,000 
where the breadwinner is hired by a private company.  Interesting to note, such 
disparities within a settlement are explicitly exemplified in both tangible and 
intangible ways.  Fieldwork observation substantiates that better-off households 
occupy bigger and better space and often take up important positions in a community’s 
association.  Thus, housing is often a manifestation of power structures within the 
settlement.  Notwithstanding such differences, all inhabitants share one common 
dilemma which is the inability to obtain access to secured tenure.   
 For consistency in terminology, this study employs the following two terms in 
the empirical analysis.2  First, ‘the underentitled’ is used instead of ‘squatters’ to refer 
to individuals or households, regardless of socio-economic status, which have been 
structurally excluded from land and tenure acquisition/distribution mechanisms in the 
official market and planning process.  Lacking tenure security, these have not been 
entitled to exist in a de jure sense even though their existence has been socially 
accepted in a de facto sense.  Second, ‘the marginalized’ is used instead of ‘the poor’ 
to refer to economically, politically, and socially vulnerable households locating at the 
margins of society, and which are often left out in the mechanism of urban governance 
and planning.  In reality, most of the marginalized are also the underentitled in the 
context of the urban housing crisis.  Hence the marginalized is used most generally 
throughout this study.  Another term which needs clarification is ‘informal 
settlements.’  The adjective ‘informal’ seems somewhat ambiguous in that it suggests 
an oversimplified ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ dichotomy where formal is largely 
understood as a synonym for official or legitimate while anything falling outside the 
formal is classified as informal.  In spite of such equivocality, the term ‘informal 
                                                  
2 As for some literature review parts, the terms used by respective authors are placed without 
modification.  Therefore, the terminological definition made hereby might not be reflected.  
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settlements’ is preferable to ‘squatter settlements’ as the latter suggests illegality in a 
de jure sense.  Informal settlement is a broader conception which allows for that fact 
that many settlements may not be illegal in a de facto sense even though they have not 
been legitimized.  Considering that informality is not necessarily equal to illegality 
and/or criminality, the use of informal settlements is more suitable. 
 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
 
Starting with this introductory chapter 1, six chapters from 2 to 7 make up the main 
body of the thesis.  The second chapter provides a review of the history of housing 
planning for the underentitled and marginalized in developing countries during the 
postwar era.  In this context, I seek to explore (1) trajectories of approaches to 
housing as a developmental tool, giving emphasis to both theoretical principles and 
practical schemes; and (2) the role of different actors --the public, the private, and the 
non-government sectors-- in housing development.  The chapter gives particular 
weight to prominent ideological shifts under the climate of neoliberalism, notably the 
emergence of ‘enablement’ discourses.  The latter is accompanied by the move away 
from the traditional binary social model comprising the public and the private sectors, 
to the adoption of a three-cell model in which civil society exists between the public 
and the private sector as an autonomous unit.  The chapter also discusses the degree 
to which such a shift has given impetus to (1) reconstructing the nature of government 
interventions; and (2) enlarging the influence of third parties which assume some of 
the responsibilities abdicated by governments.   
The third chapter examines post-war housing development in Metro Manila, 
the Philippines, the geographical context for the empirical part of this study.  This 
chapter focuses on two aspects affecting overall housing development in the post-war 
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periods: (1) economic forces in the course of urbanization and globalization processes; 
and (2) state accountability for the formulation of legislative and institutional settings.  
Reasons behind the destruction of land-use planning and its associated housing 
development are elaborated to identify distinctive characteristics of urbanization, urban 
transition and land-use development in Metro Manila.  This chapter will move on to 
an investigation of state responses and actions, specifically looking at two periods 
under different political regimes: the martial law regime of the Marcos era and the 
democratic regime under Aquino and Ramos.  Detailed analysis of the two periods 
would elucidate major ideological shifts in the legislative and institutional settings 
associated with housing development for the marginalized.   
The fourth chapter explains the research design of this study, giving an 
account of (1) the triangulation methods adopted for this study, including qualitative 
semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey, (2) the reasons behind the 
choice of methods, and (3) the procedure used in carrying out the methods in the field.  
The chapter also discusses issues pertaining to the positionality of the researcher and 
the obstacles and challenges confronting the researcher in the course of fieldwork.   
The fifth chapter deals with debates relating to the ‘enablement’ and 
‘empowerment’ paradigms in the Philippines context.  Available evidence indicates 
that policies predicated on neoliberal enabling principles have functioned as a 
backbone apparatus of empowerment movement. In this sense, the dynamics of 
empowerment is not detached from but subsumed as a democratic component of 
existing enablement frameworks.  For the purpose of ascertaining the ideal and reality 
of empowerment, this chapter contains macro- and micro-scale analyses.  The first 
half of this chapter focuses on the efficacy of enablement legislative and institutional 
settings to empower the marginalized through legitimizing and encouraging grass-root 
 8
initiatives.  The second half draws on a community survey conducted in informal 
settlements to examine the degrees, process, and nature of empowerment in the context 
of housing development, and the necessary conditions for empowerment activities.  
An underlying theme common to both analyses represents a growing share of the third 
party involvement within the official planning agenda and frameworks. 
The sixth chapter investigates socio-political networking among concerned 
parties in the planning and implementation process.  The intensity and/or breadth of 
networks with external institutions are a key factor in determining the probability of a 
community becoming a beneficiary of housing programs.  Based on the 
understanding that non-governmental organizations [NGOs] hold the key in the 
advancement of enabling frameworks and its embedded empowerment, this chapter 
first embarks on a structural analysis of NGOs to illustrate the evolution of their 
networks of which communities in informal settlements have become a part.  The 
analysis aims to explore (1) the formulation of power relations within ‘civil society’ in 
relation to flows of resources and (2) the intricacy of political correlations among local 
and international actors involved.  Details of the analysis are drawn upon to provide a 
general map of the alliances and conflicts among the actors in the Philippines context.  
In addition, this chapter looks into a paradigm shift in international funding agencies 
that have changed their development models to increase relevance to the 
democratization of society.  The hierarchization of civil society and the adoption of 
participatory project models by large multilateral funding agencies undermine the use 
of the conventional ‘bottom-up and top-down’ distinctions in approaches to housing 
development. 
The seventh chapter serves as a synthesis to describe in some detail grounded 
political tensions.  It provides a concrete account of the micro-politics as played out 
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in an actual plan by reviewing an ongoing urban-renewal project, the Pasig River 
Rehabilitation Program [PRRP].  Despite the call for a radical solution, the feasibility 
and sustainability of a large-scale resettlement project like the PRRP has been 
increasingly doubted due to various tensions among communities, external institutions, 
governments, and public agencies which developed during the implementation of the 
project.  An in-depth case study allows for an assessment of the applicability and 
effect of enablement and empowerment approaches in real world practices, leading us 
to explore in concrete terms the possibility of negotiation and mediation in the 
planning process.  This chapter illustrates that how decentralization and devolution 
efforts to enhance the autonomy of local governments may ironically bring about 
negative consequences for the implementation and management of a cross-boundary 
housing project.  
Based on problems identified in the preceding chapters, the concluding 
chapter serves as a summary of thesis by focusing on the issue of urban governance.  
Evidence shows that a lack of coordinating body on a regional scale has disordered 
consistency and equality in housing programs as it increases fragmentation and 
redundancy among existing institutions/agencies.  Reconsidering urban governance 
structures in the context of local conditions is an important key towards more efficient 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
Since the end of World War II, housing development has gained significance within 
policy arenas in the public domain.  This is partly a reflection of the shift from 
warfare to welfare regimes emphasizing social and human development.  However, it 
should be remembered that initial motivations driving housing development were 
derived from postwar reconstruction efforts to restore devastated cities.  While such 
tendencies may be identified worldwide, the proportion of low-income households 
clustering in substandard settlements has kept increasing and remains high in 
developing countries.  Inasmuch as such settlements have existed for years, problems 
pertaining to the housing of the urban poor trace lines of continuity with the past; but 
have become more prominent on the policy agenda amid massive modernization, 
urbanization, and industrialization in the postwar period.  As the degree of the 
housing crisis became more visible, wide-ranging approaches to housing have evolved, 
resulting in a diversification of not only the logics behind the approaches but also the 
actors involved in the planning process.   
Historically, housing in developing countries has been provided through 
various channels.  According to Drakakis-Smith (1981), modes of housing provision 
can be categorized generally into a conventional/formal or an unconventional/informal.  
The conventional/formal mode indicates the provision through official channels of 
planning such as public housing schemes and private sector developments.  On the 
other hand, the unconventional/informal mode refers to housing produced outside 
formal planning frameworks: informal settlements, illegal subdivision, and low income 
rental housing (see Figure2.1) (Keivani & Werna, 2001a & 2001b).  As 
Drakakis-Smith (1981) admits, it cannot be denied that this diagram is too static and 
straightforward to encompass the complexity in real world practices and that many 
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derivative sub-categories within each mode need to be elaborated.  More importantly, 
the dichotomy between the two modes is a false one as they are not completely 
separated and there is no clear-cut line distinguishing actors of each mode.  The 
diagram is indeed indicative of showing a generalized distinction of the channels; 
however, with the lapse of time in post-war development, empirical experiences have 
revealed that relations between conventional/formal and unconventional/informal have 
to be complementary.  In other wards, it is critical to reconsider the dichotomy by 
scrutinizing a misconception and failure of the model which prioritizes 
conventional/formal provisions and disregard unconventional/informal contributions.  
In order to exemplify the dynamics of interactions between the two modes in the actual 
planning/implementation process, this chapter reviews the trajectory of housing 
development, focusing primarily on the Southeast Asian context.  
 
Figure 2.1  A Conceptual Model of Housing Provision in Developing Countries 
Ho us ing Pro vis io n 
Convent io nal U nconvent iona l 
Pu b lic  Co o p erativ e  Pr iv ate  Sq u atters In f.  
Su b d iv is io n 
Ren tal 
Source: Keivani & Werna (2001b, p.193)3 
 
2.2 Cut and Thrust between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Housing Approaches: 
from the 1950s to the mid-1980s 
 
During the early industrialization phase of national development between the1950s and 
1960s, few governments in developing countries were concerned with housing policies 
                                                  
3 The diagram is originally from Drakakis-Smith, Housing and the Urban Development Process 
published in 1981.  
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despite rapid urban growth in primate cities.  Such a climate of neglect was endorsed 
by the assumption that the housing sector was unproductive (Choguill, 1995).   In a 
few countries, however, alongside slum clearance, land use conversion, and urban 
renewal, large-scale public housing projects were carried out through the adoption of 
mass construction in a quest of utilitarian principles proclaiming ‘equal benefits for the 
greatest number.’  In consequence, capital-intensive public housing projects providing 
package units for large populations cost-effectively received general recognition as the 
main thrust of housing development.  Modern technologies, imported materials, and 
standardized designs were the essential components of those public housing projects.  
Coupled with demolition and redevelopment ventures measured primarily using 
quantitative targets, such a large-scale housing approach was appropriated by a number 
of governmental bodies as a way to achieve efficient distribution of resources. 
Large-scale public housing development has had some degree of success in 
Hong Kong and Singapore.  The basic doctrine of public housing development in 
these two countries was the verticalization of space to fully utilize limited land.  
High-rise, high-density housing complexes are the manifestation of success.  Several 
distinctive characteristics make Hong Kong and Singapore different from other Asian 
nations: (1) rapid economic growth and controlled in-migration, (2) slow growth in the 
economically active population and sharp income increase, and (3) a large portion of 
land owned by the state when housing programs began (for details, see Hardoy & 
Sattherwaite, 1989).  Of the three, the most salient attribute is the proportion of 
government-owned land at the outset of housing development.  For instance, in 
Singapore, around 55% of the island’s land was owned by the government and its 
related agencies like the Housing Development Board [HDB], the Jurong Town 
Corporation, and the Port of Singapore Authority (Casanova et al., 1979).   
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An additional characteristic found largely in Hong Kong and Singapore is 
well-structured coherent institutional, administrative settings aligned to present 
housing options in the wake of slum and squatter settlement clearances.  In Singapore, 
the HDB was created in 1960 before the independence of the nation from Malaysia in 
1965, administering overall housing development throughout the island based on 
five-year building programs.  With the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, 
the HDB bore the primary responsibility of acquiring land for public housing projects 
and initiating associated urban renewal programs.  In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority was founded in 1954 as an autonomous official agency overseeing 
housing development.  A vast amount of governmental subsidies went to the 
Authority to acquire land.  In 1961, the Hong Kong government started the low-cost 
housing program, which specifically targeted low-income households with less than 
Hong Kong Dollar [HKD] 500 a month (Dwyer, 1975).  Partly due to a series of 
institutional restructuring for efficiency, the budget for housing development in Hong 
Kong accounted for 17.3% of all governmental expenses between 1974 and 1975; and 
20.8% in the following fiscal year (Yeh & Laquian, 1979).   
Affordability facilitated by accessible financing mechanisms was the key of 
the success in Hong Kong and Singapore.  In Hong Kong for example, the range of 
rents was HKD 18 to 34 in 1972, depending on types of units.  Given that the average 
monthly income of spontaneous settlers per family was HKD 496 at that time (Dwyer, 
1975), living in public housing was an affordable choice among the majority of the 
urban poor.  Unlike the situation of Hong Kong where many people just rent units, 
the Singapore government raised the percentage of public homeownership through 
fostering purchase rather than rental.  Strikingly high ownership rates in Singapore 
attribute to the availability of financial assistance: (1) the HDB public finance sector 
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was created to enable potential homebuyers to utilize subsidized mortgage rates and 
(2) homebuyers are also allowed to use the Central Provident Fund [CPF]4 to buy a 
unit.  In sum, the Hong Kong and Singapore cases point to three factors behind 
success.  These are (1) implementation of massive housing projects at an early phase 
of development, (2) systematic arrangement of institutional and administrative settings 
backed by strong political will and stringent regulations, and (3) the availability of 
financing mechanisms which render the poor eligible to apply for public housing.  
Critical to note, the fundamental motivation of public housing projects stemmed not 
from promoting individual welfare but from pursuing optimum land use, law, and order.  
As Dwyer (1975, p.185) observes in reference to Hong Kong, “the major part of the 
public housing programme, resettlement housing, has not been based on primarily the 
need to assist low income families to obtain decent housing. It has been rather a means 
of controlling spontaneous settlement, devised in order to free land needed for 
permanent development and to reduce the risk of fires in squatter camps.” 
In most of the other developing countries, however, government-led housing 
provision revealed many shortcomings in achieving both qualitative and quantitative 
targets.  Large-scale, capital intensive redevelopment and housing schemes in these 
countries has been subjected to two main criticisms.  The first criticism refers to the 
failure to accommodate the target population because neither purchase nor rental of 
public housing units was within the budgetary range of low-income households.  As a 
result, “the intended beneficiaries, the urban slum dwellers, were not benefiting” 
(Mukhija, 2001, p.214).  The second criticism relates to the issue of need gaps 
between providers and receivers, deriving primarily from the import of inadequate 
housing development models from the West.  Because many professionals and 
                                                  
4 “The CPF is the Singaporean’s social security system, providing pension and medical care as 
well as other schemes. It is Mandatory for the employee and his employer to contribute monthly a 
certain fraction of the employee’s monthly salary to the fund” (Neo, Lee & Ong, 2003, p.2646-7).  
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experts of public housing projects were educated in Europe and the U.S., their values 
are based not on indigenous thoughts but on predominant wisdoms formed by social 
trends in the West (Payne, 1977: Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989: Gilbert & Gugler, 
1992: Okpala, 1999).  “The hold of modernity as an image for the elites and 
developers of postwar cities was such that considerations of local identity or 
regionalism were swept aside” (Askew & Logan, 1994, p.7).  The adoption of high 
architectural standards and imported materials from the West also raises questions of 
management and maintenance abilities.  In many instances, architectural design, size 
and location of units, as well as the technology employed for the packaged units were 
unsuitable from the poor’s perspectives (Keivani & Werna, 2001a).  Besides, the 
limited financial and administrative capacities of governments are a negative factor 
hindering achievement of both qualitative and quantitative targets.  Insomuch as the 
proportion of housing built by the public sector remains negligible5, demolition 
exacerbates the housing crisis in a city and brings about a sharp decline in the housing 
stock for low-income households, causing overcrowding in other substandard 
settlements (Rondinelli, 1990).  Given the array of constraints like finance, land 
availability, institutional and administrative settings, such a capital-intensive approach 
may not be a workable solution in many developing countries.  In effect, inadequate 
and insufficient housing provisions by governments have led to public neglect of the 
centrally administered projects. 
The problems and failure of public housing projects in Southeast Asia may be 
illustrated with reference to some countries.  In Malaysia, low-cost housing programs 
were adopted under the new economic plans [NEPs] between 1971 and 1990 with the 
aim of satisfying the housing needs of the families whose monthly income was less 
                                                  
5 Statistics shows that public sector involvement in housing production in Singapore was 79% 
compared to 29.5% in Manila; 10.5% in Bangkok; and 1.8% in Jakarta in the early 1990s (Angel & 
Mayo, 1995).   
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than Malaysia Ringgit [MYR] 750; nonetheless, the number of units constructed was 
far below what was originally planned while special low-cost projects were given a 
lower priority compared to other development activities.6  Thailand’s attempts also 
followed the same destiny as Malaysia.  Along with slum clearances and urban 
renewal projects, mass public housing projects became a principal strategy.  In 1972, 
the National Housing Authority [NHA (of Thailand)] was founded under the World 
Bank's guidance, embarking on low-cost housing projects largely on the urban fringe 
of Bangkok.  Nevertheless, housing provided by the NHA was similarly less 
satisfactory than actual demand.7  Problems with quantity, location and affordability 
were three major drawbacks impeding further development of low-cost housing.  In 
1989, only 2.7% of the units for sale in Bangkok was less than the price level of 
‘low-cost units’ under 200,000 baht (Crane, Daniere & Harwood, 1997); units for 
low-income households built between 1974 and 1984 were located on the urban fringe, 
more than 20 kilometers from the center (Dowall, 1992); households must earn Thai 
Baht [THB] 6,500 baht monthly to purchase such low-cost units (Foo, 1992), yet the 
average income of slum dwellers was THB 3,700 and that of informal settlers was 
THB 2,000 or less (Bhakdi, 1987).  As a result, the occupancy rate of the units on the 
outskirts was just 43% (Dowall, 1992).  These case studies show that the main 
obstacles in realizing successful low-cost housing projects lie with difficulties in 
securing budgets for low-cost housing development, acquiring land in the city center, 
and providing financial support for the poor.  It is also important to note that there is a 
                                                  
6 Percentages allocated to housing development out of the state’s total budget were 2.4% in the 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), 6.1% in the Third Malaysia Plan (1975-1980), and 3.7% in the 
Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985).  The numbers of units constructed respectively were 13,244, 
26,250, 71,310, representing around 40% of the numbers planned (Yahaya, 1989).  
 
7 Between 1976 and 1978, the number of dwelling units built by the NHA of Thailand was 37,031 
(Bhakdi, 1987); however it gradually slowed down.  One survey conducted between 1984 and 
1988 shows that the number of dwelling units built by private developers on the urban fringe was 
116,672; on the contrary, the number of public housing units served by the NHA of Thailand was 
estimated around 10,000 (Dowall, 1992). 
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substantial time lag --almost two decades-- in the start of public housing projects in 
many developing nations in Southeast Asia compared to Singapore and Hong Kong.  
What this suggests is that the success of large-scale public housing development partly 
depends on early implementation before cities begin developing in a rampant, 
disordered manner.  
In the search for an alternative approach, housing policies from the late 1960s 
were redirected towards non-conventional modes requiring less governmental 
intervention.  A series of liberal movements in the 1960s gave rise to greater demand 
for personal and popular control over key political and social dimensions (Davies, 
1992).  These movements yielded a change of perceptions towards the poor’s efforts 
in housing development and nurtured the concept of ‘self-help.’  The idea of a 
self-help housing approach originated with scholars like Charles Abrams, William 
Mangin, and John Turner.  One of the biggest myths which they challenged is Oscar 
Lewis’s concept of a ‘culture of poverty’: the poor are poor by nature and poverty is 
their own fault (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992).  Advocates of self-help claim that informal 
settlements should be regarded not as a problem but as a solution to the urban housing 
crisis because “such settlements were not only well adapted to the needs and 
circumstances of their residents, but were also typically improved over time” (Harris, 
2003, p.257).  Incremental improvement activities, which Turner (1976) names 
‘progressive development,’ would naturally occur through residents’ voluntary efforts.  
Hence the self-help approach views people as having the potential to construct housing 
for themselves.  
Turner’s ideas of self-help was welcomed by international agencies, and soon 
gained prominence on contemporary policy and planning agendas.  In the early 1970s, 
the World Bank espoused Turner’s ideas in favor of advancing the policy of tenure 
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legalization (Mukhija, 2001).  Under the World Bank’s instruction, the concept of 
aided self-help housing was embraced with enthusiasm by governments and took the 
form of sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects.  Sites-and-services schemes 
combine the efforts of public housing agencies and the people.  The public sector 
provides serviced land, subsidized construction materials, and low-interest credit 
services while the people build units on the land.  On the other hand, slum upgrading 
projects aim at in situ improvement to legalize tenure and facilitate the construction of 
basic infrastructure.  In general, slum dwellers and informal settlers favor on-site 
upgrading, because it preserves existing economic and social systems; it also make 
housing stocks available to low-income households (Choguill, 1995).  According to 
Pugh (1997b), four observations can be made in the context of the increasing 
importance of self-help in policy and planning debates: (1) the scheme is more suitable 
for housing conditions in developing countries where units built through self-help 
account for more than half of the total housing stocks; (2) providing land and basic 
infrastructure and letting residents build units are less costly than constructing public 
housing; (3) the approach has the potential of enhancing community development; and 
(4) it can contribute to the creation of property rights and assets.  In effect, self-help 
related schemes thrived in the 1970s as the dominant thrust of housing development 
for the marginalized and continued until the mid-1980s.  However, important to 
mention, the self-help housing approach promoted by the World Bank did not exactly 
follow the Turner’s original conception given the Bank’s emphasis on affordability, 
cost recovery, and replicability (Jones & Ward, 1994).  
Notwithstanding such justifications of the World Bank’s self-help approach, 
real world applications did not sustain the goals of affordability, cost recovery, and 
replicability.  The on-site upgrading method offers a good example of the lack of 
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affordability.  Benefits brought by the projects did slip off from the hands of the 
marginalized, falling instead into the hands of landowners who benefit from the rapid 
increase in house and land value after the improvement by the refurbishment of 
infrastructure (Keivani & Werna, 2001a).  As a result, the financially disadvantaged 
people were doomed to be squeezed out from upgraded sites.  Moreover, actualizing 
self-help housing programs inevitably entails the commitment that participants must 
devote plenty of their time and labor.  The increasing costs for participating in a 
program often result in low cost recovery and the elimination of the poorest 
households from the program (Rondinelli, 1990).  There are also problems of 
maintenance techniques and costs.  The story of the Kampung Improvement Program 
[KIP] in Indonesia demonstrates all these complications.  The KIP, starting in 1969, 
had been generally conceived as a successful program in terms of upgrading both 
physical and social services with relatively low costs.  In fact 3.3 million residents 
enjoyed the benefits brought by the KIP (Werlin, 1999).  The state provided roads, 
lanes, drainage, solid waste management, communal water and toilet facilities, health 
and education centers while leaving construction of dwelling units to individual 
households (UNESCAP, 1993).  Nonetheless, problems did lie in the low ability and 
weak commitment of residents to fix and maintain the services provided (Hardoy & 
Satterthwaite, 1989).  In consequence, the quality of services and facilities continued 
deteriorating.  Besides, the KIP brought adverse effects of expelling the poor from 
improved sites due to increased land prices and higher rents (Karamoy & Dias, 1986).  
Despite some of its considerable achievements, the KIP projects could be perceived as 
just another form of gentrification, gradually receiving more negative evaluation. 
Another shortcoming concerns the issue of replicability.  The level to which 
the self-help approach can be exercised is limited.  At large, the approach is ridden 
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with two replicability problems: scale economies and land issues.  First, most of the 
self-help housing projects are small-scale developments, and the total output fall far 
below expected goals.  Furthermore, self-help housing provision, particularly on-site 
upgrading, is not a solution to accommodate low-income households flowing in large 
numbers from hinterlands into cities.  Second, this approach is not an effective way to 
adjust urban land markets which dominantly cater to better-off people (Hall, 1987; 
Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989).  As Main & Williams (1994, p.167) note, “the 
process of land acquisition is a low and expensive process and to avoid delays 
governments will tend to opt for less expensive low-value sites on the periphery which 
are easier to obtain.”  
Effective self-help housing policies should be accompanied with sufficient 
political wherewithal to persuade governments, experts, land property owners, 
construction and building materials firms, politicians, and administrators (van der 
Linden, 1986).  Although the marginalized have the potential and willingness to 
improve their living environment, the economic and political structures of society 
often prevent them from doing so (Jellinek, 1991).  Thus, governments must 
recognize the importance of creating adequate institutional and legislative 
arrangements to assist a community-based approach.  As Hall (1987) states, putting 
Turner’s philosophy of self-help housing in practice necessitates considerable changes 
at administrative levels.  Whether or not self-help housing attempts become fruitful 
depends on the capacity of the public sectors to remove obstacles to people-driven 
activities.  In this sense, the self-help housing approach is not merely ‘bottom-up,’ 
mainly counting on residents’ spontaneous housing efforts; rather it involves 
substantial ‘top-down’ government initiatives to realize voluntary endeavors by placing 
them onto existing legal/formal planning frameworks. 
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2.3 Emergence of ‘Enablement’ under the Influence of Neoliberalism 
 
Integration of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches has been broached since the 
1980s onwards.  At the first brush, the World Bank abandoned its project-by-project 
orientation represented by self-help and sites-and-services schemes, and proposed a 
new strategy, which sets its sight on achieving institutional reforms by incorporating 
housing policy into a wider, holistic urban economic and social development agenda 
(Pugh, 1997b & 2000).  The conception driving the new direction is ‘enablement.’  
Enablement might be often translated as a change in the nature of government 
interventions from direct to indirect involvement, leaving the practical business of 
housing provision to non-public sectors such as markets, NGOs, community-based 
organizations [CBOs], and households.  Responsibilities that governments would 
assume in this light are formulating policies and engaging in institutional reforms.  
Against the backdrop of growing prominence of neoliberal privatization and 
deregulation, modifying regulations and activating markets in the housing sector have 
been specified as core objectives of ‘enablement.’  The new enabling strategy was 
also adopted by the United Nations Centre of Human Settlements [UNCHS (Habitat)]: 
the UNCHS later developed the “Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000” [GSS] 
accepted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988.  The GSS was basically 
founded upon the overturning of a 1950s myth that housing was economically 
unproductive.  The written intent of the GSS was substantiated in a concrete, practical 
form by the World Bank’s new paradigm advocating the idea of whole housing sector 
development: a seven-point program of 1993 (Pugh, 1997b).8  The slogan of 
enablement has diffused throughout developing countries and has steadily gained 
                                                  
8 The World Bank lists several points for conceptualizing the paradigm: the development of 
housing finance systems, property rights, and infrastructure; the targeting of subsidies; the 
introduction of regulatory audits; improved organization and competition in the building industry; 
and appropriate institutionary-loaded reform (Pugh, 2001).  
 22
popularity owing to the strong backing of such influential international agencies.   
A number of backlashes against the enablement doctrine have been triggered 
by some scholars who have condemned the market enabling strategy in that it is 
irrelevant to the context of most developing countries, underestimating the significance 
of informal private markets.  In particular, Ward & Jones (1997, p.172) have taken the 
stance of criticizing the World Bank’s new enablement principles as “becoming 
increasingly dominated by a monetarist liberal philosophy, which aimed to reduce 
subsidies and the direct production of housing to a minimum.”  A critical point 
discussed here is whether the term ‘markets’ employed in the strategy encompasses 
informal mechanisms.  It should be noted that “the urbanization pattern in Asia is 
marked by a paradoxical trend: growth of mega-size cities with a simultaneous 
presence of the huge informal sector” (Amin, 2000, p.49).  In developing countries, 
informal sector employment accounts for 37% of the total employment (UNCHS, 
2001).  It is important to acknowledge that cities in developing countries are growing 
owing to the increasing functions of informal mechanisms while formal mechanisms 
have limited penetration.   
 There are also other interpretations of enablement.  Some have argued that 
while the World Bank’s housing policies by the early 1980s did intrinsically reveal 
some characteristics of market-oriented neo-liberalism, the new principles emerging 
after 1986 contain a broader, comprehensive notion of enablement accompanying the 
intent of promoting a reconfiguration of public-private roles in the most efficient way 
(Keivani & Werna, 2001b).  Pugh (1997b, p.157, p.97) claims that, “the concept of an 
‘enablement’ shelter strategy does not mean any diminution of government 
responsibility for the housing production and distribution process,” and instead 
“enablement was being regarded as facilitative, with connection to the generalities of 
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state-market-nongovernmental organization-household relationship.”  The emphasis 
is on the potential of enablement strategies to establish new collaboration structures 
transcending the dichotomy like formal/informal or conventional/unconventional.  
The most important component is the reconfiguration of the public sector’s roles 
within the overarching structure.   
Keivani & Werna (2001a) stress the significance of non-market sectors and 
pay great attention to the need for effective government interventions to correct market 
failures.  The word ‘pluralism’ in their view implies not a conflict between formal and 
informal systems but a coexistence of private markets and non-market sectors such as 
the public sector and communities.  The past experiences of housing development in 
developing countries show that market solutions have not worked well to alleviate the 
urban housing crisis.  In spite of the potential to contribute to expanding the range of 
housing options, provisions for the poor through formal market mechanisms could be 
the least effective approach, because the major concern of the market economy is 
profitability.  Usually profits from housing development for low-income people are 
not attractive enough for the private sector (Yeh & Laquian, 1979: Okpala, 1999).  
Some optimists might expect trickle-down effects of housing from high or 
middle-income people to low-income people, but there is no evidence that the effects 
have taken place (Hamdi, 1990).  Under the principle of the market economy, income 
disparities affect housing inequalities and consequently the poor are systematically 
excluded from formal housing markets.  In addition, Strassmann (1996) argues that 
residential segregation by social class may be caused by the deterioration by free 
markets.  In order to alleviate such unfair housing distribution through formal 
markets and reduce redundancy and fragmentation in housing development, what 
Keivani & Werna (2001a & 2001b) suggest is the creation of partnerships among them 
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and the consolidation of various housing provision modes by taking the form of 
public-private joint ventures.  
In real world applications, this paradigm shift to embrace the private sector 
and civil society was soon exemplified in the discourse and practice of developing 
countries’ housing development.  With a special eye on the Southeast Asian context, 
several noticeable changes in program orientations can be identified.  In Malaysia, 
between the years of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990), the focus of housing 
development moved from the previous emphasis on medium- and high- cost housing 
construction to the advocacy of low-cost housing construction by mobilizing the 
private sector’s participation under the Special Housing Program.  In fact a 
percentage of built units out of those planned went up to 69% during the Plan9 
(Yahaya, 1989).  In Thailand, since the time when the Sixth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan, 1987 to 1991, was put into practice, the Thai government 
has imported the concept of enablement into the orientation of housing development 
with a particular highlight on the following two facets: (1) encouraging and facilitating 
the private sector in housing development for the poor10; and (2) stimulating and 
supporting the public and private finance sector to serve low-interest loans for both 
housing buyers and developers (Kuraesin, 1998).  Under the enabling environment, 
the Urban Community Development Office [UCDO] was created under the NHA of 
Thailand in 199211, helping communities to build wider associational networks with 
external parties, such as NGOs, at the local levels and offering a variety of credit 
                                                  
9 In spite of the move, low-cost units tended to come to be in the possession of middle-class 
households (Yahaya, 1989). 
 
10 In effect, the housing stock contributed by developers accounted for 36% in 1988; in 1993, the 
percentage rose to 50% (Yap, 1996). 
 
11 The UCDO defines itself as a banker, facilitator, as well as coordinator to advance urban poor’s 
vocational skills, raise income, and secure housing (UCDO, n.a.).  Thus, the UCDO’s focus is not 
constructing dwelling units; rather, it aims at socio-economic development through improving 
living spheres. 
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services not only to improve the living environment but also to encourage 
entrepreneurship (e.g. activating small-scale community-based business) in the matter 
of securing and stabilizing the poor’s income-generation activities.  According to data 
in 1996, THB 76.92 million in housing project loans and THB 27.01 million in 
non-project housing loans were approved and allocated to 17,629 households by the 
UCDO (Thavinpipatkul, 1997). 
Undoubtedly, while the strategy of enablement and its related whole housing 
sector development seems ideal to make up for inadequacies in the past, it is unrealistic 
to apply all of the World Bank’s seven-point program to the real world.  It is crucial to 
identify what aspects of housing strategies are most urgently needed to untangle 
housing problems in the specific context of each locality.  
 
2.4 Housing Development as Political Struggles over Land 
 
There are four crucial physical components of housing development to be achieved: 
acquiring land, securing tenure, providing access to infrastructure and public services, 
and constructing dwelling units.  Of these, the main difficulties of housing programs 
for the poor are not the building of dwelling units but providing access to land 
(McAuslan, 1985; Hall, 1987).  Assumed that the marginalized possess the capacity 
to undertake incremental development for upgrading living environment, top priority 
should be placed on the establishment of the land delivery and management process to 
provide the access.     
The past experiences in Southeast Asian countries also exhibit a dilemma of 
retaining land for housing development.  In reality, the success of Hong Kong and 
Singapore lies in the strong governments’ ability to acquire land for public purposes.  
However, in many Southeast Asian countries, governments are strapped by many 
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difficulties in land acquisition.12  Hence the marginalized’s locational preference to 
stay in the center close to worksites is unlikely to be respected.  This is partly because 
major Southeast Asian cities have been suffering from phenomenal increases in urban 
land prices in the last few decades.  Under a market economy, land becomes a 
commodity for investment.  Investment activities leave comparably large tracts of 
land in the center unoccupied or undeveloped as landowners intentionally do so for 
speculative reasons (Dwyer, 1974; Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989).  An example of 
such major speculation is observed in Bangkok.  During only four years from 1985 to 
1989, urban land prices grew 1,500% (Douglass & Zoghlin, 1994).  Despite smaller 
increasing rates compared to the ones of Bangkok, Jakarta also has faced the same 
predicament.13  Consequences brought about by distortion of land management are as 
follows: (1) a series of forcible evictions are going on, threatening the existence of 
informal settlements; and (2) low-income households have no choice but to take 
worst-quality, worst-serviced and often worst-located pieces of leftover land in order to 
minimize the probability of eviction (Main & Williams, 1994; Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000).  
As compared to cases of other developing cities in Latin America and Africa where 
land invasion and illegal occupation might be more tolerated, informal settlers in major 
Southeast Asian cities are more likely to struggle with a greater probability of evictions 
because of the upsurge in land prices provoked by fast-paced economic growth and its 
associated urbanization.  Under the circumstances, the importance of securing land 
                                                  
12 A number of constraints hampering an effective use of land can be identified in legislative, 
policy domains.  For example, in Malaysia, the federal law stipulates that the subjects of land and 
housing are in complete control of the state governments and local councils so that the federal 
government has no authority to interfere with the subjects (Casanova et al., 1979; Yahaya, 1989).  
Thus absolute fragmentation by law makes it impossible to envision the holistic goals of housing 
development at the national level. 
 
13 “The estimated land values for a parcel of land increased approximately 11% per year between 
1987 and 989 for parcels located about 10km away from the Central Business District [CBD]. Land 
process for land in the center of the city increased less than 5% a year (in real terms) while land 
approximately 20km away from the CBD increased by 18.3% a year on average during the same 
period” (Crane, Daniere & Harwood, 1997, p.1498).  
 27
with tenure is further reinforced.  
It is crucial to note that securing tenure must come with land provision.  
Legalizing tenure through titling schemes alone does not solve any urban land problem.  
Proponents of legalization argue that multiplier economic effects to housing 
improvement14, “where people consider that governments are wiling to take measures 
to increase security rather than impose formal or legalistic approaches, they are 
invariably willing to invest in improving their homes and local neighborhoods” (Payne, 
2004, p.174).  Thus opponents are skeptical about the effectiveness of legalization by 
itself, based on the understanding that governments prefer it because it is an 
inexpensive method (Gilbert, 2002).  Furthermore, in contradiction to what de Soto 
(1989) declares, legal tenure itself is not a catalyst of multiplying investments to 
eventually increase a value of the poor’s assets unless accessible credit systems are 
available (Muchijia, 2001).   
If it is unattainable to introduce land acquisition methods requiring a huge 
amount of capital and/or strong government initiatives, an alternative, viable solution 
needs to be presented.  Instead of forcing the poor to be incorporated into an existing 
legal structure, it may be more cost-effective and viable to expand the structure to 
accommodate what the poor are accustomed to, through re-regularization.  For 
example, what constitutes illegal subdivisions can be re-regularised.  Given that most 
informal settlements are not illegal in a sense that residents pay the rent to owners and 
do not steal land, but illegal because of being subdivided against planning regulations 
(Gilbert, 2002), approving such subdivisions by modifying regulations could be a 
viable option.  In fact, as observed in most informal settlements, tenure has 
traditionally been secured on a de facto basis through intermediate mechanisms, 
                                                  
14 According to de Soto (1989), legal titles would enable the poor to access formal credit services 
and accumulate capital, what could lead to the activation of land and property markets.  
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instead of a de jure legitimized basis.  For instance, communal tenure options could 
be instrumental for both authorities and residents since it could decrease the 
administrative burden on land management agencies and increase the possibility to 
receive public services and environmental improvements through a participatory 
process of physical and socioeconomic development (Payne, 2004).  This in part 
supports Turner’s emphasis on progressive development that once space for creating 
healthy, secure living environment is ensured, residents’ motivations for developing 
infrastructure and encouraging self-help housing construction may gradually rise.   
As Choguill (1999, p.299) articulates, “a prerequisite for any progressive 
improvement to take place, in either housing or infra, is security of land tenure.”  
Unless the land delivery and management processes are reformed to correct haphazard 
land-use and development patterns, it would end up as a zero-sum game: poor 
households from the rural hinterland will continue to multiply informal settlements 
which lack of security and stable living environments.  In conjunction with the rise of 
civil society as typified by NGOs, renewed prominence has been given to the role of 
negotiations in the land and tenure acquisition procedure.  One of the noteworthy 
successes through negotiations is a land-sharing scheme implemented by squatter 
communities in Bangkok.15  A fundamental factor of the success is the intervention of 
third parties in the negotiation process to reach an agreement.  Since the first 
land-sharing project in Khlong Toey communities in the mid-1980s, a certain type of 
collaboration networks among concerned actors has already been put in place.  What 
the increasing importance of negotiations suggests is that any place-based development 
is necessarily embedded in political struggles over land: physical space.  In this 
regard, research on housing development for the underentitled should encompass 
                                                  
15 Seven land-sharing projects are found within Bangkok and two of them have been completed; 
except for Bangkok, few land-sharing projects are attempted only in the Philippines. 
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analysis on political maneuvers among concerned actors.  Therefore, apart from 
market utilization, the dynamics of active, direct involvement of civil society are 
increasingly being located as essential component in the present fashion of inclusive, 
participatory planning under the theme of ‘enablement.’   
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks: Towards Democratic Planning 
 
In order to improve housing conditions of the marginalized, various approaches have 
been proposed.  Based on failures of governmental-driven housing projects from the 
1950s to the late 1960s, alternative self-help housing approaches were invented; 
however, it soon became clear that adopting the self-help philosophy was not 
functional enough to cope with the urban housing crisis.  Neoliberal principles 
emerging from the early 1980s have shaped a successive approach named ‘enablement’ 
pushed mainly by the World Bank and the UNCHS.  Pugh (1997b, p.164) analyzes 
this turnaround with reference to the rising renewed political economy: “by the late 
1980s the new political economy was evolving towards a new position: this argued for 
blended state-market roles, rather than them being viewed as polarized opposites, and 
for a deeper understanding of relationships between economics and politics.”  The 
phenomena becoming increasingly apparent from the 1990s are that, under the 
enabling strategy within the new political economy, modes and actors of housing 
provision have been diversified and transcend traditional classifications dividing them 
into conventional/formal and unconventional/informal.  Dynamic interactions 
between these dichotomous categories have been expected to promote the delivery of 
more democratic planning styles. 
This brief review of housing planning in developing countries helps elucidate 
the historical path to reaching the current enablement model.  In order to analyze the 
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shift to enablement in a particular local setting and dissect the efficacy of the model 
when applied to real world practices, the following chapter will investigate how the 
ideal of enablement has been projected and modified in the experiences of Metro 




























Post-war Housing Development in Metro Manila: 








3.1  Introduction 
 
Metro Manila, the National Capital Region [NCR] in the Philippines is located in the 
southwestern part of Luzon, the country’s largest island, sandwiched in between 
Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.  It consists of fourteen cities and three municipalities 
(Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1).  The land area of Metro Manila is 636 km/sq large, in 
which approximately 10 million people reside according to the 2000 Census.  While 
it is the smallest administrative region, occupying only 0.2% of the national land area 
(Murakami et al., 2005), Metro Manila is the most populous area in the country.  The 
population density of the Philippines is 200 people per km/sq (Kawakami, Nagura & 
Nemoto, 1998), compared to that of 15,617 people per km/sq in Metro Manila (see 
Table 3.1).  These figures clearly indicate the degree of overcrowding in Metro 
Manila and the intense competition over urban land.  
With increasingly intensified competition, the total number of the 
underentitled has increased rapidly from 700,000 people in 1968 to 1.7 million in 1980 
in the early stage of the country’s economic development (Shatkin, 2004).  As for the 
current demographic condition, official data of the late 1990s indicates that 13.8% of 
the NCR’s population is landless and living in informal settlements; yet this official 
number is probably just the tip of the iceberg (Choguill, 2001).16  While any estimates 
of the population in informal settlements are unlikely to be perfectly accurate, there is 
general agreement on the number of around 4 million in the latter half of the 1990s 
(Karaos, 1996; Shatkin, 2004).  Based on calculations using these numbers, the 
annual population growth rates in informal settlements have declined from 3.2% in the  
                                                  
16 As Berner (1997, p.25) describes in the case of the 1990 Census, this inaccuracy is mainly 
caused by the problematic procedure of census-taking: “census takers usually interviewed with the 
owners of squatter houses but not the families renting or sharing the house with them, who 
comprise the about half of the squatter population.”  Considering the fact that 25.9% of 
households in Metro Manila are renting a unit or room (ADB, 2001), the credibility of the official 
national statistics on population in informal settlements is quite low. 
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Figure 3. 1  Map of Metro Manila (scale = 1:266,667) 
 
 









Table 3.1  Population, Land Area, and Population Density in Metro Manila, 2000 
 
City Population Land Area (km/sq) Population Density per km/sq 
Quezon City 2,173,831 161.12 13,492 
Manila 1,581,082 38.55 41,014 
Caloocan 1,177,604 53.33 22,081 
Makati 444,867 29.86 14,898 
Pasig 505,058 31 16,292 
Marikina 391,170 33.97 11,515 
Mandaluyong 278,474 11.26 24,731 
Pasay City 354,908 19 18,679 
Muntinlupa 379,310 46.7 8,122 
Paranaque 449,811 47.69 9,432 
Las Pinas 472,780 41.54 11,381 
Valenzuela 485,433 44.58 10,889 
Taguig 467,375 45.38 10,299 
Malabon 338,855 15.76 21,501 
   
Municipality    
Navotas 230,403 10.77 21,393 
San Juan 117,680 5.94 19,811 
Pateros  57,407 2.1 27,337 
    
Source: Author's calculation based on data from the MMDA (n.a.)  
 
period of 1968-1980 to 2.4% in the succeeding period of 1980-1997.  These rates 
actually correspond to the slowdown of the NCR’s population growth.  The growth 
rate of the NCR population recorded an annual average of 4.9% between1960 and 
1970, and then went down to 3.6% between 1975 and 1980, and further dropped to 
3.0% during the decade of the 1980s (Ocampo, 1995).  However, looking merely at 
growth rates masks the magnitude of the proliferation of informal settlements.  The 
share of informal settlers in the total NCR’s population remained around 20% between 
1968 and 1980; but it sharply increased between 1980 and 1997, reaching the level of 
40% (Shatkin, 2004).  In short, the expansion of informal settlements from the 1980s 
has been brought about by drastic urbanization, intensified globalization and its 
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associated migration.  Inadequate policies and planning frameworks to deal with an 
increasing velocity of the phenomena have exacerbated the housing condition of 
informal settlements and social inequalities.  Considering the transition of 
institutional and legislative settings for housing development, the following sections 
explain how these fundamental factors have affected the proliferation of informal 
settlements with a specific focus on the Metro Manila.   
 
3.2  Metro Manila in the Urbanization and Globalization Processes 
 
Of all Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines has one of the highest levels of 
urbanization (see Table 3.2).  Metro Manila is a dominant primate city in the country, 
accommodating 21.2% of the total urban population in the country as of 2003 (United 
Nations, 2004).  One of the major vehicles driving such aggressive urbanization is the 
massive volume of internal migration.  A statistics shows that about 80% of the 
inhabitants in informal settlements are migrants from the countryside (Nolasco, 1994).  
Push factors reinforcing rural-urban migration in post-war Philippines include the 
following: first, urban-biased government policies on development activities that put 
greater emphasis on import-based, capital-intensive industrial development centered on 
cities; second, failures of a rural land reform that induced both the increase of landless 
farmers and the decrease of agricultural productivity; third, particularly emerging from 
the early 1980s, militarization of rural areas that multiplied the displacement of people 
escaping from armed conflicts between the military and the rebels.  On the other hand, 
examples of pull factors include higher incomes, access to social & public services, 
and employment opportunities in urban areas (Nolasco, 1994).  In addition to 
commonly experienced socio-economic factors triggering the flows of internal 
migration in Southeast Asia, political unrest in hinterlands has been a driving force that 
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characterizes the Philippines case. 
 





rate of change, 
2000-2005 (%)




Country 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030     
Southeast 
Asia       
 
228,636  432,014 314,556 279,222 42.1 60.7 3.3 0.0
Cambodia    2,629  8,697  11,514  14,858 18.6 36.9 5.5 1.7
Indonesia   
 
100,294  187,846 119,589  89,721 45.6 67.7 3.9 -0.9
Lao PDR     1,168  3,549  4,489  5,733 20.7 38.2 4.6 1.7
Malaysia     15,611  27,324  8,814  7,867 63.9 77.6 3.0 0.1
Myanmar    14,558  30,086  34,927  31,222 29.4 49.1 3.1 0.5
Philippines   48,817  86,615  31,182  27,180 61.0 76.1 3.1 -0.3
Singapore    4,253  4,934 — — 100.0 100.0 1.7 —
Thailand     20,037  35,420  42,796  40,004 31.9 47.0 1.9 0.6
Viet Nam    20,936  46,863  60,441  61,511 25.7 43.2 3.2 0.7
Source: World Urbanization Prospect the 2003 Revision (United Nations, 2004) 
 
In order to mediate the level of overconcentration in few cities, a number of 
dispersal strategies have been tried.  In Asia between the 1960s and 1970s, urban 
growth planning predominantly focused on a control strategy to avoid 
over-concentration on few cities.  That control strategy involved several schemes 
such as restricting the volume of in-migration, relocating prospective and existing 
migrants to secondary or smaller cities, and encouraging rural development (Rondinelli, 
1994).  The Philippines was no exception.  The country adopted a number of 
measures to encourage industrial development outside Metro Manila.  These 
measures included the introduction of investment incentives for development outside 
Metro Manila, the enforcement of a ban against new industries locating within Metro 
Manila, the foundation of export processing zones, and the promotion of growth 
centers in other areas.  However, none of these schemes functioned effectively to 
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fulfill the proposed objectives (Ocampo, 1995). 
 
Table 3.3  GDPs per capita of 2003 and GDP Growth between 1975 and 2000 in  
Southeast Asian Countries 
 
Country 
GDP per capita 2003 in 
US$ (Purchasing 
Power Parity) 
GDP Growth (1975-2000) 
Cambodia $1,900 1.9% 
Indonesia $3,200 4.4% 
Lao PDR $1,700 3.2% 
Malaysia $9,000 4.1% 
Myammer $1,800 1.3% 
Philippines $4,600 0.1% 
Singapore $23,700 5.2% 
Thailand $7,400 5.5% 
Vietnam $2,500 4.8% 
Source: The World Fact Book (CIA, 2004); Correspondence on 
GDP Per Capita Annual Growth Rates (World Bank, 2002)  
 
Most importantly, as Karaos (1996) and Porio & Crisol (2004) highlight, the 
expanding gap between the upsurge in urban land prices and the stagnation of urban 
income growth has accelerated the growth of informal settlements.  First of all, the 
drastic urbanization in the Philippines does not come with sufficient economic growth 
to raise living standards.  As Table 3.3 shows, the GDP growth rate in the Philippines 
has been sluggish for the last three decades: the lowest in all Southeast Asian countries.  
In effect, the country has been totally left behind compared to Malaysia and Thailand, 
which used to be categorized under the same urban trajectory group, 
‘industrializing-agrarian,’ by McGee (1988).  Once ranked second to Japan in the 
1950s in terms of income level, the Philippines has slumped to the lowest rank with 
regard to economic progress in the region (Choguill, 2001).  Moreover, the unequal 
distribution of wealth is surprisingly high in the Philippines.  In 2003, households in 
the top 10% in income consume 31.9% of the total cash value; on the other hand, 
households in the bottom 10% consume only 2.3% of it (CIA, 2004).   
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 Second, an exponential increase in urban land prices has deprived a large 
portion of urban population, notably poor households, of access to land and tenure.  
According to Porio et al. (2004, p.55), “until the 1970s, the urban poor enjoyed 
relatively easy access to urban land through spontaneous or organized land invasions 
that were generally tolerated by government authorities.”  From the beginning of the 
1970s, market values of land in the center started to over-appreciate.  During 1973 to 
1977, the land price of Makati, the major CBD in Metro Manila, recorded the highest 
increase of 366.7% in the NCR (Mendiola, 1983).  Specifically since the 1980s, the 
commercialization of urban land partly through land speculation activities has been 
pushed forward.  For example, in the early 1990s, land prices of the best commercial 
sites along Ayala Avenue in Makati City reached between US$2,600 and US$3,700 per 
m/sq (Strassmann & Blunt, 1994).  Apart from this extreme cases, land values in 
central-city areas rose at 25% annually in the 1990s (Porio & Crisol, 2004; Shatkin, 
2004).  The steep rise in urban land prices since the 1970s has been brought on by the 
fact that tracts of registered private land available in the market are quite limited.  The 
low availability of privately-owned registered land stems from the persistence of 
monopolistic landownership mechanisms originating in the Spanish colonial period.  
Evidence shows that “almost half 44% of the land in the metropolis is owned by only a 
few families, with tracts sometimes as large as 76 hectares: in one municipality 
[Mandaluyong], a prime area in metro Manila, 650 hectares of privately owned land 
can be traced to 46 owners only, giving an average of 14.1 hectares per individual” 
(Berner, 1997, p.21).  Hence, spatial development in the NCR has been based on 
economic forces shaped by the decisions of gigantic conglomerates.  Such private 
decisions have prioritized the development of modern commercial business districts 
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along major corridors.17  The problem regarding the concentration of landownership 
is not solely about the volume of land that the rich possess; it is also deeply associated 
with their influence on government land policies.  In many cases, dominant landlord 
families exhibit their strong interest in subdivision development targeting middle-class 
households.  The market-oriented development not only further creates physical 
segregation within a city but also widens social divides through the enhancement of 
biased planning patterns that favor the ‘haves.’   
 Establishing adequate land-use planning would suppose to facilitate more 
equal distribution of land.  However, it is often distorted by ill-conceived state 
interventions amid urbanization and globalization processes.  Since the early 1970s, 
what the government has strived to achieve is, like other cities in the world, to sell the 
image of ‘modern’ Manila.  As Pinches (1994) describes, the construction of 
showcase architecture based on an international modernist aesthetic has been the main 
focus.  This desire toward architectural modernism was vigorously expressed under 
the Marcos administration to win recognition from other industrialized nations.  The 
Cultural Centre, the Folk Arts Theatre, and the Philippines International Convention 
Centre are the showcase architecture built during his era (Pinches, 1994).  A ‘selling 
the modern image’ doctrine has been maintained even after the overthrow of the 
Marcos regime, reinforced by the rapid progression of globalization.  In the 
post-Marcos periods, the focus of planning projects has been put on land-intensive 
transportation development such as the extension of ring road systems and the 
construction of new mass-transit light rail lines.  According to Shatkin (2004), those 
projects were designed to improve the climate for investment and enhance Metro 
Manila’s image as a ‘global city.’  However, they have also evoked controversy and 
                                                  
17 Examples of such development are the districts constructed along Epifanio de los Santos 
[EDSA] Avenue, which is also known as Circular Road [CR] 4: Makati by Ayala families, Ortigas 
by Ortigas families, and Cubao by Araneta families (Kawakami, Nagura & Nemoto, 1998).  
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aroused criticism with regard to their legitimacy.  This is because, behind the 
achievement of such architectural and infrastructure modernism, there has been a 
multitude of the underentitled forcibly displaced through endless demolitions.   
Under conditions of globalization, the use of land has been manipulated by 
dynamic economic forces and the state’s interest in the world city formation has not 
catered to the defense of the living sphere for a majority of the needy people.  The 
abrupt rise of land price, the exclusive focus on commercial and industrial 
development, the strong emphasis on modernization of urban landscape, and the lack 
of adequate, balanced land-use planning for public purposes, all have disrupted 
housing affordability in the formal markets.  In effect, most of the inhabitants in the 
NCR are squeezed out from the competition over the formal land and housing markets.  
While Marcos proclaimed the introduction of urban land reform by virtue of 
Presidential Decree [PD] No. 1517 with the explicit goal of rationalizing land-use and 
land-control structures, this law was never put in place because of the lack of 
implementing guidelines (Antolihao, 2004).  In addition, the latest version of zoning 
ordinances is the one enacted in 1979 and revised in 1981.  It is surprising to know 
that such regulations have not been updated in the context of rapid urbanization trends 
(Kawakami, Nagura & Nemoto, 1998).  Thus the failure of creating a livable ‘Metro 
Manila’ for all may be attributed to an excessive emphasis on infrastructure projects 
rather than land-use and housing planning. 
 
3.3  Housing Development in the Post-war Periods 
 
For almost the last six decades, housing development in Metro Manila has undergone a 
number of transformation and evolution in its major legislative as well as institutional 
settings (see Table 3.4 as a summary).  In the aftermath of World War II, it was much  
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Table 3.4  Major Legislative and Institutional Settings in Urban & Housing Planning,  
1946-1977 
 
Year   Legislative settings Institutional settings 
1946   The National Urban Planning Commission was created under EO No. 98. 
1947  
The People's Homesite Corporation and the National Housing 
Commission merged, being changed to The People's Homesite 
and Housing Corporation through EO No.93. 








 The National Housing Corporation was organized in accordance with EO No. 399. 
1972 Martial law was declared.  
1972  
The NPC was abolished; the Department of Public Works, 
Transportation and Communication and the Department of 
Interior, the Local Government and Community Development 
were established to take over the functions of the National 
Planning Committee. 
1973  The Task Force of Human Settlements [TFHS] was created under EO No.419. 
1975  The National Housing Authority [NHA] was created under PD No. 757. 
1975 PD No.772 was put in effect.  
1975  The Metropolitan Manila Commission [MMC] was created under PD No.824.. 
1976  The TFHS was renamed to the Human Settlements Commission [HSC] under PD No. 933. 
1977  The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation [NHMFC] was established under PD No. 1267. 
1978 
Urban land reform was 




The Ministry of Human Settlements [MHS] and the Human 
Settlements Development Corporation [HSDC] were created 
















 The HSC was renamed to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission [HSRC] by virtue of PD No.1396.  
1986  The National Shelter Program [NSP] was announced under EO No.90. 
1986  
The MHS was replaced by the Housing and Urban 
Development Coordinating Council [HUDCC] under EO No. 
90. 
1986  The HSRC was renamed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] under EO No. 90. 
1990  The MMC was abolished and replaced by the Metropolitan Manila Authority [MMA] under EO No. 392.  
1990 
The Social Housing Support 
Fund Act was created under 
RA No. 6846. 
 
1991 
RA 7160 (the Local 













RA 7279 (the Urban 
Development and Housing 
Act [UDHA]) was enacted. 
 
1994 
RA 7835 (the Comprehensive 
and Integrated Shelter 
finance Act) was approved. 
 






PD No.772 was repealed.   
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easier for people to find the space for forming their settlements given the situations 
that the new civil administrations were still unstable and considerable tracts of 
bomb-damaged sites existed.18  Immediately after the war, the National Urban 
Planning Commission was created under Executive Order [EO] No. 98 in 1946 with 
the aim of postwar reconstruction, intending to embark on housing development in 
cooperation with the National Housing Commission.  Nevertheless, it failed to 
function as expected due to a lack of coordination with other related agencies 
(Kawakami, Nagura & Nemoto, 1998).  While official planning systems faced 
difficulty in establishing themselves, the number of informal settlements began 
mushrooming, reinforced by accelerating urbanization trends.  The common notion 
then was that “squatting was not seen as a structural problem of urban development but 
rather as a public nuisance and a violation of the laws” (Berner, 1997, p.28).  It was 
not until 1970, around the inauguration of the Marcos administration and his martial 
law regime that urban planning incorporated housing issues for the marginalized into 
its scope.  
 
3.3.1  Rise of the Martial Law Regime: Marcos Era from 1965 to 1986 
 
In 1972 Marcos declared the martial law and initiated an agrarian reform of the ‘New 
Society.’  What Marcos envisaged through the reform was to accomplish economic 
development through making the country a modern agro-industrial state.  Under the 
slogan of the New Society, a high priority was given to the projects toward 
beautification of the urban landscape: construction of showcase architecture described 
above.  In concert with the centralization of power, institutional settings of housing 
development were realigned.  In 1975, two important institutions were founded.  
                                                  
18 A good example is the informal settlement established within the Spanish fort of Intramuros 
(McGee, 1990). 
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One is the creation of the National Housing Authority [NHA] under PD No.727 
through the integration of various agencies in charge of overall housing and 
resettlement matters.  The other is the establishment of the Metro Manila 
Commission [MMC] under PD No.824 as a consolidated planning body to deal with 
cross-boundary urban issues on a regional scale.  This establishment related to the 
declaration of Metro Manila as one administrative region containing 17 separate 
cities/municipalities.  Most critically, in 1975, PD No.772, an anti-squatting law, was 
issued, stipulating squatting as a criminal offense subject to imprisonment.  The 
enactment of the law undoubtedly involved the beautification principle.  In a climate 
privileging aesthetics, shacks in informal settlements were regarded as eyesores.  As 
Porio & Crisol (2004) mention, a pronounced action that characterized the first half of 
the Marcos administration was the enforcement of large-scale evictions and 
resettlements in order to get rid of such eyesores.  One statistics reveals that 400,000 
families in total were displaced during 1973 to 1980 (Pinches, 1994).  
 Yet, a combination of huge social costs for resettlement and a surge of public 
backlash against evictions and demolitions led the government to shift its housing 
approach to slum upgrading by launching the Slum and Improvement Resettlement 
[SIR], which is also known as the Zonal Improvement Program [ZIP], in 1977 
(Nolasco, 1994; Karaos, n.a.; Porio & Crisol, 2004).  In the late 1970s, the 
Philippines was chosen for the implementation of the World Bank pilot on-site slum 
upgrading programs, which were greatly influenced by Turner’s theory of a self-help 
housing approach.  In conjunction with practices of the SIR and ZIP, Bagong Lipunan 
(New Society) Integrated Sites and Services [BLISS] projects --the construction of 
multi-storey, medium-density residential complexes-- were promoted under the 
Ministry of Human Settlements [MHS] founded in 1978 under PD No. 1396.  It 
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originally intended to accommodate the marginalized; but it had not brought any 
impressive impact to mitigate the housing crisis in Metro Manila due to inadequate 
affordability and quantity.  Only the privileged, the upper 10% of the Metro Manila’s 
population, could afford to enjoy the benefit of BLISS.  Moreover, the number of the 
people displaced for BLISS projects were much larger than their total outputs: less 
than 2,500 units (Berner, 1997).  Consequently, BLISS projects were strongly 
criticized as another beautification attempt driven personally by the Minister of Human 
Settlements: Imelda Marcos.  In sum, all of the housing strategies under the Marcos 
administration proved ineffective, dispossessing the marginalized of space for living 
under the publicized modernization and beautification principles.  Even though the 
NHA upheld an ambitious objective of satisfying the housing needs of the poorest 30% 
of the population, it was never achieved.  Furthermore, the issuance of PD No.772 in 
1975 is one of the notorious legacies left by Marcos.  Until it was repealed in 1997, 
the law continued to generate the distortion of housing development for the 
underentitled. 
 
3.3.2 Return of the Democratic Regimes: Post-Marcos Administrations from 
1986 to Present 
 
After the revolt of so-called ‘People’s Power’ (EDSA Revolution I) in 1986, the 
Aquino administration was inaugurated.  Three important housing legislations 
instituted during her regime were: (1) EO No.90 in 1986, (2) the Local Government 
Code of 1991 [LGC], and (3) the Urban Development and Housing Act [UDHA] of 
1992.  As Porio & Crisol (2004, p.208) clearly state, “these legislations marked the 
departure from eviction and relocation to the adoption of a more decentralized 
approach towards housing and urban development, integrating housing needs and 
urban poor participation in land use planning. It redefined the roles of government 
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agencies, urban poor communities and the mediating groups like NGOs and 
community-based organizations [CBOs] and changed the performance and 
relationships of stakeholders in the housing and land sector.”  While these changes 
are creditable progress in the urban regulatory/institutional framework, substantial 
outcomes however have proved to be uneven. 
The issuance of EO No.90 was an aspiring attempt to dismantle existing 
centralized power structures governed by few.  The MMC was replaced by the 
Metropolitan Manila Authority [MMA], which was a depoliticized council constituting 
all city/municipality mayors and the term of a chairman, who was elected by the 
council, is limited to a six-month (Berner, 1997); the MHS was abolished and the 
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council [HUDCC] was established in 
turn as a supervising agency responsible for policy formulation and program 
coordination.  Moreover, the inception of the National Shelter Program [NSP]19 
monitored by the HUDCC was announced under EO No.90.  In effect, housing issues 
were given a high priority in the mid-term development plan for 1987-1992 
(Strassmann & Blunt, 1994).  Government accountabilities toward low-cost housing, 
otherwise referred to as socialized housing, were finally specified in formal planning 
frameworks.  As a financial backbone of the NSP, the Social Housing Support Fund 
Act, which is commonly mentioned as the Abot-Kaya Pabahay Fund, was enacted 
under Republic Act [RA] No. 6846 in the early 1990 (Home Guaranty Corporation, 
n.a.).  A critical shift in the NSP is the change of the government’s role from provider 
to facilitator of housing projects to promote the non-government and private sectors’ 
participation into housing development.  Karaos (1996, p.3) says, “this new role 
translated into a shift in emphasis from direct housing production to providing 
                                                  
19 Beneficiaries of the NSP were the people in the bottom 30% of the population, who were neither 
able to spend more than PHP175 a month nor take on loans and mortgages from formal banking 
systems: they were entitled to receive an aid for a 9% interest of housing loans (Nolasco, 1994).  
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financing, both mortgage and development financing.”  Against this background, the 
role of the NHA, the chief agency responsible for provision of housing, has shrunk to 
an institution supporting resettlement projects for the people living in danger areas 
(Shatkin, 2004).  Within such shift, slum upgrading substantially came to a halt 
except for the Community Mortgage Program [CMP] discussed in Chapter 5.   
 With the passage of RA No.7160 --the LGC of 1991, planning and 
implementation bodies of land-use planning, housing provision, and infrastructure 
development have been downscaled to the local level.  In economic terms, the LGC 
gives local government units [LGUs] greater flexibility in using their own budget, for 
example, by allowing the LGUs’ issuance of financial instruments to procure resources 
for its programs and mandating the transfer of tax revenue from the central government 
to LGUs (Laquian, 2005).  The LGC has indeed encompassed several sections 
advocating the promotion of housing development for the marginalized: addressing the 
low-cost housing needs of the people (Section 17) and initiating expropriation 
proceedings over land for the benefit of the poor and landless (Section 19).  
Furthermore, on the social side, the LGC breaks new ground for the rise of civil 
society and its entry into the formal political realm.  Through the establishment of 
local development councils or designated bodies to serve as venues for representing 
communities, the LGC underpins the institutionalization of people’s organizations’ 
[POs] and NGOs’ roles in the planning process: stimulating the establishment and 
performance of POs and NGOs to become active partners (Section 34) and providing 
financial support to POs and NGOs (Vincente-Angeles, n.a.).  The enactment of this 
law gives great stimulus for the empowerment movement.  It has surely opened a new 
vista of grass-roots organizations through the legitimization of their existence and 
activities.  In consequence, the combination of the economic and social empowerment 
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envisioned in the LGC has elicited positive assessments on the part of large 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
[ADB] (Silva, 2005). 
 At the end of her term in 1992, the Aquino administration undertook further 
actions by the adoption of RA No.7279 -- the UDHA of 1992 (see Appendix I).  Its 
comprehensive objective is to achieve sustainable urban and housing development 
through the facilitation of more rational, equitable land-use and housing planning.  
Along with the strengthening of civil society’s engagement, the UDHA also tries to 
prompt the private sector’s involvement in the construction of socialized housing.  
One of the crucial goals that the UDHA sets down is the achievement of balanced 
housing.  It instructs private developers to allocate at least 20% of the total project 
cost or area to socialized housing.20  A permit for development will not be given 
unless developers obtain proof of compliance with this requirement.  Despite the low 
compliance rate in 1993, it gradually improved in the following year: during the year 
of 1994 alone, 55 socialized housing projects were erected, producing 10,849 units in 
total (Karaos, 1996).  Utilization of the private sector’s resources to bolster socialized 
housing, which had been inactive for a long time, eventually started materialized.  Of 
all, the most meaningful article for the underentitled is Section 28, which discourages 
evictions except in the case of settlements situated in hazardous areas.  Even in that 
case, several requirements must be observed, such as provision of sufficient 
consultation, 30-day notice, and relocation sites before actual evictions take place 
(Karaos, 1996; Vincente-Angeles, n.a.).  This section not only safeguards established 
living space of informal settlers but also advocates the rights and values of the settlers 
                                                  
20 In compliance with the law, private developers’ contributions may be made under any of the 
schemes below: development of a new settlement, slum upgrading or renewal, joint venture 
projects with LGU or any government institution, and participation in CMP as financer or 
developer, purchase of LGU housing bonds (ADB, 2001). 
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and their housing units.  However, controversies have repeatedly arisen in that the 
section is contradictory to PD No.772, which prescribes squatting as a criminal 
offense.  
 The actual implementation of the UDHA was postponed until 1994, when the 
Ramos administration commanded LGUs to work on registration of beneficiaries and 
land inventory to be submitted to the HUDCC (Karaos, 1996).  In the same year, the 
Ramos regime passed the Comprehensive Integrated Shelter Finance Act [CISFA], RA 
No.7835, in order to backup socialized housing programs financially.  The purposes 
of the law are to provide a budget to the NSP through increase annual appropriation, 
enhance the financial capability of housing related agencies toward effective delivery 
of housing, and mobilize the government resources to satisfy the housing needs of the 
bottom 30% population in collaboration with the private sector (Urban Research 
Consortium, 1997).  Under the law, the funding allocation for the NSP grew from 
PHP 800 million in 1992, which was equal to 0.3% of the national budget, to PHP 4.2 
billion in 1996, which accounted for 1% of it (Karaos, 1996); between 1995 and 1998, 
the NSP was financed PHP 38.5 billion in total through the CISFA (ADB, 2001).  
Mixed enforcement of these decentralized legislations has been designed to facilitate 
favorable settings for socialized housing development.  
The Estrada and Arroyo regimes followed the same line of the predecessors’ 
agendas.  During the Estrada administration inaugurated in 1998, public expectations 
hit a high level because of his compassionate propaganda advocating for the welfare of 
the poor: ‘Erap para sa mahirap.’  In 1998, the Lingap Para Sa Mahirap program 
was launched as a primary initiative featuring housing provision and poverty 
alleviation, creating the National Anti-Poverty Commission.  The program envisioned 
to champion the 100 poorest families in each city and province.  After the 
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impeachment of Estrada, Arroyo won the election with an unprecedented highest 
percentage of votes in history.  What characterizes housing policy of her 
administration is its intensive focus on land proclamations to untangle tenure issues.  
Tenure provision through land proclamations is not a new scheme given the fact that 
Aquino also employed this scheme, granting some land proclamations such as the 
National Government Center [NGC] in Quezon City; however, the scale and scope are 
much larger at the present stages.  For the two years at the beginning of this century, 
the number of families given tenure through land proclamations amounted to 645,910 
families in 33 informal settlements covering 22,360 hectares.  The scheme works 
effective towards the improvement of informal settlements on public land.  This brief 
review clarifies that the year of 1986 is a turning point in the transition of institutional 
and legislative settings for the development of socialized housing.  Nonetheless, an 
analysis of the Philippines experience would be incomplete without evaluation of 
concrete outcomes brought by the transition  
 
3.4  Concluding Remarks: Problem Definition in the Philippine Case 
 
In the Philippines, a political shift from the martial law regime to democratic regimes 
indeed has brought a significant change in housing development for the marginalized.  
By following the enabling development model, the Philippine government since 1986 
has attempted to create facilitative environments for activating third party 
involvements.  Despite the laudable change in the settings, however, stagnation of 
housing development still continues.  In addition to a cumulative capital shortfall due 
to the country’s sluggish economy, that stagnation stems from a lack of institutional 
capacity and political will to operationalize pro-poor legislations in place.   
Moreover, with historical hindsight, it is sad to admit that changes of regimes 
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and leadership have not meant much to the majority of the urban poor population in 
the NCR.  The reasons are two-fold.  First, no matter whether the piece of legislation 
is progressive or otherwise, nothing really affects them unless it is realized in the real 
world.  For example, the Lingap Para Sa Mahirap program under Estrada merely 
covered 0.0008% of the country’s poorest as measured based on the international 
poverty standards (Choguill, 2001); land proclamations by Arroyo are least applicable 
to the settlements on privately-owned land (Porio & Crisol, 2004).  Second, as 
Antolihao (2004, p.51) asserts in his study on the NGC, ‘identity crisis’ disarrays 
government directions of planning.  “During the Marcos regime, the state took its 
position as a landowner and started a demolition campaign to evict squatters in NGC. 
However, during the Aquino period, the state took on a more social service provider 
role and allocated a portion of NGC for distribution to its residents. Nonetheless, these 
are just conceptual generalizations, since we are aware that, in reality, the state often 
suffers from a ‘identity crisis’: taking on the positions of landowner and provider of 
social services at the same time.”  These points suggest discrepancies between the 
ideal and reality in Metro Manila.  What is foremost and urgently needed is the 

































4.1  A Methodological Route 
 
In order to explore the complexity of socio-political processes threaded into housing 
development in Metro Manila, this study adopts a mixed method strategy --not so 
much triangulation21 but complementarity-- by combining semi-structured interviews 
and questionnaire survey.  According to Hammersley’s typology, “this 
(complementarity) approach occurs when the two research strategies are employed in 
order that different aspects of an investigation can be dovetailed” (Bryman, 2001, 
p.447).  While the material gathered through the semi-structured interviews and the 
questionnaire survey differs in scope, they can be interwoven to provide a more 
multifaceted understanding of housing development. 
In attempting to conduct the fieldwork within an ethical frame, I gave weight 
to four principles and responsibilities in grounding my fieldwork.  Drawn from 
Bailey (2001) and Sidaway (1992), these are: (1) equalizing the power relationship and 
democratizing the research process as well as guaranteeing confidentiality and 
anonymity, (2) adhering to informed consent to the objective of a project and the end 
use of the information to build mutual respect and confidence between researchers and 
participants, (3) sharing the findings of a project with all the parties involving a project, 
and (4) anticipating consequences of a project and being accountable for practice, 
process and immediate outcomes in terms of whom the project is for.    
 
4.1.1  Semi-structured (informal) Interviews 
The purpose of the interviews is to capture a picture of inter-linkages among 
stakeholders, in which strategic moves of cooperation and confrontation are being 
                                                  
21 Triangulation indicates an approach introducing a multiplicity of investigators, theoretical 
frames, data, and methods (Berg, 1989; Bryman, 2001).  There are roughly two types of 
triangulation.  One is within-method triangulation: exercising one method by using multiple 
theories and data.  The other is between-method triangulation: putting multiple methods together 
to analyze the same issue (Gaber, 1993). 
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manifested.  Semi-structured interviews22 were specifically designed for subjects in 
different entities involved in housing development: community leaders23, NGO 
members, international agency staff, and public officials.  In addition, interviews with 
academics were also sought in order to explore the role of educational/research 
institutions.  The reasons for choosing a semi-structured interview style are: (1) to 
allow interviewees speak freely about their opinions without limiting answers to a set 
question; and (2) to evolve predetermined topics into more probing questions 
depending on interviewees’ responses.  Hence, the sequence and wording of the 
questions were kept flexible.  Through eleven weeks of fieldwork, 36 interview 
sessions were completed with 45 interviewees.  The organizations covered included 7 
NGOs, 2 governmental agencies, 2 international organizations, 7 neighborhood 
associations, apart from 6 academics (see Appendix II).  Interviews were documented 
through note taking.  Short pauses interspersed throughout the interview session gave 
me leeway to prepare more probing questions based on earlier responses taken down as 
notes as I revisit particular topics of discussion with the interviewee.   
In order to identify and obtain access to local organizations within the 
Philippines, fieldwork began with a preliminary phase aimed at establishing 
connections with key organizations/persons to seek their advice on the choice of 
interviewees.  After possible interviewees were specified with the help of gatekeeping 
organizations/persons, appointments for interviews were set up.  Appointments were 
made through both formal --directly contacting either an entity or individual by 
                                                  
22 According to the definition of semi-structured (informal) interviewing presented by Eyles (1988, 
p.7), “the questions asked, their sequence and wording are not worked out beforehand. In this case, 
the interviewer tries to tailor the wording of the questions to each particular individual and ask the 
questions in an order appropriate for the interviewee.” 
 
23 The term ‘community’ employed in this study refers to a settlement in which a group of people 
belonging to the same neighborhood association or people’s organization live.  Therefore, 
community is geographically defined by a territory of the association/organization. 
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phone/email-- and informal -- getting a verbal referral from intermediary contact 
persons-- channels.  Appointments with international agencies, some local NGOs and 
academics were largely arranged through formal channels; in contrast, informal 
channels were more useful in setting up meetings with community members.  While 
most interview sessions took the form of single-person interviewing; five out of the 36 
interviews developed unintentionally into group interviews.  This tended to happen 
with interviews held at local NGO offices where the primary interviewee might wish to 
provide information as accurately as possible by inviting staff engaging in different 
duties within an organization to join in. 
 
4.1.2  Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire survey was administered to residents of selected informal settlements 
in order to obtain data for investigating (1) their perceptions and preparation levels 
towards upgrading activities and (2) implications and impacts of housing development 
on the degrees of empowerment.  Some of the data will be used to explore 
correlations within the empowerment processes.  The questionnaire takes the 
household as a unit of analysis, and asks the self-identified head of household to fill 
out.  It contains structured questions (see Appendix III)24 which allow for 
open-ended responses.  After discussion with members of the communities to be 
surveyed, it was decided that the survey questions should be prepared in the local 
language, Tagalog, notwithstanding the fact that many residents are fluent in 
conversational English.  Since most of the residents expressed discomfort with 
articulating their thoughts in English, a questionnaire in Tagalog would be instrumental 
                                                  
24 Questions in the survey range from comprehensive households’ socio-economic profiles, general 
conditions of housing units, and certain actions to the improvement of the conditions. On top of this, 
in order to understand the intersection of internal and international migration flows, the 
questionnaire includes questions on overseas Filipino workers [OFWs]. 
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in gathering more accurate, inclusive field materials. 
As Marshall & Rossman (1989) suggest, plans for entry to sites through 
formal and informal gatekeepers need to be incorporated into the research design.  In 
particular, insofar as a research topic touches the issues of informality, the roles of 
gatekeepers are extremely important for accessibility and safety reasons.  Access to 
informal settlements is often limited except for insider-residents and it is not unusual 
that such settlements are closed to strangers, especially foreign outsiders.  In an effort 
to specify preferable research sites and gatekeepers, substantial assistance was 
provided by local NGO staff.25  In total, fourteen communities in five cities 
(Caloocan, Makati, Manila, Pasig and Quezon) were visited.  Site visits in different 
cities helped me to narrow down a focus of a case study discussed in Chapter 7: 
investigating the feasibility of a cross-boundary project affecting a number of people in 
various jurisdictions.  
Site selection for the survey took into consideration the following criteria: (1) 
the size of a community is relatively small and roughly equal to other research sites; 
(2) communities have different levels of socio-political networks with outsiders; (3) 
accessibility to communities is facilitated by gatekeepers; and (4) communities leaders 
understand the purpose of the study and are willing to give permission to conduct the 
survey.  Two communities --787 Quezon Avenue Neighborhood Association and 13th 
Street Neighborhood Association-- were selected based on the criteria.  Both 
communities share a similar population size of around fifty to seventy households and 
are located within the same jurisdiction, Quezon City; the 787 Quezon Avenue 
community participates in a broader alliance of NGOs and informal settlements while 
the 13th Street community is isolated from any kind of working groups and NGO 
                                                  
25 Such assistance includes offering chances to visit multiple settlements and working as an 
intermediary between community leaders and the author. 
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assistance; both communities were referred to via contact persons who helped to 
actualize the implementation of this survey; and community leaders in both 
communities agreed to the objectives of the survey.  After the two research sites were 
selected, one more community was added.  The last community --the Buayang Bato 
community in Pasig City-- has been a part of large-scale on-site housing upgrading 
programs run by a NGO, Gawad Kalinga [GK] and its incorporation into this study 
allows an exploration of the different outcomes between a land-secured community 
and underentitled communities. 
Prior to the start of the questionnaire survey in the communities, 
semi-structured interviews with community leaders were conducted to get a better 
picture of the communities.  Participant observation and unstructured informal 
interviews were also attempted to develop rapport with the residents and observe 
everyday life in the communities, including aspects of day-to-day subsistence, work 
patterns, recreational habits, time schedules, social relationships as well as 
relationships with other neighboring communities.  
Questionnaires were distributed to households on a door-to-door basis.  
Administrators of the questionnaires in the two informal settlements were community 
members; in the case of the Buayang Bato community, GK staff handled the 
questionnaires.  A total of 113 questionnaires were collected back and the obtained 
data was analyzed by mainly employing a ratio approach: calculating a percentage of 
a selected answer out of the total.  Correlations among questions --independent 
variables-- were investigated based on the same ratio approach.  For example, a 
correlation between income and education levels was sought by calculating a 
percentage of the households in the same income and educational group out of the 
total: percentages of each category were used to identify data distribution, thereby 
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developing hypotheses using the correlation. 
 
4.2  Positionality: Location of the Researcher 
 
There are a number of physical, biological, and existential parameters shaping the 
researcher’s positionality: gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and so on.  In 
terms of my positionality as a researcher in the field, the main issue I had to work 
through relates primarily to my nationality as Japanese.  In the course of research, I 
came across several situations where both negative and positive images of ‘Japan’ and 
‘Japanese’ exist in Filipino society.  In addition to the nationality issue, ensuring the 
objectivity of research while maintaining a proper distance from the research subjects 
is another critical question regarding ‘positionality’ in the field. 
 
4.2.1  Impact of Nationality in the Field 
 
In my encounters with my research subjects, nationality tends to be taken as the first 
criterion raised by local people when I am introduced to them.  There were two main 
difficulties I had to confront as Japanese in the Philippines.  The first difficulty 
derives from the history of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and its subsequent 
occupation during World War II, resulting in a generally hostile perception of the 
Japanese.  The negative image of Japan and Japanese as an adversary still persist 
among some people in the country.  The second difficulty lies in the ambiguity 
regarding the ideological location of Japan in the First and Third World paradigm, 
which basically divides the world into either ‘the West or East’ or ‘developed or 
developing’ after the collapse of the Second World conception in the late 1980s.  The 
ambiguity possibly comes from an implicit assumption of ‘the West equals to 
developed nations.’  Japan can be classified as ‘developed’ in economic terms but is 
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not ‘Western’ in geographical and cultural terms; at the same time, Japan cannot be 
categorized as ‘developing’ either.  
In order to cope with historical baggage, I ensured that I had substantial 
knowledge of World War II to be able to engage in dialogue on the war experience 
with my interviewees.  The knowledge allowed me to express serious views on 
Japan’s role in the war and convey my enthusiasm toward the construction of renewed, 
peaceful relationships between Filipino and Japanese.  In dealing with locals who 
thought of the Japanese as arrogant ‘Asians’ because of their greater economic power, I 
tried to play down the economic and material aspects of ‘Japaneseness’ by wearing 
locally suitable clothing in the field and consuming local products and services.  This 
strategy greatly helped me not only adjust and blend myself into living in Metro 
Manila but also to identify with the locals and the locality in which I was situated.  As 
a way to bridge the gap between researcher and the researched, I asked a local person 
who is familiar with life in informal settlements to work as an interpreter for site visits.  
Calling at the settlement with her changed my position in the field tremendously since 
many of the potential research subjects have considerable trust in her as someone who 
could convey their thoughts and claims. 
 Despite a number of difficulties associated with nationality, being Japanese in 
the Philippines is not always negative.  The combination of the image of Japan as a 
successful industrialized country and massive injections of Japanese financial and 
technical assistance into the Philippines meant that Japan may also be perceived by the 
locals as a source of information and technology.  In fact, some of the locals showed 
great interest in the Japanese Official Development Assistance [ODA], drawing on the 
opportunity to inquire about the details of the assistance.  Through these experiences, 
I came to recognize that translating ‘Japaneseness’ into local society requires flexibility 
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and commonsense in adapting to different situations. 
 
4.2.2  Distance from the Research Subjects 
 
Another positionality dilemma I had to deal with is to balance involvement and 
detachment from the research subjects.  I had to constantly gauge what kind of 
distance --how close or far the researcher is to the researched-- I should maintain with 
them as this has an impact on the researcher’s degree of responsibility.  As the 
number of participants with whom a researcher interacts increases, her/his ethical 
world expands, and this may lead to the multiplication of ethical obligations beyond 
the researcher’s capacity and intention.  In the course of this fieldwork, defining an 
adequate distance from the researched and keeping this in a constructive manner is one 
of the major tasks, partly because many of the research subjects, are inclined to see the 
researcher as an advocate, who can solve problems relating to their housing concerns.  
In order to avoid raising the subjects’ expectations, as Sidaway (1992) points out, it is 
necessary to clearly present the scope of the research and its anticipated outcomes 
without making any false promises.  
 
4.3  Concluding Remarks: Significance of Fieldwork in Planning 
 
Conducting fieldwork in the discipline of ‘planning’ represents an effort to identify the 
gap between ideal and reality.  This is because planning is necessarily subject to 
evaluation and feedback after implementation to testify its effectiveness in the real 
world.  Therefore, planning research must be accompanied by on-site inquiry on the 
consequences and impact of current frameworks and practices.  No progress will be 
made without knowing what is going on in the field.  Fieldwork is also the place 
where a researcher can seize the opportunity to bring her/him down to earth through a 
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realization of her/his stance and location in the study.  In addition to developing 
theoretical speculations on the discourse of current enabling housing development, the 
following chapter introduces results of the questionnaire survey in three communities 
to analyze the degrees of empowerment on a micro scale.  Findings of field 
interviews are mainly incorporated in Chapter 6 and 7 in order to illustrate the 
complexity of socio-political networks among concerned actors and identify 












































Articulations between Enablement and 








5.1  Introduction 
 
In many developing countries, two concepts signaling democracy --‘decentralization’ 
and ‘devolution’-- have been gradually inserted into the planning agenda since the 
1980s.  These terms are often used interchangeably.  In the literature, the same 
rhetoric is employed to elucidate the two: the transfer of authority, resources, and 
responsibility from central governments to local units (Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Silva, 
2005).  The distinction between the two may lie in terms of their scope.  
Decentralization implies a broad-based transfer of various functions such as fiscal and 
administrative functions; while devolution is usually introduced to connote a narrower 
focus on the political dimension, involving the redeployment and redistribution of 
decision-making powers.  Regardless of such definitional differences, both concepts 
symbolize the departure from autocratic controls to the dispersal of functions among 
and conferment of power upon diverse local institutions.   
There are two different views regarding the interpretation of decentralization 
and devolution movement (Slater, 1989; Shatkin, 2000).  One view is tied to the 
neoliberal discourse backed by international agencies, notably the World Bank.  In 
this strand of thought, local governments are regarded to be more accountable and 
responsive to providing services in an efficient and cost-effective manner given their 
closeness to their citizens in both geographical proximity (i.e. physical distance) as 
well as accessibility (measured in psychological terms).  This view rationalizes the 
withdrawal of central government interventions and supports the augmentation of 
dependency on the private sector.  The alternative view relates to empowerment 
theory as elaborated in the political economy approach.  According to Friedmann 
(1992), civil society is conceivably a fundamental and appropriate actor in 
implementing locally sustainable development, thereby contributing to the creation of 
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a more democratic society.  A key ingredient of this view bears on the opening up of a 
cloistered political system to achieve the empowerment of the marginalized through 
participation.  Despite the different standpoints in theory, the two views are not 
mutually exclusive in practice.  As Laquian (2005, p.313) mentions, “what was 
needed was to empower the urban poor by giving them the opportunity to participate 
more actively in governance. Enabling and capacity building strategies were adopted 
to give the poor a larger stake in governance.”   
The Philippines’ experience for the last two decades follows this line of 
development.  Since the inauguration of the Aquino administration in 1986, the 
political landscape of Metro Manila has changed from ‘monocentric’ to ‘polycentric.’  
Both the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 have emphasized the autonomy of 
local governments in pursuit of the Philippines’ decentralization and devolution 
attempts.  A series of people-based actions gave great impetus to structural reforms in 
urban governance. The Philippine national government has been eager to buy into 
the enabling housing strategies, which bundle a ‘top-down’ neoliberal development 
model with a ‘bottom-up’ empowerment model.  Enabling housing strategies were 
embodied in the formulation of a pro-poor legislation, the UDHA of 1992.  Since its 
enactment, the UDHA has served as a foothold for those claiming squatters’ rights to 
defend their life space.  Nonetheless, the real impact of the reforms from a political 
perspective remains unclear.  In other words, questions need to be posited whether the 
practice of enablement have indeed increased the political capacity of the 
marginalized.   
This chapter starts with a description of the theoretical concepts of enablement 
and empowerment.  What do these principles exactly refer to and aspire to achieve?  
In what context, do the two emerge and how have they gained currency in the policy 
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and planning arena?  Following this, the chapter critically appraises the prevailing 
view that the demise of centralized, authoritarian governance represents a shift from a 
top-down to bottom-up model of planning.  It argues that if enablement frameworks 
provide the basis for creating favorable environments to empowering alienated citizens, 
we also need to be able to measure the degrees of empowerment.  In short, based on 
the theoretical elaboration in the first half of this chapter, the second half is devoted to 
a detailed examination of the articulations between enablement and empowerment in 
practice.  The second half contains both macro-scale and micro-scale analyses.  The 
macro-scale analysis looks at empowerment at the program implementation level to 
evaluate the effectiveness of present planning frameworks.  The micro-scale analysis 
examines empowerment at the level of subsistence in order to illustrate how the 
decisions of allocating resources to obtain certain empowerment assets are made in a 
given household economy and how such decisions affects a community’s viability of 
enhancing collective actions.   
 
5.2  Ideological Interplay between Enablement and Empowerment 
 
In brief, enablement in the context of housing development is a holistic approach in 
which the state provides frameworks to encourage housing development by people 
themselves, engaging the private sector in order to mobilize all relevant resources.  
Under the prevailing climate of neoliberalism during the 1980s, the reduction of 
governmental interventions was justified to let markets function on behalf of the public 
sector.  It was believed that macroeconomic stabilization would improve the overall 
performance of the economy and in fact, it was one of the necessary conditions to 
relieve the Third World debt crisis in the early 1980s.  However in the aftermath, 
macroeconomic neoliberal approaches such as structural adjustment programs 
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triggered numerous adverse impacts on societies in the developing world.  A shift 
from welfare regimes to macroeconomic austerity programs has gradually caused 
social instability.  Due to the diminution in public spending which was supposed to 
correct market failures, disparities between the rich and the poor have widened and the 
number of vulnerable households has multiplied.  In particular, advancement of 
privatization and its associated commodification trend intensified social divides, 
jeopardizing the livelihood of the urban poor.  “Based on the principle of maximizing 
private profit, urban infrastructure and services concessionaries naturally focus their 
efforts on social groups with the capacity to pay. Thus, they are not motivated to 
extend their services to the poor and the underprivileged” (Laquian, 2005, p.312).  
The shortcomings of neoliberalism revealed did force policy orientations to 
value the significance of social development.  With the purpose of alleviating social 
problems and providing equitable access to services, neoliberal principles in housing 
development were modified to place more emphasis on a reconfiguration of 
state-market-civil society relations through the promotion of partnerships among all 
concerned parties.  In the striving for the reconfiguration, decentralization and 
devolution have gained legitimacy based on the assumption that ‘local’ and 
‘subnational’ governments are more appropriate units to take their citizens into the 
planning process.  This is where decentralization and devolution are theoretically 
connected with democratization.  In fact, such a view is nothing new in the field of 
housing development.  At the beginning of the 1980s, Turner (1983) had already 
addressed the need for institutional changes and collaboration of related actors through 
decentralization.  However, a noteworthy alteration during the following ten years is a 
combination of economic drives --neoliberal approaches-- with political restructuring 
--institutional reforms-- and social development to correct market failures.  Premised 
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on its advocacy of the private sector’s contribution to housing development, the 
enabling model proposed by the World Bank (1993) underlines that governments 
should embark on reforming legislative, regulatory, and institutional settings to 
reinforce participatory planning.  Apart from putting stress on the importance of the 
state’s role to eliminating and mitigating market failure effects, housing policies 
predicated on this understanding started pushing an egalitarian perspective 
--empowerment of civil society through participation-- to the forefront of planning 
agenda.  “Civil society can, according to neoliberals, exert organized pressure on 
autocratic and unresponsive states and thereby support democratic stability and good 
governance. Civil society institutions can also be vehicles for participation in 
development programme and empowerment of target groups of poor people” (Mohan 
& Stokke, 2000, p.248).  Thus the concrete objective of enablement contains further 
empowerment of civil society which serves to invigorate democratization of 
decision-making mechanisms in urban governance.  Given the long history of civil 
society’ persistent activity, inclusion of empowerment articles in legislations should be 
interpreted not as contemporary phenomenon emerging with the ideological shift of 
policy, but as outcomes produced by continuing interactions between the state and civil 
society.  This way of viewing the inclusion understands the development of 
participatory planning as a consequence brought by increasing civic power.  
Therefore, in this view, the rise of the empowerment discourse and practice in the 
policy arena is as an inevitable result owing to prolonged encounters between the state 
and civil society.  From another perspective which is a focus of this chapter, 
empowerment can be intentionally proposed and manipulated by the state to control 
and/or utilize civic power through inclusion.  In order to clarify this point, the 




5.2.1 Enablement as ‘Top-down’ Empowerment 
 
An important question that needs to be asked is whether empowerment process comes 
with or against enablement.  In his well-known book, Empowerment: the Politics of 
Alternative Development, John Friedmann (1992) conceptualizes the theory of 
empowerment.  According to him, the origin of empowerment is attributed to a 
critique of growth-maximization models of economic development, which have 
aggravated the degree of vulnerability of the marginalized.  “An alternative 
development is centered on people and their environment rather than production and 
profits. And just as the paradigm in the dominance approaches the question of 
economy growth from the perspective of the firm, which is the foundation of 
neoclassical economics, so an alternative development, based as it must be on the life 
spaces of civil society, approaches the question of an improvement in the condition of 
life and livelihood from a perspective of the household” (Friedmann, 1992, p.31).  
Taking households as a fundamental unit of empowerment, alternative development 
entails the translation of households’ social power26 into political power through 
practice.  And to transform political claims into legitimate entitlements, a supportive 
political environment has to exist to make the transformation happen.  A key to 
creating the environment is embedded in cooperation with the state: “although an 
alternative development must begin locally, it cannot end there. Like it or not, the state 
continues to be a major player. It may need to be made more accessible to poor people 
                                                  
26 The (dis)empowerment model of poverty begins with the assumption that marginalized 
households are deficient in social power to improve their living conditions.  The basic social 
power consists of the following eight items: (1) defensible life space, (2) surplus time, (3) 
knowledge and skills, (4) appropriate information, (5) social organization, (6) social networks, (7) 
instruments of work and livelihood, and (8) financial resources.  Of these, securing life space, 
surplus time, and social organization and networks are regarded as bases to obtain remaining 
aspects of social power. 
 65
and more responsive to their claims. But without the state’s collaboration, the lot of the 
poor cannot be significantly improved. Local empowering action requires a strong 
state” (Friedmann, 1992, p.7).   Thus, Friedmann argues that empowerment will not 
be realized by opposing the state, but by advancing internal reforms of an existing 
system.  Furthermore, collaboration with a third party which serves as a provider of 
technical and financial assistance as well as a mediator with authorities must be set up: 
external organizations like NGOs play an important role in the process of 
emancipating the disempowered from traditional dependency on the state. 
 Friedmann’s view on empowerment thus represents a ‘top-down’ approach to 
empowerment.  ‘Top-down’ empowerment implies that the powerful, particularly the 
state, provides opportunities for the people to take alternative activities, thereby 
achieving an inclusive democracy while maintaining existing orders.  On the contrary, 
‘bottom-up’ empowerment begins with resistance of the disempowered against the 
powerful with the aim of changing existing orders (Somerville, 1998).  According to 
Mohan & Stokke (2000), the former can be described as ‘revisionist neoliberalism’ 
which lays weight on participation; while the latter can be called ‘post-Marxism’ 
which focuses on collective mobilization against systematic disempowerment brought 
by the state and the market.  Despite the difference in standpoint, Mohan & Stokke 
(2000) assert that both revisionist neoliberalism and post-Marxism share a common 
belief that states or markets cannot and should not assume the whole responsibility of 
securing equal welfare distribution.   
Considering the current enabling strategies, empowerment in current 
legislations tends to fall into the ‘top-down’ model in many cases since it is carried 
forward through the enhancement of participation within the state’s framework.  In 
this light, describing the downside of the ‘top-down’ model would be useful in order to 
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reveal gaps between ideal and reality where empowerment is concerned.  Somerville 
(1998) lists two possible downsides.  First, ‘top-down’ empowerment might doom 
participation to a political excuse on the part of the state without producing any 
substantial outcome; second, although the initial objective of empowerment assumes 
the increase in independence of vulnerable, poor people, collaboration with the state 
and external organizations may end up with increased dependency, which in turn could 
lead to disempowerment.  These points suggests the need of perceiving 
‘empowerment’ as both a process (of empowering the targets) and an outcome (of the 
targets are empowered).  In addition to Somerville’s analysis of the downsides, 
Cornwall & Brock (2005) carefully look into the danger of abusing catchy ‘buzzwords’ 
which are participation, empowerment, and poverty reduction.  In their assertion, 
those words “come together in mainstream development discourse in a chain of 
equivalence with ownership, accountability, governance and partnership to make the 
world that the neoliberal model would have us all inhabit” (2005, p.1057).  What this 
points out is, all the appealing words indicating problems and solutions are put into the 
same kitchen sink, namely development discourse.  They sound plausible, thereby 
making it difficult for people to disagree with them.  To avoid being trapped by words 
alone, attention need to be paid to “what is actually being done in the name of 
participation, empowerment, and poverty reduction, and to ask questions about the 
extent to which this represents real differences in practice” (Cornwall & Brock, 2005, 
p.1044). 
 Debates on the outcomes guide us to explore how to measure degrees of 
empowerment.  An analysis done by Alsop & Heinsohn (2005) focuses such 
measurement on the capacity of making an effective choice.  According to them, 
there are two critical factors affecting the capacity to choose.  The first factor is 
 67
‘agency’: an actor’s ability to make a productive choice.  Indicators introduced to 
measure agency are ‘asset endowments.’  The assets that Alsop & Heinsohn (2005) 
list can be roughly categorized into either social or economic orientations.  Social 
aspects include psychological, organizational, informational, and human assets; 
economic aspects contain material and financial assets.  These assets are intimately 
related to one another.  Increase of one asset has a multiplier effect to heighten other 
assets in consequence.  For instance, education --a human asset-- not only expands 
the accessibility to information --an information asset-- and enhances the capacity of 
envisioning alternative options --a psychological asset (Alsop & Heinsohn, 2005), but 
also enlarges a chance to get better-paid, regular jobs which contribute to accumulation 
of material and financial assets.  The second factor includes both formal and informal 
‘opportunity structures.’  Formal structures denote legislative and regulatory 
frameworks; informal structures involve covert norms and customs operating at the 
level of subsistence.  Given the fact that Alsop & Heinsohn’s analysis is associated 
with the investigation of the World Bank’s research team, it is not surprising that 
empowerment in their perspective draws on revisionist neoliberalism.  This explains 
why the main argument of this measurement approach concentrates on (1) the degrees 
of empowerment within existing systems; and (2) the importance of institutional 
settings enabling the targets to empower themselves.  Under the present dominance of 
the World Bank’s enabling housing strategies in developing countries, this 
measurement approach provides a starting point to assess the progress of 
empowerment in the housing context. 
 
5.3  Evaluation of Programs and Frameworks: Macro-scale Analysis 
 
In the Philippines, a sequence of democratic pro-poor, local-based legislations since 
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1986 have urged socialized housing development for the underentitled through the 
reinforcement of participatory planning.  A signature ‘enabling’ housing program 
invented in the new era is the CMP, widely regarded as a successful scheme advancing 
the improvement of informal settlements and the empowerment of marginalized 
communities.  As Berner (2000, p.560) says, “the CMP was the first result of this 
(enabling) paradigm shift.”  This section begins with a review of the CMP before 
turning to an overall assessment of the existing housing framework (legislation and 
institutional settings), focusing on the way the framework has been put into practice.  
 
5.3.1  Effectiveness of the Community Mortgage Program  
 
The CMP, which was formulated in 1987 under the Aquino administration, was 
institutionalized under the UDHA of 1992.  The program makes loans available to 
urban poor communities for land acquisition, housing construction, and/or site 
improvement without putting up collaterals.  The average loan amount is PHP 31,000 
per household at a subsidized annual interest rate of 6% to be repaid over a period of 
25 years, provided by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation [NHMFC].27  
Its main budgetary support was confirmed by the approval of the CISFA of 1994.  
The basic scheme of the CMP is founded on incremental development.  In many 
cases, loans firstly go to the purchase of land and site development comes after 
securing land titles.  In general, the CMP adequately addresses and responds to the 
need of the marginalized with regard to the amelioration of their substandard 
settlements.  In the period between 1989 and 2003, the total number of families and 
communities assisted by the program reached 140,650 and 1,126 respectively; its 
                                                  
27 In 1994, the NHMFC was assigned to administer the CMP under RA No. 7179.  The history of 
the NHMFC dates back to 1977: it was established by virtue of PD No. 1267.  Later on, the 
NHMFC became as one of the key agencies in the implementation of the NSP under EO No.90 in 
1986 and then, it was mandated as the major government home mortgage institution.  In 1989, it 
was integrated into the big umbrella of the HUDCC under EO No. 357 (COA, 2000a). 
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repayment rate of 75% is the highest of all government housing loan programs (Mitlin, 
2005).  This success primarily owes to a low monthly amortization rate of the CMP: 
PHP 300 families on the average (Karaos, n.a.).   
The CMP contains two innovative features.  First, it requires target 
beneficiaries to organize a community association; and the land title secured through 
the CMP is transferred not to individual families but to the association.  Apart from 
economic benefits such as material and financial assets, undergoing the process of 
forming the association brings considerable social gains.  In the process, a sense of 
solidarity is born through participation, developing social capital among residents 
(Porio et al., 2004; Mitlin, 2005).  In recent empowerment debates, the importance of 
social capital has been widely acknowledged as a means of binding communities 
together to help increase the political capacity for decision-making (Karaos, 1997; 
Mohan & Stokke, 2000).  Porio et al. (2004) illustrate certain empowerment 
outcomes brought about by social capital: strengthening the association boosts 
confidence to negotiate with landlords and officials, and particularly women are more 
likely to find themselves empowered by playing key roles in the negotiations.  Thus, 
community organizing becomes a source of psychological and social assets.  Besides, 
the existence of a stable community association is critical for incremental development 
in communal infrastructure and environmental improvements that necessarily call for 
collective activities (Mitlin, 2005).  In the course of collective activities, residents 
learn the meaning of participation and ways to mobilize common resources.   
The second innovative feature of the CMP is the need for a financing plan 
originated by external organizations or agencies such as NGOs, LGUs, or national 
housing agencies.28  An originator of the plan assumes responsibility for ensuring 
                                                  
28 The fee for the origination is PHP 500 per family or 2% of a loan amount if it exceeds PHP 500.  
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compliance of documentary requirements and payment of amortizations.  This 
mandate works effectively in encouraging communities to build collaborative networks 
with external institutions, notably NGOs.  In addition to formulating the plan, NGOs 
provide assistance for community organizing and training (Porio et al., 2004), give 
legal information necessary for the application, facilitate negotiations with landlords, 
and offer other services such as surveying and consultations (Berner, 2000).  More 
importantly, communities gain many opportunities to expand their networks with 
external organizations because the ‘originator’ NGOs perform brokering functions (for 
details, see Chapter 6).  The second feature hence stimulates the cultivation of 
organizational, informational, and human assets.  Both features combine to set up a 
conductive environment for satisfying Alson & Heinsohn’s ‘asset endowments.’  In 
line with their discussion, the formal opportunity structure provided by the CMP has 
the advantage of strengthening the capacity of agency and promoting higher degrees of 
empowerment. 
 
5.3.2 Critique of the Community Mortgage Program and Existing Legislative 
and Institutional Frameworks 
 
Despite these advantages, the CMP has several drawbacks, many of which stem from 
the overarching enablement housing framework.  Financial constraint is the first 
factor that has reduced the feasibility and sustainability of many housing programs.  
Between 1995 and 1998, the allocated budget through the CISFA for overall socialized 
housing programs totaled PHP 38.5 billion and PHP 12.5 billion of the budget was 
allocated to the CMP.  Nevertheless, the amount of the total budget actually released 
was PHP 7.5 billion.  For the CMP, less than 30% of its approved PHP 12.5 billion 
was released (ADB, 2001; Mitlin, 2005).  In effect, the CMP has reached less than 
4% of all the families living in illegal and substandard settlements nationwide (Berner, 
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2000).  The latest data on the CMP shows that the scale of the program keeps 
shrinking.  While PHP 2.7 billion was available to the CMP for the year 2000, only 
PHP 199 million was released during the first quarter of the year.  In the following 
year 2001, this slowing-down trend was further apparent in that only PHP 38 million 
was released to cover merely 819 families during the first quarter of the year (Mitlin, 
2005).  Statistics reveals that, during the Aquino era from 1986 to 1992, the number 
of housing units provided was 268,249 against the estimated housing need of 2.6 
million.  During the Ramos era from 1992 to 1998, only 598,374 units were provided 
against the estimated housing needs of 3.7 million (ADB, 2001).  In the subsequent 
Estrada and Arroyo administrations, albeit high priority being accorded to housing 
provision, socialized housing initiatives have further experienced a sharp downturn.  
Table 5.1 lists the number of housing assistance provided between 2001 and 2004.  It 
shows that the accomplishment ratio of socialized housing (56%) is well below that of 
low-cost housing (122%).  The decelerating rate of socialized housing provision is 
also reflected in the cutback of the CMP: the number of household beneficiaries 
severely declined from 28,474 in 2001, to 19,529 in 2002, and further to 11,453 in 
2003 (NEDA, 2004). 
 
Table 5.1  Housing Targets and Accomplishments 
 








880,000 207,940 118,987 84,716 81,853 493,496
Low Cost (PHP 
225,000 to PHP 
2 million)  
320,000 54,447 74,306 114,507 146,067 389,327
Total 1,200,000 262,387 193,293 199,223 227,920 882,823
Source: NEDA (2004, p.59, quoting the HUDCC) 
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Contextual reasons for the overall decrease of socialized housing and increase 
of low-cost housing are at least two-fold.  First, policy-makers, housing-related 
officials, and the private sector tend to concentrate on new housing constructions rather 
than existing stock improvements and utilization.  While the promotion of the private 
sector’s involvement has occupied an important part of the Philippines’ enabling 
strategies, the construction of cheap socialized housing which produces only nominal 
profits has not attracted bottom-liner companies.  The increase in low-cost housing 
provision might signal a loss of the private sector’s interest in socialized housing.  
This shift is largely concerned with the second contextual issue: the rapid rise of urban 
land prices.  The effectiveness of the CMP was comparably high at its initial stage 
when land prices remained affordable; however, the escalating land prices in Metro 
Manila have made it almost impossible to implement in-city socialized housing 
programs.  “In short, the CMP alone is not suitable to solve the sharpening 
contradiction of high land prices and the low income of the large majority of the 
population. Under market rules, it would at best produce middle-class settlements on 
the urban fringe” (Berner, 2000, p.561).  In spite of a very efficient building industry 
and relaxed standards and regulations for low-cost housing, even the cheapest housing 
units constructed by unsubsidized private developers were not within the reach of 
many low-income households (Strassmann, 1996).  Moreover, high land prices in 
urban areas also led to an amendment of the UDHA.  Under the original UDHA, the 
private sector had to construct the required socialized housing within the same 
city/municipality as the main project; but the amendment made in 1994 permitted an 
attached socialized housing project to be carried out in an adjacent city/municipality.  
In effect, the locations of socialized housing tend to be in remote, peripheral areas 
isolated from livelihood activities and social housing programs started shifting 
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attention to suburban resettlement development instead of on-city improvement.   
Interest in resettlement schemes became most strongly evident during the 
Estrada era.  The Estrada administration enthusiastically committed itself to 
developing large-scale resettlement sites like Erap City for informal settlers living 
along rivers and tributaries (Porio, 2001).  This orientation clearly exemplifies the 
state’s attitude toward soaring land prices: the preference is to divert development 
focus to the suburbs rather than to plow funds into urban land reforms.  In his critique 
of the Philippines’ enablement framework as a neoliberal, market-driven approach, 
Shatkin (2000, p.2360) sets forth that “as a result of …reforms (based on the 
enablement model), national governments are able to cut expenditures while also 
accessing the resources of international organizations, local governments gain 
increased autonomy, the for-profit private sector gains freedom from much central state 
regulation and civil society organizations are provided with opportunities to influence 
decision-making… (However, the enablement model) also stresses that governments 
should refrain from intervening in land markets.”  In contradiction to anticipated 
outcomes, the enabling housing approach in the Philippines indeed has brought the 
diminution of government’s accountabilities and responsibilities for overall 
development activities. 
One of the most controversial parts of the enabling housing strategies 
concerns the progress of institutional-loaded reforms.  The Philippines’ experience 
offers a good example demonstrating that facilitation of appropriate institutional 
settings is not sufficient.  The idea and content of the LGC and the UDHA constitute 
a progressive yardstick for socialized housing development and people’s empowerment.  
Nonetheless, problems exist in the operation phrase.  Many local NGO staff lament, 
“the concepts behind the legislation are impressive, but the problem lies in their 
 74
institutionalization and operationalization.”  In the case of the CMP, the insufficient 
capacity of handling agencies, especially the NHMFC, has redounded to administrative 
delays and an increasing backlog (Berner, 2000).  For example, the completion of 
CMP projects from the time of submitting an application to finalizing financing has 
often been prolonged to three years.  Such inefficiency is mainly attributed to existing 
structures, particularly in the excessive centralization of all the procedures at the 
NHMFC head office in Manila (ADB, 2001).  To cope with this problem, NGOs has 
proposed the creation of an autonomous corporation for the CMP: the Social Housing 
Finance Corporation [SHFC].  The SHFC shall serve as the primary institution in 
charge of addressing the housing needs of the poorest 30% households; and the CMP 
assets shall be transferred to the SHFC (Porio et al., 2004; Mitlin, 2005).   
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the planning agenda.  The Mid-term Philippine Development Plan of 2004-2010 
prepared by the National Economic and Development Authority [NEDA] (2004) 
specifies in the Action Plan of Legislative Agenda the need to enhance the institutional 
capacity of housing related agencies.  In addition to the creation of the SHFC, the 
agenda includes, first, the elevation of the HUDCC to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development [DHUD] as a leading government agency responsible for dealing 
with rapid urbanization, urban poverty, growth disparities, and precarious urban 
environments.  The HUDCC has been set up as the consolidated administrative 
agency tasked to supervise various national agencies involved in housing development 
(see Figure 5.1); but its organizational structure has systematically forfeited power to 
others.  The elevation into the DHUD, which is expected to function as the ‘one-stop’ 
agency, will streamline the procedures while harmonizing all housing related agencies 
(NEDA, 2004; Porio, 2001).29  Another important plan embraced in the agenda is the 
foundation of Local Housing Boards [LHBs] in every city and municipality.  LHBs 
shall function as a stepping-stone, taking the people’s voice up to the higher authorities.  
Despite the ongoing decentralized efforts, the LGUs’ contribution to the existing 
housing framework remains low.  Two reasons account for this.  First, LGUs have 
often hesitated to observe the UDHA because certain provisions are politically 
sensitive, such as the identification of vacant land for socialized housing because the 
land is owned by politically influential groups (Shatkin, 2000).  Second, housing 
programs for the urban poor have been largely initiated by the national government so 
that LGUs have in general depended on the national government for implementing 
housing solutions (Karaos, 1997).  Thus, the LGUs’ accountabilities mandated in the 
                                                  
29 The proposal of the transforming the HUDCC into the DHUD was sent to the Philippine 
Congress during the Estrada era; however, this reform had to be postponed due to the change in the 
administration to the Arroyo government in 2001 (Porio, 2001).  The role of the DHUD --policy 
and plan formulation and overall management of urban development-- is well defined in the ADB’s 
study, Institutional Strengthening of the Housing and Urban Development Sector (Ragradio, 2003).  
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LGC and UDHA have not been actually fulfilled.  It is hoped that the foundation of 
LHBs would raise the LGUs’ capacity for independent intervention to complement 
deficiencies of the national government’s housing programs.  
In spite of its ambitious envisioning, however, the agenda has faced 
substantial delays in the actual operationalization.  For instance, the SHFC was 
created in January 2004 by virtue of EO No.272; but it has not been registered yet as of 
July 2005.  Furthermore, the foundation of LHBs has not been approved by the 
Congress.  In order to inform the public of this delay and demand quick action from 
the state, the Urban Poor Alliance (2005), a consolidation of hundreds of NGOs, POs, 
academics, and other third parties, took out a full-page advertisement in a major 
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, on July 10, 2005.  In the advertisement, the 
Urban Poor Alliance (2005) also claims the establishment of an autonomous 
commission to ensure proper implementation of Section 28 of the UDHA with the 
authority to investigate violation and prosecute violators.  Section 28, which prohibits 
evictions without relocation sites provided, has never been effectively applied.  In 
reality, forcible demolitions have continued even after the passage of the UDHA (see 
Table 5.2).  According to a study conducted by the Urban Poor Associates [UPA], a 
weighty NGO specializing in the issue of anti-eviction, only 401 out of the 11,480 
displaced families received relocation sites or cash compensation in 1996 (UPA, 1998).  
These figures imply that the rate of compliance to Section 28 was only 3.5%.30  This 
complication well illustrates that enacting legislation is not enough; what is urgently 
needed is the facilitation of adequate institution settings to realize operationalization. 
                                                  
30 Reasons of this low compliance rate are three-fold: (1) many LGUs are not committed to 
relocation programs for the families evicted from privately-owned lands (Karaos, 1996), (2) in 
most of the cases, renters or sharers in settlements are excluded as beneficiaries while the UDHA 
originally counts them in as beneficiaries (UPA, 1998), and (3) extension of moratorium on 
demolitions under the UDHA was defied by President Ramos in September 1995 and his veto 
turned into a major setback for the implementation of the UDHA (Karaos, 1996). 
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Provided with relocation 
sites 
      Public Private   
1986-91 278 600,000 - - 90% no relocation 
1992 68 13,671 37 22 Hardly any relocation 
1993 42 11,621 25 15
67% no relocation, 31% 
relocated, 2% with cash 
compensation 
1994 28 1,799 19 8 <55% relocated 
1995 16 4,895 8 8
81% no relocation, 13% 
temporarily relocated, 6% 
relocated 
1996 >28 6,975 11 9
75% no relocation, 14% 
with cash compensation, 7% 
relocated, 4% temporarily 
relocated 
1997 16 8,067 10 4 31% relocated 
1998 20 3,882 14 6 86% relocated 
1999 16 2,424 7 8 17% relocated 
Source: Antolihao (2004, p.8)    
 
In sum, the Philippines’ enabling housing strategies contain elements of 
‘top-down’ empowerment.  While certain housing programs targeting low-income 
households, notably the CMP, have obtained success in heightening the degrees of 
empowerment to some extent, the Philippines’ experience reveals several lessons.  
First, the strategies present no viable solution to untangle distorted urban land markets.  
Second, the private sector’s contribution to socialized housing remains small and 
ineffective.  Third, outcomes of ‘top-down’ empowerment depend largely on the 
institutional capacity to operationalize existing pro-poor legislations.  Fourth, 
institutional settings are not flexible and dynamic to respond to up-to-date situations.   
 
5.4 Degrees of Empowerment in Households and Communities: Micro-scale 
Analysis 
 
In addition to macro-level analysis of the operationalization of planning frameworks, 
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closer scrutiny at ground level would be useful in understanding the reality of 
empowerment among households and communities.  Empowerment consists of 
multiple social, economic, and political dimensions.  In Alsop & Heinsohn’s asset 
endowments above, manifold factors are intricately encompassed: social, human, 
psychological, organizational, informational, material and financial assets.  Increase 
of an asset is intertwined with increase of another asset.  Thus, analyzing correlations 
among assets would help us understand the complexities of the empowerment process. 
Flows of empowerment processes are not uniform.  Instead, they depend on 
the specific context.  Roughly classified, there are two models demonstrating 
empowerment paths.  The first type [Model I] starts with empowerment of individual 
households and then extend up the scale to bigger units.  The underlying purpose of 
Model I is to enhance social mobility of a household and lead to a realization of 
collective empowerment at the community level.  The second type [Model II] is 
based on expectations of a trickle-down effect, i.e. taking off with community 
empowerment and then channeling it to the individual household level.  In Model II, 
social mobilization comes first to pursue common interests for an entire community.   
 
Figure 5.2  Street View of the Buayang Bato Community 
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Figure 5.3  View of the 787 Quezon Avenue Community 
 
      





In order to explore the processes and models of empowerment in the context 
of housing development, this section introduces results of surveys in three 
communities with different backgrounds and compares them.  The first community is 
the GK Buayang Bato community located in Pasig City along the Pasig River (see 
Figure 5.2).  This community succeeded in securing land titles and started upgrading 
of the settlement with the assistance of a prominent NGO: Gawad Kalinga.  The 
second is 787 Quezon Avenue Neighborhood Association situated on a riverbank of the 
Pasig River tributary in Quezon City (see Figure 5.3).  This community is designated 
as one of the affected informal settlements in the PRRP (for details, see Chapter 7) and 
has been fighting against forcible eviction in close conjunction with Quezon 
City-based NGOs.  The third is 13th Street Neighborhood Association sitting at the 
dead end of a street in Quezon City (see Figure 5.4).  In this community, no external 
support or interventions exist as it tries to shield itself from demolition.  The main 
focus of this comparative study is to uncover how the security of land titles and the 
existence of external assistance affect residents’ perceptions toward housing 
improvement and degrees of empowerment of households and communities. 
 
5.4.1  Empowerment Model in the Context of Housing Development 
 
At the outset, this section starts with discussions of generally assumed correlations in 
Model I to grasp the inadequacies of the model.  Regarding social mobility on an 
individual household scale, one of the positive correlations is found between education 
--human asset-- and income --financial asset: higher educational level, larger income.  
Results from the three communities substantiate this correlation.  Figure 5.5 shows 
the percentages of monthly income groups by educational attainments at both 
individual (I) and household (H) levels.  Graphs in the category (I) are drawn based 
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on income of an individual household’s head by her/his educational backgrounds; 
graphs in the category (H) collate data on total households’ income by the head’s 
educational attainment.  At the individual level (I), 87% of the heads with only 
elementary education fall into income segments below PHP 5,000.  Yet at the 
household level (H), that percentage reduces to 54%; in fact, 20% of them reach higher 
income segments over PHP 10,000, and unemployment rate drops from 20% to 7%.  
These observations imply that households in this group comprise multiple 
breadwinners to obtain a livelihood.  In contrast, college and vocational school 
graduates maintain almost the same percentages at both individual and household 
levels.  This suggests that households in these groups with tertiary education records 
consist of a single breadwinner, whose income level is relatively high.    
 
Figure 5.5  Percentages of Monthly Income Groups by Educational Attainments 
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In addition to higher salary, college and vocational school graduates are more 
likely to enjoy job stability.  By looking into job types by educational levels, it reveals 
that jobs taken by those with elementary and high school education require low initial 
investments and skills.  For example, waster pickers and garbage collectors are 
mainly found in the ‘elementary’ group; tricycle/jeepny drivers are the dominant job 
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available to the ‘high school’ groups.  On the contrary, a substantial number in the 
‘college’ and ‘vocational school’ groups tend to obtain positions at company as 
technicians or professionals (see Figure 5.6).  The hypothesis that education 
contributes to enhancement of financial assets --income-- and psychological assets 
--the stability of earnings-- seems valid.  
 
Figure 5.6  Types of Jobs by Educational Attainments 
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Figure 5.7  Income Distribution of the Three Researched Communities  
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Table 5.3  Educational Attainments in the Three Researched Communities  
 
  Buayang Bato 787 Quezon Avenue 13th Street 
Elementary 17% 21% 19%
High school 63% 65% 50%
College 14% 14% 23%
Vocational school 6% 0% 8%
 
Next, the relationship between the level of financial assets and the security of 
land titles is analyzed to find out whether secured titles are related to higher income.  
Figure 5.7 shows income distributions of underentitled communities --787 Quezon 
Avenue and 13th Street-- and a land-secured community --Buayang Bato.  
Comparison between 787 Quezon Avenue and Buayang Bato presents a clear 
correlation between secured titles and higher income: the average monthly income per 
household in 787 Quezon Avenue, PHP 6,089, is far below the one of Buayang Bato, 
PHP 7,811.  However, the result of 13th Street throws doubt on this correlation as its 
average monthly income of the settlement, PHP 8,492, records the highest among three 
communities.  A possible reason for this lies in educational attainments of 
households’ heads.  As Table 5.3 exhibits, 31% of the households’ heads in 13th Street 
have tertiary education.  At a glance, educational levels in 787 Quezon Avenue and 
Buayang Bato look similar except in terms of the percentage of vocational school 
graduates.  Yet there is a decisive factor differentiating the average household 
incomes of the two: the percentages of multiple breadwinners.  An interesting finding 
in this light is that the incidence of multiple breadwinners in a household is critical in 
defining the economic capacity of the household rather than the educational attainment 
and occupation of the household head and members.  In 787 Quezon Avenue, only 
15% of the total households have multiple breadwinners compared to 30.3% in 
Buayang Bato and 37% in 13th Street.  In analyzing a profile of households earning 
over PHP10,000 a month, multi-breadwinners households account for 80% in Buayang 
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Bato and 75% in 13th Street31; but the percentage in 787 Quezon Avenue is 0%, 
indicating all households with the income levels over PHP10,000 make a living 
through earning of a single breadwinner.  In this context, establishing a 
multiple-breadwinner system is a means of improving organizational assets at the 
individual household level to compensate for a lower level of educational assets.  
Therefore, as Friedmann (1992) mentions, the ‘household’ should be recognized as the 
most fundamental unit of civil society nurturing organizational assets, where various 
negotiations take place in terms of conducting consumption, production, and 
reproduction activities and distributing resources.   
 Another crucial parameter wielding an influence on human and financial 
assets is the existence of international migrant labor --overseas Filipino workers 
[OFWs].  In 787 Quezon Avenue, the percentage of households where members have 
sought work overseas remains negligible, only 2%, as against 22% and 21% in 
Buayang Bato and 13th Street respectively.32  While migrant remittances33 are first of 
all allocated to everyday household expenditures, residual amounts are used to cover 
educational costs for other household members.  In other words, certain portions of 
financial assets are translated into improving human assets (rather than material assets 
such as land).  This is the preferred household strategy given the widely held 
assumption that higher education will ensure better job status and income and enhance 
social mobility.  As a result, investment in land and/or housing has lost out in terms of 
priority, accounting for the fact that sometimes, no obvious difference can be spelled 
out in terms of income distribution between secured- and unsecured-land communities. 
                                                  
31 The household, whose monthly income is the highest of all respondents, PHP30,000, contains 
five breadwinners. 
 
32 These figures would affirm that the transnationalization of labor among the urban poor is a key 
to enhance the economic viability of a community and increase social mobility of a household. 
 
33 The amount of remittance ranges from PHP 5,000 to PHP 15,000 a month. 
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Therefore, higher human and financial assets may not be translated into 
investment in improving physical housing conditions.  Comparisons between 13th 
Street and 787 Quezon Avenue underpin this point.  Despite the higher average 
income of 13th Street, the percentage of households living in a multiple-room unit is far 
lower than in 787 Quezon Avenue.  In 13th Street, only 7% of households reside in a 
unit with more than two rooms compared to 32% in 787 Quezon Avenue, which is in 
fact the highest among the three communities.  Moreover, with respect to basic 
utilities and furnishings, the 787 Quezon Avenue community enjoys more secured and 
stable service provision.  The installation rate of water-pipes and meters by the 
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System [MWSS] is high, and a considerable 
number of households have access to electricity provided by a private company called 
Meralco.  In contrast, basic utilities provision in the 13th Street community is rather 
poor.  Only one water stand has been set up by the MWSS, so the residents basically 
get water from the stand and save it in tanks.  As for electricity, 61% of the 
households are categorized as either ‘jumpers’ (illegally tapping electricity from 
neighbors and paying a nominal fee or nothing for it) or have ‘no access.’   
In short, while there are synergies between improving human and financial 
assets, the link connecting these assets with housing improvement tends to be 
problematic.  In fact, of all respondent households in two underentitled settlements, 
none of the households with an OFW member has spent any of the remittances on 
housing repair/improvement and land acquisition.  Furthermore, households with 
savings for housing upgrading account only for 14% and 18% in the two settlements 
respectively.  Instead of envisaging a long-term goal like housing development and 
saving money for it, people are more likely to allocate financial assets to the purchase 
of less expensive, quick-to-obtain material assets.  This is partly because unceasing 
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threats of eviction and arson direct people to invest not in unmovable properties like 
housing/land but in movable goods like home appliances.   
To approach the issue differently, housing development requires community 
empowerment.  The improvement of the living environment must embrace security of 
land tenure, installation of basic utilities, and facilitation of a safer built-environment 
on the community scale.  Hence it entails increase of the community’s institutional 
capacity to consolidate collective efforts and bring about consensus among residents.  
As the analysis of the survey results illustrates, enhancement of social mobility at the 
individual household level does not lead to substantial actions toward the amelioration 
of the living environment.  It must be acknowledged that Model I is somewhat flawed 
in defining financial assets as a dependent variable.  Greater economic power will not 
always produce a higher motivation toward housing improvement.  Financial 
constraints are no doubt a well-known impediment to housing improvement; 
nonetheless, effective strategies need to go beyond financial assets to better focus on 
institutional constraints --weak social and organizational assets-- that hinder social 
mobilization of the marginalized groups.   
 
5.4.2 Enhancement of the Community’s Institutional Capacity: the Role of 
Social & Organizational Assets 
 
Housing improvement actions are associated with strong social and organizational 
assets, which are the foundation of increasing the community’s institutional capacity.  
First, in order to gauge the priority accorded to social assets as against other material 
assets, one of the questions in the survey asked respondents to give a ranking of the 
following five criteria: land/house titles, basic utilities, built environment, location, and 
social relationships.  
As can be seen from Figures 5.8 to 5.10 respondents give greatest emphasis to  
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Figure 5.8  Housing Priorities in the 13th Street Community 
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Figure 5.9  Housing Priorities in the 787 Quezon Avenue Community 
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Figure 5.10  Housing Priorities in the Buayang Bato Community 
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either secured titles or basic utilities.  The results also reflect complications specific 
to each community.  In the 13th Street community, a relatively higher priority is given 
to ‘location’: around 70% of the respondent households rank this at least third.  This 
emphasis on ‘location’ might be explained by the current geographical condition of the 
community: it sits within a quiet neighborhood a few blocks away from a major 
corridor, accessible to various facilities and worksites.  Due to the present convenient 
location, residents are inclined to stress the importance of location.  In the 787 
Quezon Avenue community, half of the households gave the third rank to the built 
environment, followed by secured titles and basic utilities.  This result seems logical 
in view of the fact that the community stretches along at a river bank, facing the risk of 
flood on a daily basis.  The first floors of homes are completely flooded every time it 
rains and the river level rises.  Such a precarious condition has led the residents to 
give more attention to a built environment which ensures the safety of the living 
sphere.  
In terms of social assets, one hypothesis posited is that a lower degree of 
social assets is linked with lower achievement in housing improvement.  This is borne 
out in Figures 5.8 to 5.10 to some extent.  There seems to be a difference in terms of 
the importance placed on social assets between informal and legalized settlements. 
The community with secured land titles --Buayang Bato-- shows a slightly higher 
emphasis on social relationships with other residents.  In both the 13th Street and 787 
Quezon Avenue communities, the majority of the households accord the lowest rank to 
the social component of housing: 63% and 73% respectively.  In contrast, this 
percentage drops to 46% in the Buayang Bato community.  To further explore this 
point, a key question is whether the higher emphasis on social capital in Buayang Bato 
is a consequence brought about by the security of land titles.  If this is the case, it 
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would mean that the development of social assets comes after the reservation of 
material assets.  If not, it suggests that the Buayang Bato community’s success in 
defending their living space is the result of stronger social assets.  A useful parameter 
to consider here is the length of settlement as it can be assumed that a longer length of 
stay facilitates stronger social capital among households.  Considering the fact that 
the percentages of the households who have lived for over thirty years in Buayang 
Bato (83%) strikingly outweighs those at the 13th Street and the 787 Quezon Avenue 
communities (33% and 14% respectively), it is likely that (1) shared experience over 
the years of defending their place against eviction and other encroachment contributes 
to the creation of thicker social capital and/or (2) considerable social capital 
accumulated over a long time leads to a success of defending the existence of a 
community in the face of demolition.   
An interesting finding that emerged during fieldwork is that a weaker 
emphasis on social assets at the individual household level does not necessarily 
indicate a lower degree of organizational assets at the community scale.  
Organizational assets are converted into a tangible form of ‘leadership system’ in the 
community known as POs in the Philippine context.  For example, the percentage of 
households who gave the lowest rank to ‘social relationships’ is the highest in 787 
Quezon Avenue (73%); yet the community’s PO can be said to be rather active in 
bringing together residents’ voices, representing them in terms of rights and complaints, 
and expanding the community’s networks with external institutions.  POs serve as a 
mechanism to encourage residents’ participation in community improvement activities.   
As Figure 5.11 shows, there are two realms where organizational assets 
operate: internal --within a community-- or external --outside a community.  The case 
of the 787 Quezon Avenue community suggests that organizational assets operating in 
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the internal realm are useful in nurturing social assets through the pursuit of common 
interests such as housing improvement.  In turn, the enhancement of social capital 
helps to consolidate the leadership system.  In effect, the combination of social and 
organizational assets will increase the community’s institutional capacity.   
 




This study also casts a particular spotlight on organizational assets operating 
in the external realm.  As the CMP case clearly demonstrates, the third party, notably 
NGOs, plays an indispensable role in boosting community empowerment. What has 
caught the eye of external institutions is a reliable leadership system representing a 
community and increasing its members’ aspirations to make collective actions happen.  
Field interviews with several NGOs staff point out that a decisive factor in raising the 
possibility of gaining NGOs’ assistance is the reliability of an existing PO or the 
potential of a reliable PO.34 ‘Eligibility’ to become a NGO-assisted community partly 
depends on the strength and stability of a PO.  The nature and strength of POs in turn 
depend on contextual factors including the probability of eviction.  For instance, a 
relatively energetic PO is found in the 787 Quezon Avenue community that has faced 
the risk of immediate eviction.  On the other hand, the PO of the 13th Street 
                                                  
34 As for NGOs offering trainings or community based programs, they usually complete a 

















community serves as a ‘formality’ for registration purposes since the risk of demolition 
remains low given its location in a place where further development is not likely to 
occur.  From this comparison, the risk exposure is a decisive factor urging a PO to 
become more proactive and to seek support from external institutions.  At present, as 
contrasted to the 13th Street community where no NGOs’ assistance exists35, the 787 
Quezon Avenue community has been under the patronage of two prominent networked 
NGOs in Quezon City: the UPA and the Community Organizers Multiversity [COM].  
As a whole, the presence or absence of networks with NGOs can be read as a useful 
indicator showing the degree of organizational assets, which greatly determines the 
probability of turning social assets into political actions. 
 
5.5  Concluding Remarks: Enabling ‘Networking’ and Empowerment 
 
The enabling strategies advocated by influential international organizations like the 
World Bank and the UNCHS have served as a dominant framework formulating 
housing programs for the marginalized in developing countries.  The theoretical and 
practical underpinnings of the enablement approach originated in neoliberal thought; 
yet, the approach is not conditioned by ‘fundamental neoliberalism’ which primarily 
relies on the power of markets.  Rather, it is premised on ‘revisionist neoliberalism’ 
which respects the third power of civil society by launching locally-driven legislation.  
In this light, together with decentralization and devolution movements, enabling 
strategies have been favored by many governments in developing countries as a 
method to democratize the planning process and empower the marginalized through 
                                                  
35 In the Philippines, it has become customary that any community exist under tutelage of churches 
in the parish.  Many churches provide free medical/educational services to informal settlers who 
belong to a church’s Basic Ecclesial Community [BEC].  The 13th Street community is also a 
member of the BEC under Mt. Carmel in Quezon City.  By organizing a series of bible sessions 
on a regular basis, BECs have played an important role in giving people great spiritual comfort; 
however, they rarely provide assistance or solutions to cope with housing-related problems. 
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citizen participation.   
Current planning frameworks for housing development in the Philippines 
adhere to the line of ‘revisionist neoliberalism.’  As well manifested in the CMP case, 
the state presents an enabling framework to promote the improvement of housing 
conditions and its associated empowerment, which are to increase people’s active 
participation into program development and implementation.  An interesting point 
revealed by the macro-scale and micro-scale analyses of this chapter is a gap in 
understanding profiles of the urban poor.  As the micro-scale analysis highlights, the 
urban poor can be no longer treated in a monolithic manner, because the 
socio-economic level of ‘urban poor’ households indeed vary.  Disregard of ongoing 
stratification among the urban poor causes the failure of specifying beneficiaries, 
explaining why many housing programs for the underentitled have not been able to 
reach the real needy.   
In order to mitigate such gaps, effective utilization of the third party grounded 
in the field has been widely claimed in the policy arena.  One of the great emphases is 
put on the internalization of NGOs’ contributions within formal planning frameworks.  
Renewed legislations in place prescribe NGOs as a catalyst to add further dynamism to 
the fostering of socialized housing for the marginalized.  For example, NGOs are 
designated as an inevitable originator in the pursuance of the CMP.  Even within the 
‘top-down empowerment’ framework, Filipino NGOs are not always subordinate to the 
state, functioning as a lobbying body to demand effective operationalization of the 
frameworks.  In this sense, the potential to evolve the frameworks may rest on 
internal reforms pressed forward by NGOs.  The importance of external interventions 
particularly made by NGOs has also been validated by the micro-scale analysis on 
communities.  The analysis draws on the hypothesis that the improvement of informal 
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settlements would require community-wide social mobilization for collective actions; 
and expanding networks with external organizations increases the possibility of 
realizing such mobilization.  In this regard, structural examination of ‘networking’ is 
critically called for to identify political correlations among concerned actors/parties.   
Detailed analysis of social-political networking evolving particularly from NGOs in 
the Philippine context is useful to comprehend concrete functions of NGOs as a 
mediator and broker, power relations within networks, advantages and disadvantages 
of the third party interventions.  The next chapter probes these points to elucidate 









































Structures of ‘Socio-Political Networking’: NGOs 










The Philippines is widely known as one of the largest nodes of civil society activities 
in the world.  The number of civil society registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] has reached over 60,000 nationwide, including civil clubs, 
professional associations, POs, and NGOs.36  Among these, so-called 
development-oriented NGOs account for 3,000 to 5,000.  As for the geographical 
distribution of development-oriented NGOs, the largest concentration is found in 
Metro Manila.  The augmentation of the number and scope of NGOs has been greatly 
hastened by the introduction of democratic legislation since 1986.  Within the 
paradigm shift from monocentric to polycentric power structures, the role and capacity 
of NGOs in adapting development programs to particular local conditions has received 
recognition.  As collaborations between the public sector and NGOs increase, NGOs 
are rapidly gaining centrestage in the mainstream of planning.   
As described in the previous chapter, the advancement of community 
empowerment is facilitated by establishing access to a third party, notably NGOs.  An 
important question hence concerns how an informal settlement engages in 
‘socio-political networking’ beyond the boundaries of the community to broaden its 
supporting base and to gain a greater voice in the politics of planning.  This chapter 
engages in a structural analysis of Filipino NGOs in order to identify the complexity of 
social linkages and power relations in the external realm.  It examines the formation 
and enlargement of NGO alliances and the integration of communities into these 
alliances.  From a macro-scale perspective, NGOs restructure and transcend their 
domestic playgrounds, obtaining more political and financial clout internationally.  
The increasing significance of NGOs has invoked a paradigm shift of project models 
                                                  
36 POs, such as community associations, refer to primary grassroots organization run on a 
voluntary basis. They also function as gateways to external institutions.  On the other hand, NGOs 
are intermediate institutions with full-time staff, providing various assistances to POs (ADB, 1999). 
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employed by powerful multilateral funding agencies such as the World Bank and the 
ADB.  Recently, these international institutions have become more receptive to the 
espousal of more democratic, participatory models which emphasize the roles of 
NGOs and communities.  At the local scale, ‘grassroots level’ hierarchies develop 
among the different organizations: rather than equal partnerships through horizontal 
ties, the relations between NGOs and communities (POs) are inclined to be vertical 
according to inflows and outflows of resources.  Hierarchization has emerged at the 
grassroots level, leading to the formulation of a power structure within ‘bottom-up’ 
entities.  Within this hierarchy, the rise of NGOs may have possible adverse effects on 
communities’ self-empowering capability.  By focusing on NGOs as the intersection 
of local and international linkages, this chapter introduces findings of field interviews, 
attempting to investigate current socio-political networks among concerned parties in 
housing development.  
 
6.2 Enlargement of Community’s External Contacts through NGOs 
 
“Significant in the evolution of Philippine NGOs is the marked growth of NGO 
networks that may be issue-, area-, or sector-based” to build mutual support, share 
resources and expertise, and conduct joint activities (ADB, 1999, p.8).  In the 
Philippine context, where many NGOs are intensively intertwined through numerous 
channels, a community does not need to have multiple contacts with different NGOs.  
In fact, multiple contacts may prove counter-effective in that NGOs generally offer 
assistance to a community without other external interventions.  This is to avoid 
possible redundancies and conflicts with other parties.  In this regard, constructing a 
bridge with the ‘right one’ is most critical because a primary NGO performs brokering 
functions between sources of external assistance and communities, helping 
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communities expand their networks.  
An NGO alliance named TRICOR, in which the 787 Quezon Avenue 
community participates, provides a good example to demonstrate NGO interactions.  
TRICOR is composed of three Quezon City-based influential NGOs and each of them 
has its own distinctive tasks and visions: (1) the Community Organization of the 
Philippines Enterprise Foundation [COPE] mainly focusing on community organizing 
by assisting community-based development; (2) the UPA specializing in the issues of 
crisis intervention and anti-eviction by providing legal consultations; and (3) the COM 
engaging in training programs by offering modules for raising a community 
organizer.37  The underlying principle of TRICOR is to conduct joint sessions and 
staff development through sharing programs and resources while each of them has its 
own organizational structure, funding sources, and local and international networks.  
None of them may be approached by individuals.  Communities must have POs 
serving as a communication window with TRICOR.  In the case of the 787 Quezon 
Avenue community, a division of the tasks between the COM and the UPA is clearly 
set up.  The former upholds the community’s flood control planning and the latter 
gives legal assistance concerning eviction.     
As Figure 6.1 shows, the three organizations of TRICOR fulfill a referral 
function to link communities and associated NGOs to one another.  Even though the 
diagram may give an impression that the networks are aligned vertically, they are in 
essence defined by horizontal relationships.  There are two principles that rationalize 
the expansion of NGOs networks.  The first principle is the consolidation of NGOs’ 
powers towards serving the common interest while the second principle is to 
compensate where expertise is lacking to achieve the same interest.  For example, 
                                                  
37 The origin of these three NGOs is the same: the Philippine Ecumenical Committee for 
Community Organization --known as PECCO-- which initiated the vitalization of grassroots 
movement during the Marcos era. 
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since the UPA does not offer any technical service for the improvement of substandard 
living environment, it has fostered relationships with a NGO catering to this purpose: 
the Technical Assistance Organization [TAO-Pilipinas] dealing in services of such as 
drawing site-development and subdivision plans and teaching know-how of self-help 
housing construction.  The TAO-Pilipinas basically provides technical assistance to  
 





communities via representative NGOs.  Concessions and service fees ranging from 
PHP10,000 to 15,000 per hectare, are paid by NGOs.  NGOs use the plan prepared by 
the TAO-Pilipinas for communities to apply for housing programs such as the CMP.  
Relationships between the TAO-Pilipinas and the UPA depict a brokering function of 
NGOs.  It means that contact with an NGO with a broad alliance allows a community 
to receive assistance from organizations inaccessible without a referral.  Being part of 











communities in the same disadvantaged position.  Accordingly, communities’ 
interconnections have built the foundation of forming working groups among the 
marginalized.  To cite a case, the 787 Quezon Avenue community has joined two 
working groups under the supervision of TRICOR: the April 30th Working Group38 
and Ugnayang lakas ng mga Apektadong Pamilya sa Baybaying Ilog Pasig [ULAP] 
(the Powerful Alliance of Affected Families along the Pasig River) to be described in 
Chapter 7.  The formation of a working group strengthens consolidated power of the 
marginalized in the external realm; while participation in the group enhances the 
institutional capacity of POs through working as a representative of a community.    
Enlargement of the networks contributes to the capacity for NGOs to gain 
greater acceptance from other external parties.  The broader the networks, the more 
visible the NGO in positioning itself within the politics of planning.  This is the basic 
rationale behind NGO networks attempting to extend their spheres of activities and to 
stretch their arm to LGUs, churches, academics, research institutes, and international 
organizations.  In short, NGO alliances serve as the bedrock from which to intervene 
in housing politics beyond the local grassroots level.  
 
6.2.1 NGOs’ Position in Local and International Axes 
 
Nowadays, NGOs tend to locate themselves at the intersection of local and 
international axes.  As part of the movement for universal human rights, formulating 
coalitions between local and foreign NGOs has been espoused in the international 
community as a means to perform watchdog functions through information exchange 
and lobbying activities.  On the issue of housing development for informal settlers, 
                                                  
38 The formation of the April 30th Working Group derives its origin from a political rally against 
forcible eviction on April 30th, 2000.  Until today, the total number of its member POs has reached 
45 within Metro Manila.  The UPA helps to mobilize the group and often subsidizes necessary 
costs for the group’s monthly meeting.   
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regional- and world-wide alliances to date are the Habitat International Coalition, the 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International, the Center on Housing Rights and Eviction, and 
the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, of which many housing-oriented Filipino 
NGOs have become a part. 
Financial mechanisms that support NGO activities is also becoming diverse 
and internationalized, involving various kinds of donors and sponsors.  The ADB 
(1999) lists a four-fold typology of external funding agencies in the Philippine context: 
(1) foreign NGOs and foundations; (2) bilateral channels in the form of ODA; (3) 
multilateral channels of international development and funding agencies such as the 
United Nations, the World Bank, and the ADB; and (4) church organizations.  Among 
these, church organizations, many of which foreign-based, tend to characterize the 
Philippine case.  To take TRICOR as an example, European and Canadian catholic 
organizations account for a large portion of the three organizations’ funding.  Except 
for spot funding for a short-term program, all of the three organizations have rarely 
received funding from local institutions including the public and business sectors.  
According to NGO staff, the reasons for seeking international financial assistance are 
at least four-fold.  First, international organizations respect long-term visions and are 
more flexibility and less bureaucratic.  Second, under the climate of the country’s 
sluggish economy, local funding to sustain NGOs’ activities in a long run is both 
difficult to find and unstable.  Third, development principles of the local public and 
business sectors tend to be driven by commodification and cost-recovery within a 
macroeconomic framework.  Fourth, these sectors impose more requirements and 
interventions that narrow the scope and eligibility of a program, resulting in conflicts 
among stakeholders.  As such, the NGOs are of the view that cross-sectoral 
partnerships would be better enhanced at the transnational level than in the domestic 
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arena.   
There are of course exceptions.  Some NGOs have taken advantages of the 
changing legislative environment, to build cooperative systems with the public and 
private sectors to produce worthwhile outcomes, and have in effect made a profound 
impact on national planning agendas.  A NGO called the Gawad Kalinga [GK]39 
offers a good example of such accomplishment.  Since its foundation, the GK has 
upheld the slogan ‘a new Philippines with no more slums,’ devoting itself to 
implementing a combined program of off- or on-site housing improvement and 
community development through the establishment of the Kapitbahayan Neighborhood 
Association.  The GK adopts four basic criteria for selecting its beneficiaries: (1) 
poorest of the poor based on economic standing; (2) LGU’s (governor or mayor) 
intention to carry out a program; (3) existence of an on-site PO; and (4) residents’ 
aspirations and potential measured by a preliminary survey including a site-visit, 
profiling, and interviews.  Besides these four criteria, secured land titles greatly 
increase the possibility of being selected.  However, in some cases, the GK intervenes 
in negotiation on land issues.  The GK’s housing program is designed based on 
give-and-take sweat equity: it supplies beneficiaries with necessary costs, materials, 
and technical supports for housing construction; the beneficiaries in return provide a 
total of 252 days of labor for community building.40  Given this program structure, it 
can be said that the GK model is a standardized aided self-help housing approach with 
precise guidelines and procedures to increase the degree of replicability.  
Replicability is one of the key terms that the GK emphasizes in order to multiply the 
scale and scope of overall activities.  In Metro Manila, the GK’s beneficiaries have 
                                                  
39 A parent organization which founded the GK is the Couples for Christ, a catholic community in 
the Philippines. 
 
40 With the aim of building a community, the GK program often accompanies the construction of 
common facilities such as chapel, school, multi-purpose building, clinic, library, and public space. 
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reached over 100 communities as of late 2005.  The Buayang Bato community, a 
research subject in this study, has been designated as a GK program site since 2004.  
 The success of the GK lies in its extensive supporting networks, 
encompassing a number of collaborators and sponsors locally as well as internationally 
(see Figure 6.2).  GK’s funding sources are quite diverse, including the business 
sector, church organizations, civic associations, and foreign governments.  Having 
multiple donors helps not only to increase the available budget but also ensure the 
stability of monetary inflows.  As for financing, the ANCOP Foundation International 
[ANCOP] occupies an important place.  The ANCOP is an arm of the GK, primarily 
catering to resource-procurement duties.  It has established an international 
fundraising network by setting up branches in 20 different areas around the world.  
As for the relationships with the national government and its agencies, the GK 
represents a model of ‘reconfiguration’ as envisaged by democratic legislation.  
Unlike small-scale, locally-based NGOs which have relatively weaker ties with the 
higher levels of authorities, the GK has forged partnerships with the public sector, and 
is perceived as a crucial organization in the central arena of the national planning 
agenda.  In fact, the Mid-term Plan proposed by the NEDA incorporates contribution 
made by the GK.  More importantly, on October 10, 2005, the House of 
Representatives approved Housing Resolution No. 68 that appointed the GK as the 
priority project.  In addition to political backing from the national government and its 
agencies, the GK has eagerly sought understanding and support from local governors 
and mayors by occasionally organizing orientation programs for potential LGU 
partners, and has succeeded in gaining their interests in collaborating with the GK.  
Another crucial supporting body is academic institutions, namely universities.  
Mobilization of university students is one of the GK strategies to recruit and retain 
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volunteers.  From the perspective of participating students who are interested in 
development issues, working for the GK gives them a chance to gain precious 
experiences and knowledge to further career aspirations.  The GK thus demonstrates 
how NGOs have adapted themselves to capitalize on the changes in legislative settings 
in the Philippines.  
 




6.2.2 NGOs’ Influences on a Paradigm Shift in the Development Models 
 
The ascendancy of NGOs as a development contributor and partner has exerted a 
major influence on the delivery of multilateral aids.  As has been the pattern, 
multilateral funding agencies find themselves involved in a project through either 
accommodating a loan to government units or executing their initiated projects.  A 
third way is becoming increasingly evident: taking on board NGOs as a main 
implementer to make a project more locally suitable and desirable.  Emergence of the 





















third way indicates that “there has been a conscious evolution in Philippine 
NGO/funding agency relations from the recipient relations of the past toward one of 
the development partnerships today” (ADB, 1999, p.52).  This conceptual and 
behavioral change symbolizes a paradigm shift in the development models of major 
multilateral funding agencies like the World Bank and the ADB.   
Such a paradigm shift is evident in community-based housing and 
infrastructure projects centering on NGOs and affected communities.  For instance, 
the World Bank decided to participate in a community-based pilot project named 
‘Upscaling Urban Poor Community Renewal Scheme,’ which is initiated by a 
nation-wide NGO, the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies [PHILSSA] 
in January 2004.  By setting the PHILSSA as an originator and local NGOs as 
implementer, the project aims at addressing the plight of marginalized communities in 
collaboration with the Department of Finance [DOF], the HUDCC, and academics 
(PHILSSA, 2004).  As a matter of fact, the establishments of horizontal ‘partnership’ 
relationships in the pilot project can be realized not at the overall planning stages but 
mostly at the implementation stage.  Nevertheless, the new community-based project 
models are indeed a valuable first step to upsizing the scope of the third way approach.   
The ADB also begins underlining merits of bringing NGOs into its 
community-based project.  In July 2000, the ADB launched a pilot project of slum 
improvement in two areas along the railway track in Muntinlupa City and a 
community in Payatas, Quezon City.  Instead of providing funding directly to an 
originating NGO like the World Bank, the ADB project set the Department of Social 
and Welfare and Development as an executing agency.  Apart from the difference, the 
World Bank and the ADB share the same approach: adopting a community-based 
upgrading model, appointing local NGOs as a principal implementer, and establishing 
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supporting networks with LGUs, the national government, and academics (Veneracion, 
2004).   
 
6.3 Possible Adverse Effects of NGO Interventions: Power Structure at the 
Grassroots Level 
 
Vertical relationships are no longer reserved for unbalanced power structure in a 
triangle of civil society, the public sector, and the private sector.  Within so-called 
grassroots organizations themselves, a certain hierarchy does emerge in tandem with 
an increase in interactions among them.  In particular, some tensions can be observed 
in the relationships between NGOs and communities.  Given the current trend of 
giving a high profile to NGOs, intensification of relationships with NGOs may lead to 
the disempowerment of communities.  There are two critical elements as to why 
NGO interventions may cause possible adverse effects on community empowerment.  
First, reliance on NGO funding and technical assistance increases the degree of 
dependency, inhibiting communities from developing local capacity and leadership 
(Shatkin, 2003).  Although the objective of community empowerment is to strengthen 
the degree of independence, excessive NGO interventions would do harm to 
self-development within communities, and accordingly may provoke a clash of values 
and priorities as a result of gaps between the NGO’s principles and the community’s 
will.  Because of increasing dependency on NGOs, communities fall into a situation 
where they have to follow what NGOs regulate without reservations.  This point is 
associated with the second issue, ‘representation.’  Ideally, NGOs are supposed to 
play the role of advocate, representing communities’ claims on their behalf.  The 
question posited here is whether NGOs represent the genuine claims of communities or 
adjust these claims in accordance with the NGOs’ principles.  Generalizing specific 
claims of each community in conformity with NGOs’ principles can be a strategic 
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scheme to augment the scale and impact of collective actions.  However, such 
generalization would also oblige specific communities to compromise what they hope 
to achieve.  
 The typology of NGOs has diversified enormously.  Some NGOs can be 
categorized as ‘top-down NGOs,’ which are organizations having a rigid and 
standardized program framework that is applied to their partners.  Given the situation 
that many marginalized communities are unable to lay out a clear vision and goal for 
themselves and identify ways to actualize these aims, top-down NGOs greatly assist 
the communities to accomplish their intentions in an efficient way.  Nonetheless, 
top-down NGOs disclose a critical downside: selectiveness.  In reality, the dynamics 
of selecting and being selected --in other words, providers and receivers of resources-- 
operate within power structures.  Thus institutions holding the authority of ‘selecting’ 
candidates worthy of resource allocation occupy a higher position in the power 
structure.  Vertical relationships between NGOs and beneficiaries --communities-- are 
the outcome of these dynamics.  In addition to selecting a target subject based on 
their own criteria and eligibility, top-down NGOs tend to accept prospective 
communities only under the condition that the communities fully consent to and 
comply with the NGOs’ philosophy, ethics/values, rules, and program procedures.  
This point is related to the increasing dependency described above.  Since a total 
package of detailed instructions on what and how to carry out a program is given by a 
NGO, it may be ended up that beneficiaries merely follow what is included in the 
package.  As a result, it is unclear whether such intensive NGO-driven approach has 
the ability to motivate self-developing endeavors organically generated by 
beneficiaries themselves.   
In addition, as revealed in field interviews, the professionalization of NGOs is 
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another factor which has widened disparities in power, placing communities in 
subordinate positions to NGOs.  The major external force driving professionalization 
among NGOs is the increase in the complexity of legislative arrangements relevant to 
housing development, community empowerment, and poverty reduction, requiring 
advanced knowledge to interpret and make the most use of them.  In effect, such 
circumstances push NGOs to raise the level of professional expertise in order to cope 
with ever-changing legislative settings.  The progress of professionalization has 
indeed brought positive consequences.  NGOs get a lead on enhancing their 
intellectual capacity and are better able to ensure that they are not caught by loopholes 
in the law.  However, it has simultaneously aggravated the unbalanced power 
relations in that communities without appropriate resources have no choice but to lean 
more on NGOs.  As a result, the dependency on NGOs would increase.  In order to 
alleviate this possible adverse effect, many NGOs have addressed the need of 
simplifying legislative settings and associated application procedures.  What 
professionalization infers is that knowledge and information are a source of power.  
Therefore, it empowers NGOs and disempowers less-educated communities.  
 
6.4  Concluding Remarks: Political Maneuvers within the Networks 
 
A key to community empowerment lies in ensuring access to networks of external 
institutions, notably NGOs.  Based on their stance of advocating for the marginalized 
communities and lobbying government activities, Filipino NGOs have achieved 
acclaim for their contributions to expediting civic actions.  Yet, possible adverse 
effects --excessive dependency and distorted representation-- may arise, leading to 
structural disempowerment of communities.  These counterproductive effects have a 
considerable impact on the formation of vertical relationships between NGOs and 
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communities where increases in accessibility to more resources would heighten the 
vulnerability of communities.  In this light, challenges posed to both NGOs and 
communities involve raising the consciousness of how to balance unequal power 
relations prescribed by resource flows.   
 





Regardless of such drawbacks, there is no doubt that Filipino NGOs have 
become a major force in the mainstream of politics.  For example, increasing 
recognition of NGOs as an effective and efficient channel of delivering a project has 
led to a paradigm shift of the development models in multilateral funding agencies.  
The new models assign NGOs as originators as well as implementers of a project.  As 
Figure 6.3 shows, while located at the heart of broader socio-political networks which 
transcends local, domestic boundaries, NGOs have also performed connecting and 
mediating roles.   





































evolving from NGOs, it is also critical to scrutinize a wide variety of 
competitive/collaborative interactions that have been developed among actors shown 
in the diagram.  In particular, since the enactment of LGC and the UDHA, 
interrelations between different entities have been getting complicated due to the 
diversification of ‘legitimate’ actors involved.  Further investigation of how the 
networks functions in actual housing projects is of great help to understand political 
tensions arising in the implementation process.  The next chapter examines these 
points by inquiring closely into an ongoing urban renewal and resettlement program in 
Metro Manila, indicating a number of setbacks largely ascribable to the enactment of 
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Relocation and resettlement schemes figure prominently in the field of housing 
planning for the marginalized in a city.  In postwar Philippines, early attempts of 
displacing informal settlers date back to the 1950s.  Particularly since the 1960s, the 
locus of resettlement sites has been pushed outward to urban fringe provinces such as 
Cavite, Bulacan, and Laguna.  For example, five thousand low-income households 
were forced to leave for Sapang Palay in Bulacan between 1963 and 1964.  However, 
these displacement measures proved unsuccessful in general.  According to the NHA 
report in 1982, 90% of the households moving to large resettlement sites in the three 
provinces above returned to Metro Manila.  Thus, the dominant pattern identified 
here is a vicious circle of eviction, relocation, and remigration (Nolasco, 1994).  The 
absence of adequate infrastructure, transport facilities, and livelihood opportunities in 
resettlement sites account for such a pattern.  As a result, many resettlement 
initiatives have failed to provide satisfactory outcomes.  
After the demise of the martial law regime, a number of evictions and 
demolitions that have been scheduled to be executed in tandem with the adoption of 
relocation programs.  What most characterized housing development in the 1990s is 
the resurrection of large-scale urban renewal programs.  In particular, through a 
campaign pledge of pro-poor policies, the Estrada administration focused largely on 
off-city displacements as part of broader urban renewal programs while following the 
enablement principles.  As Porio (2001, p.5) summarizes, “the programme initiatives 
of the Estrada administration offered several alternatives that demanded new 
institutional arrangement and partnership among stakeholders in the social housing 
sector. Foremost among these were the Pasig River Relocation Programme, Erap City 
Resettlement Programme and the OFW City to be implemented in partnership with 
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local governments, NGOs, and the private sector. These programmes obtained support 
from the private sector because of the political mileage they provided for the political 
regime and its supporters.”  Given the substantial number of people living in 
impoverished informal settlements in Metro Manila, massive urban-renewal housing 
programs appear justifiable.  However, the feasibility and sustainability of these 
programs have attracted increasing criticism as numerous tensions among involved 
parties developed during project implementation.  The hypothesis of this chapter is 
that, despite their intention of promoting democratization of planning process, 
democratic legislations claiming ‘more power to local’ have intensified political 
tensions among concerned actors, bringing negative consequences such as conflicts, 
fragmentations, and unequal/unfair treatments.  In order to exemplify linkages 
between current enabling legislations and emerging tensions within the framework of 
actual housing projects, this chapter looks into an ongoing program in Metro Manila, 
the PRRP, as a case study.  This case demonstrates the complexity of key actors 
involved and the difficulty of establishing adequate institutional settings under the 
prevailing climate of decentralization and devolution. 
 
7.2 Overview of the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program 
 
The Pasig River flows 26 kilometers across the National Capital Region, connecting 
Manila Bay in the west and Laguna de Bay in the east.  The river system including its 
tributaries runs through five cities and four municipalities (see Figure 7.1).  It once 
nourished abundant aquatic life and served as a transporting channel.  However, the 
ecosystem of the river system has been destroyed due to ever-increasing pollution.  
Degradation of the Pasig River system mainly derives from the fact that the system has 
been used as a refuse point of both industrial and domestic waste released from over  
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Figure 7.1  Map of the Pasig River 
 
 
Note: the Pasig River is indicated by the red line.  
Source: Mandaluyong City (2004) 
 
 





300 factories and approximately 70,000 families on the riverbanks41 (see Figure 7.2).  
                                                  
41 The population growth in informal riverside communities remains high owing to the upward 
land-price spiral in the formal market.  In fact, “from 1988 to 1990, the rate of migration into the 
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During the 1980s to 1990s, the daily volumes of industrial and domestic waste 
discharged into the system reached 145 tons and 185 tons respectively (AusAID, n.a.).  
Moreover, illegal abandonment of waste has increased the frequency of flooding, 
severely jeopardizing lives and the living environment of riverside communities (see 
Figure 7.3).  Given a lack of adequate flood control, garbage collection, and sewage 
systems, the Pasig River’s situation is likely to be further aggravated.  
 
Figure 7.3  Level of Flooding 
 
 
Note: Both red lines correspond, indicating the level of flooding after raining. 
 
 
 The idea of rehabilitating the Pasig River is nothing new, having been hotly 
debated by every administration.  For example, the former First Lady and Acting 
Governor of Metro Manila, Imelda Marcos, proposed a plan to encourage revitalization 
and redevelopment of the river as a tourist spot; however the plan eventually met with 
                                                                                                                                                
squatter colonies along the riverside was estimated at 73%” (Cruz, 1997). 
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failure due to a lack of political and financial support (Cruz, 1997).  In an effort to 
override a repeat of the past fiasco, the Aquino administration readdressed the 
rehabilitation issue in collaboration with the Danish aid agency called DANIDA.  In 
1993, her successor, Ramos, launched the PRRP at the cost of PHP 15 billion within a 
15-years time span.  The PRRP, a multi-agency program headed by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR], has the objectives as listed in Table 7.1.  
In its initial phase, the program obtained certain successes from the environmental 
point of view resulting in the reduction of both solid and liquid waste in the river 
(Alano, 2003).   
 
Table 7.1  Goals of the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program 
 
1. Completely eliminate the offensive odor 
2. Reduce the Biochemical Oxygen Demand load of the Pasig River 
3. Reduce the amount of solid waste dumped with regular waste collection activities
4. Increase and control the flow of the water 
5. Reduce the frequency of flooding 
6. Strengthen the content, and improve the enforcement, of the Zoning Ordinance of 
1981 for the National Capital Region 
7. Remove the sunken vessels from the bed of the river 
8. Develop parks along the Pasig River 
9. Relocate the squatters 
Source: Cruz (1997, p.7-8) 
 
The Estrada administration also continued to prioritize the PRRP as a solution 
to the urban housing crisis.  During his term, the program was further pushed forward, 
new institutional settings created and a source of funding secured.  In January 1999, 
the Pasig River Rehabilitation Commission [PRRC] was founded as a chief monitoring 
agency of a 15-year development plan, composing 12 government agencies and three 
private sector groups.42  It is mandated to promote the rehabilitation of the waterway 
                                                  
42 These government agencies are Department of Budget and Management, MMDA, the Office of 
the Executive Secretary, DENR, DPWH, HUDCC, DOF, Department of Tourism, Department of 
Transportation and Communication, Department of National Defense, Department of the Interior 
 114
and ensure its pristine conditions remain conducive to transport, recreation, and 
tourism (Constantino-David, 2004; COA, 2000b).  With the aim of reviving the 
river’s ecosystem and redeveloping the river terraces, the Pasig River Rehabilitation 
Masterplan designated four types of zones to be established: (1) heritage zone for 
preserving historic sites; (2) transition zones for industrial use; (3) central business 
district zones; and (4) agro-tourism zones (PRRC, 2000).  The government also 
applied a 10-meter easement as environmental preservation areas [EPAs], cleared up 
riverside informal settlements while constructing large resettlement sites in the suburbs.  
Due to the enforcement of the 10-meter easement, an estimate 10,000 families have 
been affected.   
A notable progress during the Estrada time is securing funding sources.  On 
July 20, 2000, the ADB signed a contract authorizing the Pasig River Environmental 
Management and Rehabilitation Sector Development Program Loan [SDP] to the 
PRRC and the DOF as executing agencies.  The SDP constitutes two types of loans 
which cover funding for both planning and implementation: US$100 million policy 
loan for policy reform to enhance the environmental management of the Pasig River 
system; and US$75 million investment loan for financing the cost of executing the 
Pasig River Development Plan [PRDP].43  Together with the SDP, US$1 million 
technical assistance for capacity building support [TA] was also approved to backup 
institutional capacity building of the PRRC, the MMDA, and LGUs toward the 
accomplishment of the 15-year plan from 2000 to 2015 (Lindfield, 2003).  In addition 
                                                                                                                                                
and Local Government, and Department of Trade and Industry.  Three private sectors are 
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, GMA Network, Inc., and the Erap Partnership for 
the Poor Foundation (COA, 2000b). 
 
43 Components of the PRDP include measures to relocate informal settlers; establish 10-meter wide 
EPAs along the river banks; improve infrastructure and provide public services and facilities in 
urban renewal areas next to EPAs; introduce and maintain a septic tank system to decrease the 
release of untreated wastewater to the river; and stop illegal abandonment of solid wastes (ADB, 
2002). 
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to the ADB’s funding for urban renewal components of the PRRP, the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation [JBIC] also approved funding specially for riverbank 
constructions to the Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH]. 
 




 In sum, although the PRRP originated under the Ramos administration, its 
current framework was primarily shaped under the Estrada administration with the 
promotion of resettlement programs.  The most famous resettlement site among the 
PRRP relocatees is Kasiglahan Village I [KV I], located in Montalbane of Rizal 
province (see Figure 7.4).  Built on 52 hectare of land, KV I contains 10,000 units (20 
sq/m per unit).  During the two years 1998 and 1999, 8,000 families on the riverbanks 
were forced to accept off-city relocation and most of them transferred to KV I (Racelis, 
2003).  It may seem that the resettlement programs would be accelerated in the 1990s, 
given secured funding and the newly established commission.  However, the reality 
proved different.  Some studies show that between 30 to 40% of the relocatees came 
back to Manila (Denis & Anana, 2004).  This remigration trend is mainly attributed to 
the same reasons as before: resettlement sites were located in inaccessible, remote 
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places where livelihood programs rarely existed.  For example, KV I is situated in an 
inconvenient place, one to two hours away from the city center by public 
transportation.  Considering the fact that the transportation cost to the center, around 
PHP 150, is almost equal to the daily income of a petty worker, residents have to find a 
source of income nearby.  However, work near to the resettlement site is difficult to 
come by as there is seldom any sustainable livelihood program accompanying the 
resettlement program.  As Karaos (n.a., p.4) observes, “the most common problem 
encountered was still the absence of viable livelihood opportunities which could 
adequately substitute for the loss of income and livelihood due to dislocation.”  These 
shortcomings form the basis of NGOs’ and affected communities’ claims in seeking 
in-city relocation.  
 
7.3 Rise of Protest against the Program Procedure 
 
Direct, active involvement of the third party has an important consequence for the 
program formulation and procedure.  Of all, ADB’s involvement has had enormous 
impact.  First, it has led to changes in the government’s attitude toward relocation.  
Relocation-related agencies are required to observe a set of stringent guidelines 
stipulated by the ADB.  According to the guidelines, eviction and demolition will not 
be allowed unless resettlement sites with decent conditions are offered to affected 
families.  This requirement functions as a reminder to assure the validity of Section 
28 of the UDHA.  Particularly after a death incident happened during the demolition 
of the Pineda community in September 2000, the ADB strongly demanded the MMDA 
to halt any eviction resorting to violence, threatening to withdraw assistance otherwise 
(Racelis, 2003).  Accordingly, the PRRC proclaimed on October 12 that no further 
demolition would be organized.  In fact, although the MMDA has threatened to evict 
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10,000 families, other government agencies continue to decline execution (Denis & 
Anana, 2004).  ADB’s pressures against coercive demolition have thus raised the 
importance of dialogue with the communities among public officials.  In short, 
ADB’s interventions in line with its vision of enabling strategies --promoting 
participatory governance-- has acted positively on revitalizing civil society’s 
involvement.  NGOs and POs are not only able to stress the illegality of eviction but 
also argue that it does not satisfy ADB’s guidelines.  Their strategy aims at utilizing 
the power of the ADB as a lobby mechanism for program implementation.  Despite 
its intention of contesting public agencies, such collaboration between big international 
institutions and civil society is a product that current legislations envisage.  
 It is interesting to note that, while building rapport with the ADB, civil society 
has simultaneously challenged the ADB-PRRC plan.  A dramatic shift in terms of 
civil society’s involvement arose after the formation of the ULAP supported by NGOs.  
The ULAP is a consolidated representative body of the affected riverside communities, 
consisting of 18 POs.  It was originally institutionalized by the COM in TRICOR 
demonstrated in Chapter 6.  The COM provides a space for ULAP’s regular meetings, 
where PO leaders discuss each community’s interests and problems on the subject of a 
better formulation of the ULAP strategy.  The inception of the ULAP has changed the 
position of marginalized riverside communities from a passive to active subject 
capable of claim-making against the plan.  For example, “ULAP insisted that rather 
than move thousands of families to distant resettlement sites at great expense, the 
government should take steps to allocate the land to them or acquire adjacent land, 
followed by upgrading and housing schemes” (Racelis, 2003, p.12-3).  Since then, the 
ULAP has functioned as a formal communication window with government agencies 
and the ADB.  The most critical contention raised by the ULAP is the validity of the 
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10-meter easement.  The easement should be three meters based on the national Water 
Code; but the easement has been extended to a 10-meter one owing to resolutions 
passed by the MMDA.  In addition, the question of social equity has been posited 
since this 10-meter easement mainly applied to informal settlements, while the 
removal of industrial and commercial sites and the homes of well-off families tend to 
be left out because of the burden on both landowners and governments to provide 
compensation (Denis & Anana, 2004).  The ULAP has stood firmly against the 
10-meter easement and off-city relocation, while agreeing to accept the 3-meter 
easement and on-city relocation.   
 
7.4 Tensions Developed in the Implementation Process 
 
In spite of endeavors to build effective relationships with one another under enabling 
environment, crucial tensions have emerged among concerned parties owing to present 
legislative and institutional settings encouraging decentralization and devolution.  
First, tensions have developed between communities and LGUs.  In spite of collective 
decisions made in the ULAP, reactions to the decisions may vary by LGUs.  This is 
because the LGC has authorized LGUs to exercise powers of self-determination and 
decision-making on planning issues.  This means that each LGU has its own policy 
on the easement which may be different from the PRRC’s arrangement.  Regarding 
the issue of setbacks from the river, the ULAP and its member communities must 
speak to each LGU to negotiate separately.  Thus LGUs’ empowerment amid the tide 
of decentralization and devolution makes program standards inconsistent.   
Inconsistency among LGUs is also found in compensation packages provided 
for the Pasig River relocatees.  As Table 7.2 summarizes, the contents of the packages 
differ considerably by LGUs.  For example, Mandaluyong City offers a compensation 
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of PHP 7,000 per family while the City of Manila presents only moving assistance and 
a pack of groceries.  Such differential treatment under the same program has raised 
the issue of equality, possibly intensifying internal tensions among affected 
communities.   
 
Table 7.2  Compensation Packages by LGUs 
 
City/Municipality Compensation 
Pasig City PHP 2,000; free moving; grocery package 
Makati City PHP 7,500 Æ PHP 7,000; livelihood program
1; 1 
sack of rice; grocery package 
San Juan PHP 5,000 
Mandaluyong City (St. Mesa) PHP 7,000 
City of Manila (Quiapo) Free moving; grocery package 
Note: 1 livelihood program refers to micro finance programs for starting  
small-scale business such as tricycle, rug-making, and soap making. 
 
The tensions deriving from differential compensation are also carried over to 
the resettlement site.  Among all Pasig River relocatees in KV I, evicted families 
receiving some form of compensation account for only one-third of the total.  KV 1 
accommodates not only PRRP beneficiaries but also families evicted for various 
reasons.44  Differences in reasons for displacement translate into perceived 
inequalities among the relocatees: for example, relocatees from Piñahan & Payatas in 
Quezon City, where tragic land slides occurred, were given better compensation 
packages prepared by the national government.45  Many of these relocatees were 
conflated with ‘informal settlers,’ giving the impression that treatment of relocates was 
erratic and unequal.  Accordingly, tensions between communities and LGUs tended 
                                                  
44 For instance, in the early Estrada time of 1999, a couple of thousands of families moved in from 
San Juan because of demolition; in 2001, around 400 families, who were not ‘poor,’ were 
transferred from other parts of Montalbane; from 2001 to 2003, a number of evicted families from 
Commonwealth in Quezon City were relocated due to road-widening constructions. 
 
45 They were entitled to receive compensation of PHP 30,000 for housing lots and PHP 10,000 for 
allowance and livelihood through the Central Bank in Quezon City.  The livelihood program itself 
reached PHP 20 million in total. 
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to spill over to tensions among relocated residents and communities. 
Another set of tensions between communities and NGOs on the one hand and 
government units on the other revolves around a difference in orientations in relation 
to ‘ends and means.’  The perspective of governmental bodies --LGUs and 
housing-related statutory boards-- concentrates on the ‘ends,’ that is, resettlement 
programs on the urban fringe.  The focus is on clearing eyesore settlements and 
removing the settlers from the territory under their charge.  “[LGUs] are supportive of 
the rehabilitation [of the Pasig River] if it involves water quality or the removal of 
urban poor people, but they are much less supportive when it comes to discussing land 
tenure security and upgrading/housing” (Denis & Anana, 2004).  On the other hand, 
civil society organizations are concerned about the ‘means,’ that is, the process of 
relocating people to alternative places.  The fundamental thrust governing the actions 
of civil society organizations is the improvement of the marginalized’s living 
conditions.  From this stance, civil society organizations, such as the ULAP, have 
requested governments to look for the possibility of in-city relocation sites if 
resettlement becomes unavoidable because of hazardous environments.  In order to 
close the ideological gap between the two sides, a River Summit was held in Ateneo de 
Manila University on 17 June, 2005.  The total number of participants reached 800 
from various institutions: ULAP, UPA, COM, church organizations, lawyers and 
attorneys, academics, other local NGOs, and international NGOs from Korea, Thailand, 
and Cambodia; NHA, DENR, and baranguy captains.  However, the actors most 
needed to come --local government officials-- did not show up although they were 
invited.   
Three key issues are important in examining the tensions between civil 
society and governments.  These three make up the heart of civil society’s claim 
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raised at meetings of the ULAP.  The first issue involves the lack of transparency of 
the whole process: affected communities were not provided with proper information on 
the program components such as coverage areas.  The second issue concerns the 
illegality of the procedure: no prior notice and consultation prescribed in the UDHA 
have been given before demolition.  The reality is that: “informing the people about 
their eviction and relocation comes at the end part of the whole process. By then 
government has already chosen and developed a rehousing or resettlement solution. 
People can only accept or reject it. Thus people are not really consulted and given the 
opportunities to present their alternative solution” (UPA, 1998, p.142).  A third issue 
pertains to the exclusivity of the process: POs’ involvement was not encouraged by 
LGUs which often intentionally squeeze certain communities out from the program.  
For example, the City of Manila requires the Delpan community, one of the most 
impoverished settlements located at the mouth of the Pasig River, to file the following 
three documents in order to become beneficiaries of a relocation program: (1) a 
certificate of a PO’s registration with the SEC; (2) a list of organizations within the 
community; and (3) a list of members with detailed profiles such as a census register.  
The problem lies in the preparation of the third document.  Since many of the 
residents are not tax-payers and are migrants from other provinces, the community 
cannot collect the necessary information from city hall.  The submission of the third 
document is supposed to work as a countermeasure against ‘professional squatters’ 
who falsify IDs to get program benefits.  At the same time, however, LGUs may also 
manipulate this requirement as a measure to decrease the number of approved 
beneficiaries.  In short, many of these issues point to the question of the citizens’ trust 
in LGUs as well as LGUs’ accountability to their citizens.  Furthermore, these three 
issues call into question the democratization of planning processes that the LGC and 
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the UDHA stipulate. 
 There are also profound tensions among LGUs themselves, particularly 
between senders and receivers of informal settlers.  In the past, the NHA supervised 
overall housing issues; however, the renewed legislations enacted after 1986 have 
certified the NHA as an authority in charge of only producing housing units and 
developing resettlement sites.  The loss of the NHA’s influence on housing 
development has meant the lost of an intercessor between sending and receiving LGUs.  
NHA’s gradual withdrawal from direct construction and provision of housing has 
increased LGUs’ responsibilities for handling housing development.  In a context 
where the autonomy of LGUs is protected by the enforcement of the LGC, the lack of 
coordination among LGUs makes it difficult to realize cross-boundary projects.  
Without written consent binding both sides, receiving LGUs tend to find significant 
disadvantages in terms of social costs in accommodating a surge of low-income 
households. In consequence, many receiving LGUs have started to complain about 
relocation programs initiated at the discretion of senders, requesting sending LGUs to 
compensate the costs.  Some receiving LGUs in fact forcibly decided to reject the 
provision of basic utilities for relocatees from other cities/municipalities.  Resistance 
on the part of receiving LGUs can also be seen in KV I: Mayor of Montalbane 
expressed his dissatisfaction at the sudden proliferation of low-income households 
within the boundary off his unit.46   
All the tensions described above indicate that acute problems inherent in the 
PRRP exist in the absence of coherent regulatory frameworks and coordinated 
institutional settings.  In fact, a lack of regulations to standardize compensation 
packages and to coordinate sending and receiving LGUs accounts for major drawbacks 
                                                  
46 The current Mayor of Montalbane, Pedro Cuerpo, proposed to the PRRC that facilities should be 
built by contract.  
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of the PRRP.47  Without regulations to enforce the making of an agreed consensus 
among LGUs, the PRRP is often unable to implement programs effectively amidst 
fragmented institutional settings.  While the PRRC is mandated to facilitate 
coordination for the PRRP, it has not been able to function as a coordinating agency 
under circumstances where prerequisite regulatory settings for coordination do not 
exist.  Another crucial government agency of the PRRP, the NHA, suffer from similar 
inefficiencies.  As Karaos (n.a.) argues, the low cost recovery of the resettlement 
projects, despite a relatively low monthly amortization rate48, is probably attributable 
to the poor collection machinery of the NHA.  She continues to observe that “as a 
result of poor repayment, practically all relocation projects were heavily subsidized 
and community facilities and services were always poorly maintained” (Karaos, n.a., 
p.4).49  Unless the NHA revises a collection system to increase the cost recovery rate, 
an outgrowth of informal/illegal service mechanisms will eventually lead to poor 
maintenance of facilities and deteriorating living conditions of the site.  In 
consequence, the operation of the PRRP would be deadlocked.  In addition to the 
inefficiency of each related agency, there is also ineffective coordination and conflicts 
between these two authorities.  In principle, the PRRC and the NHA must work in 
close cooperation by assuming separate responsibilities: the PRRC is in charge of 
monitoring the program procedure and the NHA assists it by providing resettlement 
sites.  However, in reality, both tasks are not well integrated.  Such ineffective 
                                                  
47 As Karaos (2003, p.35) points out, “[the Philippine government] still does not have a national 
resettlement policy. Such a policy should ideally define not just the entitlements to be given to the 
displaced households but also the development principles on which the entitlements and standards 
are based.”  
 
48 The rates are determined based on contracts with the NHA.  Usually, the 25-year loan for the 
total PHP 270,000 adopts a gradual increase payment: for example, if the monthly amortization 
starts from PHP 250 for the first 3 years, it goes up to PHP 500 for the years of fourth to tenth, then 
PHP 825 for the rest of the years. 
 
49 These points are actually manifested in the words of a resident interviewed: “if we do not pay 
amortization, no help is provided by the NHA. So we just tap water and electricity illegally.” 
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coordination and redundancy is well represented in a situation where no principal 
agency exists to execute demolition.  Three main agencies --the NHA, LGUs, and the 
MMDA-- have performed the duty of ‘demolition’ without coherent guidelines.   
All of these complications have definitely delayed the completion of the 
PRRP. Slow progress of the PRRP has often tempted the ADB to consider 
withdrawal from the program.  ADB’s pressures on the program have in turn 
prompted a tense standoff between international funding agencies and government 
units.  The government’s negative perception of the international multilateral funding 
agencies is predicated on a critique of dependent theory, apparent in the statement of 
Constantino-David (2004, p.137), a former chair of the HUDCC:  
“the noble rationale for foreign aid is altruism—the responsibility of 
more developed countries to assist those with less. But in reality, 
much foreign assistance has degenerated into expressions of power 
and control. The dividing line between aid and business has been 
blurred. It is the reproduction of old colonial relations framed within 
a hypocritical rhetoric of democracy and philanthropy. Countries of 
the South that are in desperate need of funds are thus placed in the 
ironic situation of having to thank lenders and donors for funds that 
ensure the South develops according to the paradigms of the North. 
This integrates them into a global order in which poor countries…are 
powerless.” 
 
In the case of the PRRP, the power structure that Constantino-David refers to regards 
the ADB and the JBIC as supreme and the governments in the locality as subordinate.  
Such a dichotomization of ‘international’ versus ‘local’ structures is also reflected in 
the relationship between civil society and international institutions.  With the 
advancement of the anti-globalization movement against multilateral funding agencies 
for their economically-driven, capitalistic development approaches, hosts of NGO 
alliances all over the world have increased the level of mobilization in terms of 
massive demonstrations and offers of both constructive and destructive criticism to 
such agencies.  Therefore, although there is the emergence of renewed, cooperative 
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relationships between the two, it is rather doubtful whether the collaboration is actually 
built upon a genuine partnership.  In several interviews with NGO staff, both 
amicable and hostile attitudes toward international institutions were revealed.  On the 
one side, NGOs understand the importance of establishing a collaborative bond with 
the agencies; but on the other side, they continue to perceive the agencies as a power 
elite which impose bureaucratic systems on them. 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks: Pursuit of Adequate Urban Governance 
 
Aimed at alleviating environmental degradation and promoting inner-city 
redevelopment, the PRRP has been propelled as a flagship urban project over the last 
decade, particularly under the aegis of Estrada.  In the planning stage, it appeared to 
be successful: a specialized commission was put in place and secured funding assured.  
However, it turns out that the PRRP had to confront an array of complications in the 
implementation stage.  Although certain cooperative socio-political networks are in 
place, a number of tensions are evolving among concerned parties within the networks, 
impacting negatively on the feasibility and sustainability of the program.  Confusion 
has prevailed in the implementation stage as a result of fragmentation and a lack of 
coordination.  As Table 7.3 illustrates, no consistency is identified with respect to 
implementing and funding agencies in charge.  As a result, the level of 
accomplishment varies from community to community.  The realization of a 
large-scale program straddling multiple municipal boundaries like the PRRP 
necessarily entails a strong coordinating body to smoothen operating mechanisms and 
mediate the interests of each stakeholder.  This is currently missing as the PRRC 
lacks the mandate to provide the coordination necessary to institutionalize program 
implementation.   
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Table 7.3  Summary of the Program in Four Communities 
 
  District 1 & 4 Buting  Santolan  Delpan  
  (Quezon City) (Pasig City) (Pasig City) (City of Manila)
Number of 
affected families 5,000+ 500 1,400+ 1,000 
Chief agency MMDA PRRC DPWH LGU 
Funding ADB & LGU ADB JBIC LGU 
Accomplishment Widening river Building linear parks 
Building linear 
parks No 
  Cleaning riverbanks       
 
Such weak coordination power is partly due to the democratic legislation 
advocating decentralization and devolution.  As Mohan & Stokke (2000, p.249) 
argues, a clear-cut problem of contemporary development theory is “the tendency to 
essentialise and romanticise ‘the local’.”  Unlike the time of Marcos when Metro 
Manila was understood as one big ‘region’ under the control of a strong administrative 
and planning body, Metro Manila today is a bundle of segmentation: 17 cities and 
municipalities each with their own respective self-governance structures.  Although 
the MMDA has been set up to ensure effective delivery of services at a metropolitan 
scale, the 1987 Philippine Constitution has substantially reduced the MMDA’s power.   
Moreover, an Article of the Constitution stipulates that “local government units may 
group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources for 
purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law” (Laquian, 2005, p.309).  
What this regulation suggests is that the creation of a coordinating body for a 
cross-boundary program should come out from self-organization efforts among LGUs.  
Coupled with the enforcement of the LGC that lays weight on the autonomy of LGUs, 
inter-city competition has intensified, making it even more difficult to establish 
coordinated metropolitan governance to attend to cross-boundary issues.  Such 
inter-city competition becomes evident in the inconsistency of relocation programs, 
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translating into intra-city contentions among affected communities.  To lessen or 
eliminate the tensions and conflicts observed in the PRRP requires the development of 
a metro-scale administrative unit with the power to bind not only LGUs but also other 
actors together.  A lesson that all concerned parties have to learn is the need for 
effective coordination that can transform the tensions and conflicts into positive steps 
to modify and improve program management and implementation.  In order to realize 
this, Metro Manila as a whole needs to reconsider creating unified administrative 
structures of urban governance.  
 While this chapter has focused on the feasibility and sustainability of 
relocation and resettlement programs, it has not aimed to answer the most fundamental 
question: whether relocation and resettlement are a suitable, appropriate scheme to 
improve living environments for informal settlers.  Considering the negative 
externalities of displacement such as the loss of livelihood means and opportunities 
and the rise of conflict within resettlement sites, relocation and resettlement schemes 
may disempower people economically as well as socially.  Nonetheless, these 
schemes may be unavoidable in the case of physically precarious sites.  Hence, 
whether relocation and resettlement schemes are necessary calls for careful thought 
and fair judgment to decide whether the best choice is to extricate and remove people 
from their situations.  To put it differently, a question that needs to be clarified here is 
whether urban renewal programs like the PRRP are effective in rehabilitating not only 























8.1 Future Prospects and the Current Paradigm of Human Settlement 
Development 
 
Defense of living sphere for the marginalized still occupies a key place in 
contemporary urban planning.  Given the intensification of urbanization rates in the 
less developed world, the urban housing crisis is not a temporary but ongoing problem.  
Two contextual factors account for the continuing dominance of urban areas: (1) 
unsuccessful attempts to disperse national growth to other parts of the country 
(Rondinelli, 1991)50; and (2) powerful forces of globalization which further reinforces 
‘nodes’ in international circuits (Sassen, 2001).  An important remark in this regard is 
that the noun attached to ‘primate’ is no longer ‘cities’; ‘regions’ have emerged as a 
unit of the ‘nodes’ due to the rapid geographical expansion of megacities.  In the 
particular context of Southeast Asia, a distinctive characteristic of urbanization in the 
region is the phenomenal growth of the capital metropolis.  As Table 8.1 shows, the 
present level of human agglomeration in Southeast Asian metropolises is becoming 
extremely high and not likely to be reversed.  The UN estimate (2004) projects that 
over 60% of the total Southeast Asian population will live in urban areas by 2030.  
The case study area for this research, Metro Manila, the Philippines, has also 
experienced rampant urban sprawl stretching beyond its administrative boundary.  
Peripheral and surrounding areas of the NCR, called CALABORZON [Cavite, Laguna, 
Bayangas, Rizal, and Quezon] have been witnessing a high population growth rate 
owing to a combined increase of in-migrants from hinterlands and out-migrants from 
the NCR (Kelly, 2000).  What the above suggests is that the call for a new paradigm 
of human settlement development should be reclaimed in this ever urbanizing and 
globalizing era in order to improve existing informal settlements and deal with the 
                                                  
50 Hackenberg (1980, p.404) mentions, “growth pole’s strategies aimed at stimulating regional 
development through the purposive creation of intermediate cites as ‘regional centers’ do not 
work..” 
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anticipated increase in the influx of migrants into expanding mega-metropolises. 
 
Table 8.1  Urban Agglomeration in Major Southeast Asian Cities [Regions], 2003 
 
Population of the largest urban agglomeration in 2003 
Agglomeration Population (1000) As % of urban population 
Jakarta  12,296 12.3 
Kuala Lumpur  1,352 8.7 
Metro Manila  10,352 21.2 
Singapore  4,253 100.0 
Bangkok  6,486 32.4 
Source: World Urbanization Prospect the 2003 Revision (United Nation,  
2004) 
 
 As explicitly expressed in the Habitat discourse, the planning paradigm of 
human settlement development has undergone a major shift in tandem with current 
trends.  While the main concerns at the Vancouver declaration in 1976 converged on 
physical planning solutions initiated by government agencies, the main thrust at 
Habitat II in 1996 focused on the democratization of the planning process by stressing 
(1) public-private partnerships and (2) local governments’ and NGOs’ roles to carry out 
pragmatic steps (Leaf & Pamuk, 1997).  This paradigm transition certainly mirrors 
the diffusion of neoliberal imperatives claiming the superiority of a less-interventionist 
approach based on ‘enablement’ strategies discussed throughout this study.  
According to Burgess, Carmona & Kolstee (1997, p.139), the strategies fall within 
three domains to be enabled: the market, the local government, and the community.  
In the field of housing planning, these enablements have been translated into reality 
through the utilization of the private sector’s development, the downscaling of 
decision-making processes to local levels under decentralization and devolution 
policies, and the promotion of citizen participation toward empowerment.  In the 
course of fostering the three enablements, the position of local governments in the 
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planning practices has been reconfigured.  In return for gaining self-determination 
and -implementation powers in development activities, they are now required to 
assume increasing responsibilities in nurturing enablement environments for the 
inclusion of the private sector and communities.  In spite of widespread acceptance, 
Pugh (1994, p.363, quoting Dunn) cautions against over-optimistic anticipation of the 
enablement strategies: “it is overoptimistic in its ideal that democratization has the 
power to solve all significant social problems and that mutual benefits flow universally 
from market-led development.” 
 
8.2 Lessons Learned from the Philippine Experience 
 
As described in the preceding chapters, housing development policies in the 
post-Marcos Philippines have pursued the world-wide trend of enablement 
neoliberalism.  Successive legislations enacted after 1986 put the emphasis on the 
dismantling of centralized autocratic systems to strengthen decentralized democratic 
alignments.  In the renewed planning frameworks, LGUs are placed in the center of 
planning and implementation while NGOs play a significant role in mediating relations 
between authorities, markets, and communities, systemizing broad socio-political 
networks with a range of parties.   
Nonetheless, the inadequacies of existing legislations and the drawbacks of the 
PRRP discussed earlier disclose major complications in the implementation of 
enablement housing strategies.  First, despite the transfer of planning authority to the 
local state, the relationship between the national government and LGUs remains a 
paternalistic one.  “[In the Philippines,] despite the movement toward decentralization, 
local governments have largely continued to depend on the national government for 
implementing housing solutions. Housing programs catering to the urban poor, such as 
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resettlement and land acquisition financing for urban poor communities, are all 
national government-funded and -operated” (Karaos, 1997, p.7).  Given the lack of 
necessary resources to exercise the provided authority, LGUs’ overreliance on the 
national government has not been upended.  Persistence of conventional power 
structures within the national government at the top also undermines the efficacy of 
community enablement --citizen empowerment.  Whatever the case may be, 
empowerment within the neoliberal discourse reveals the nature of ‘resistance in the 
grip of the powerful.’  Mohan & Stokke (2000, p.249) conclude that political 
structures remain unchanged even during the intensification of community enablement: 
“the revised neoliberal position represents a ‘top-down’ strategy for 
institutional reform in the sense that it is an effort by state agencies and 
collaborating non-governmental organisations to make institutions more 
efficient and to include identified target groups in the development 
process…Power resides with individual members of a community and 
can increase with the successful pursuit of individual and collective 
goals. This implies that the empowerment of the powerless could be 
achieved within the existing social order without any significant 
negative effects upon the power of the powerful.”  
 
In this sense, there is a threshold to the degree to which empowerment can be achieved.  
As the evidence of the PRRP illustrates, affected communities have definitely gained 
political voice in the program implementation through the formulation of working 
groups and networks with NGOs.  However, that empowerment has seldom led to 
producing preferred outcomes that satisfy the aims of contestations.  For instance, the 
controversial 10-meter easement is still effective; many LGUs have not seriously 
sought the possibility of in-city relocation.  Second, political enablement through 
decentralization and devolution causes ‘municipal fragmentation’ which has brought 
“different rates and types of urban development, different regulatory regimes and 
irrationalities in the land market, and the location and delivery of technical 
infrastructure and services” (Burgess, Carmona & Kolstee, 1997, p.148).  In other 
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words, democratization of the planning process to enhance the prerogative of LGUs 
has to an extent inversely yielded undemocratic consequences: unequal redistribution 
of development benefits.  Powerful LGUs which hold abundant resources and greater 
bargaining ability are likely to obtain the maximum fruits from a series of political 
enablement.  Hence, as Silva (2005, p.402) purports, “devolution can result in less 
equitable growth within a country.”  Inconsistency of program components and 
procedures itemized in the case study of the PRRP clearly captures this problem of 
‘municipal fragmentation.’   
 
8.3 Rethinking the Mechanism of Urban Governance 
 
These two complications inevitably guide us to revisit the mechanism of urban 
governance: how can the expanding metropolitan regions be managed to cope 
with cross-boundary housing problems and what kind of institutional structures 
is needed for the management.  An important concept which deserves further 
consideration in this context is ‘inter-city networks.’  In his analysis of 
inter-city networks from both international and local viewpoints, Douglass 
(2002, p.68) ventures that “using intercity networks for more cooperative forms 
of exchange and support can potentially have high pay-offs in terms of raising 
awareness of issues, formulating innovative approaches to shared problems, and 
tapping opportunities to pursue joint policy responses to urban problems across 
urban and territorial boundaries.”  In fact, the importance of cross-boundary 
collaborations has also been recognized by government agencies in the 
Philippines.  The National Urban Development and Housing Framework 
prepared by the HUDCC (2000) addresses the need for establishing 
inter-governmental cooperation and metropolitan arrangements in land 
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development, resettlement programs, and socialized housing programs to 
increase economies of scale and spill-over effects of services.  
Notwithstanding the intention declared in the framework, however, concrete 
attempts to forge inter-city networks have not yet been identified and put into 
practice in terms of housing development.   
One of the main thrusts in this study is problematizing the absence of a 
coordinating body which can facilitate productive collaborations among local 
governments with its own authority.  Inter-city conflicts constitute a critical cause 
engendering intra-city contentions which may destabilize socio-political networks, 
particularly those among NGOs and communities.  Thus, developing urban 
governance mechanisms capable of marshaling appropriate institutional structures will 
be a step forward in mitigating inter-city conflicts and contribute to the stabilization of 
political relationships in society.  Based on an examination of housing development in 
Metro Manila, two types of coordinating bodies can be presented as the backbone of 
urban governance.  The first is a consolidated entity created through voluntary efforts 
of LGUs and developed on a project basis as in the case of the PRRP.  This first type 
depends on initiatives on the part of the LGUs and is consistent with decentralized 
institutional structures.  The second type is a centralized entity shaped by the national 
government’s impetus: it should be an issue-oriented authority governing overall 
housing development activities on a regional scale, containing sub-divisions in charge 
of specific programs.  While the formulation of this second type seems to run against 
the grain of decentralization, the centralized entity is not totally opposed to the rise of 
LGUs; rather, it will respect the autonomy of LGUs while neutralizing inter-city 
disruptions.  It is crucial to note that the operation of the centralized entity must 
require strong commitment on the part of the national government to actively expedite 
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inter-city collaborations for efficient management of housing-related projects.   
The choice of the type of coordinating body is conditioned by local political 
settings.  The danger of adopting generalized strategies like enablement as a 
‘package’ lies in the failure to take into account the diversity of local settings.  While 
there are common global principles underlying strategies to confront the problems of 
shelter provision around the world, there must also be flexibility in the application of 
these principles to the real world (Leaf & Pamuk, 1997).  Such customizing and 
negotiating efforts will be instrumental in reducing the gap between the ideal and 
reality in working out solutions to the major problems of housing development in 
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LGU Tasks as mandated in the UDHA 
 
1. Prepare a comprehensive land use plan in accordance with the purposes of UDHA 
(Section 6&39) 
 
2. Conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements with the consultation of the 
HLURB and other associated government bodies (Section 7) 
 
3. Identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the underprivileged 
and homeless in urban areas with the assistance of related government agencies 
such as the NHA and the HLURB (Section 8) 
 
4. Confirm as to the blighted status of lands (Section 13) 
 
5. Identify and register all people qualified for socialized housing (Section 17) 
 
6. Participate in joint venture housing projects with the private sector (Section 18) 
 
7. Provide basic services and facilities in socialized housing and resettlement areas in 
coordination with the private sector and other public sector (Section 21) 
 
8. Encourage program beneficiaries’ participation into the decision-making process 
(Section 23) 
 
9. Take measures to suppress the illegal squatting 
 
10. Carry out the relocation and resettlement projects for the people living in danger 
areas (Section 29) and provide the people the relocation and resettlement sites 
equipping basic services and facilities, and livelihood programs in coordination 
with the NHA (Section 30) 
 
11. Prevent the establishment of illegal housing units (Section 30) 
 
12. Support the NHMFC for the sake of the CMP beneficiaries (Section 23) 
 
13. Enhance the production and use of construction materials and techniques which are 
locally-available and inexpensive  
 
14. Submit an annual report to the President and House of Representative (Section 41) 
 
15. Introduce another taxation to lands in urban areas, if needed (Section 43) 
 








Community Organizers Multiversity [COM] 
Community Organization of the Philippine Enterprise Foundation [COPE] 
Gawad Kalinga [GK]  
Homeless People Federation of the Philippines [HPFP] 
SAMA-SAMA 
Technical Assistance Organization [TAO-Pilipinas]  
Urban Poor Associates [UPA] 
 
<International Agency> 




Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] 
National Housing Authority [NHA] 
 
<Community> 
Buayang Bato community 
Delpan community 
Golden Shower community 
Kasiglahan Village I 
KAMASACA association 
787 Quezon Avenue Neighborhood Association 
13th Neighborhood Association 
 
<Academics> 
Dr. Mary Anne Karaos 
Dr. Emma Porio 
Dr. Ma Laordes G. Rebullida 
Prof. Ernesto Setote 
Dr. Gavin Shatkin 



















1. Pangalan, edad, kasarian, at probinsya ng padre de pamilya (your name, age, sex, and 
hometown).  
 
2. Kung dito na kayo pinanganak sa lugar na tinitirhan niyo, pakisabi kung saan galing ang 
pamilya ninyo (If you are second or third generations in this settlement, please tell where 
your family from). 
 
3. Paki-lista po ang lahat ng nakatira sa pamamahay ninyo (kabilang po kayo). 
(Please fill out the following details of your household member: Name, age, sex, relation 
to you, profession, monthly income) 
 
4. Pakibanggit ang pinakamataas na antas ng pag-aaral na naabot ninyo 
 (Please describe your final education level). 
 
5. Gaano na kayo katagal dito sa Metro Manila? Pakibanggit ang pinakaunang dahilan kung 
bakit ninyo naisipang lumipat sa Manila (How long have you been in Metro Manila? 
Please explain initial reasons that made you decide to move to Manila). 
 
6. Gaano na kayo katagal dito sa lugar na tinitirhan niyo? Bakit dito niyo naisipang lumipat? 
(kung meron pa kayong tinirhan na ibang mga lugar dito sa Metro Manila bago kayo 
lumipat dito, pakibanggit kung saan ang mga ito at kung gaano kayo katagal tumira doon) 
(How long have you been in this settlement? Why did you move to this settlement? If you 
moved in and out more than one time, please indicate the locations and length of stay in 
each settlement). 
 
7. Ilang silid/kwarto ang nasa inyong bahay? Meron po ba kayong mga pasilidad tulad ng 
kusina, palikuran (kung meron, de-buhos ba o de-flush?), at banyo o paliguan? (How many 
rooms are there in your unit? Do you have private facilities such as kitchen, toilet, and 
bathroom?) 
 
8. Saan kayo kumukuha ng tubig at kuryente? Pampubliko ba o pribado ang kinukuhanan 
ninyo? Magkano ang binabayaran niyo bawat buwan para sa tubig? Sa kuryente? (Please 
indicate the types of basic utilities –-water & electricity-- you have now, and please write 
down each providers – public or private- and monthly cost).  
 
9. Anu-ano pong mga gamit sa bahay na de kuryente (appliances) ang meron kayo?  
(Please describe the types of electric appliances that you have) 
 
10. Nangungupahan po ba kayo? ______ Kung oo, magkano ang binabayaran ninyo bawat 
buwan para sa upa? (Are you paying a rent? If so, please tell how much.) 
 
11. Pakilagyan po ng numero ang mga sumusunod na sangkap ng isang pamamahay ayon sa 
pinakamahalaga para sa inyo (1), pangalawang pinakamahalaga (2), pangatlong 
pinakamahalaga (3), pang-apat na pinakamahalaga (4), hanggang sa pinakahuling 
mahalaga (5) (please place the priority to the following five itemss from the most important 
--1-- to the least important --5): 
 
        (   ) Tubig, kuryente, kalsada (Basic utilities facilitated) 
(   ) Pakikitungo sa ibang mga residente (Social relationships with other residents) 
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(   ) Lapit ng bahay sa pinagtatrabahuan, sa sentro ng komersyo (location –  
proximity to worksite, school, and/or the center) 
(   ) Lupa o bahay na may titulo (land or house with title) 
(   ) Kinatatayuan ng bahay (maayos na disenyo at nasa ligtas na lugar) 
(built-environment -- nicely designed unit on a physically-safe site). 
 
12. Humihiram po ba kayo ng pera pag halimbawang kailangan ninyo? _____ Kung oo, 
pakisabi kung kani-kanino kayo humihiram.  
(How do you borrow money in case you need? Please specify the sources of borrowing). 
 
13. Nakakapag-ipon po ba kayo para (questions about savings):  
pambayad sa lupa? ______ Kung oo, mga magkano po ang inyong naiipon?  
(Have you saved money for acquiring tenure?) 
sa pagpapaayos ng bahay? ______  Kung oo, mga magkano po ang inyong naiipon?  
(Have you saved money for implementing housing improvement? If so, how much is the  
amount of your saving?) 
 
14. Naisipan niyo po bang lumipat sa isang pampublikong pabahay o public housing? ______  
(Have you ever considered moving to public housing?) 
Sa isang relocation site? ______ (or relocation sites?) 
Pakipaliwanag po kung bakit oo o hindi ang inyong sagot. (Please explain reasons of Yes  
or No) 
 
15. Meron po bang miyembro ng inyong pamamahay na nakapunta na sa labas ng bansa para 
magtrabaho?  
______ Kung oo, pakisabi kung (Are there any persons in your household who went or  
have been overseas for work? If so, please specify the followings) 
Saan __________ (place/country) 
gaano katagal _____________ (length) 
uri ng trabaho _______________ (types of job) 
buwanang kita/sahod ______________ (monthly income) 
kung magkano ang pinapadala sa inyo bawat buwan _______________  
(amount of remittance(s) per month) 
 
   Saan niyo po ginamit ang padala ng nagtrabaho sa labas?  
(How did or do you use the earning/remittance?) ____________  
   Pakilista po ang mga pinagkagastusan nang malaki gamit ang padala.  
(Please indicate major investments).  
 
   Nakapag-ipon po ba kayo ng perang pinadala ng nagtrabaho sa labas para sa pagpapaayos 
ng inyong bahay? ________ Kung oo, pakibanggit kung  
magkano __________ 
kung anong parte ng bahay ang inayos ___________ 
   (Have you invested a part of the earning/remittance to housing improvement? If yes, please  
write down the use and amount.) 
 
   Meron po bang miyembro ng inyong pamamahay na pupunta pa lang sa labas ng bansa  
para magtrabaho? (Are there any persons in your household who will go overseas for  
work?) 
 
16. Ano’ng uri ng suporta ang inaasahan niyong ibigay ng gobyerno sa inyong pabahay? 
(What kind of support do you expect from the government to you housing?) 
 
 
